Lutali v. Pereira

1 Am. Samoa 2d 58
CourtHigh Court of American Samoa
DecidedSeptember 25, 1981
DocketCR Nos. 44-81, 45-81, and 46-81
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Am. Samoa 2d 58 (Lutali v. Pereira) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering High Court of American Samoa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lutali v. Pereira, 1 Am. Samoa 2d 58 (amsamoa 1981).

Opinion

MURPHY, Associate Justice.

Petitioners A.P. Lutali and Paopaoailua M. Mulitauopele, through their counsel have petitioned this court to issue a criminal information under Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice of the High Court of American Samoa to be brought against the defendants. The question of law before this court can be stated as follows: Can the Chief Justice of the High Court of American Samoa issue a rule under statutory authority that permits a private citizen to institute a prosecution if the Attorney General will not prosecute the case? This court has determined that Rule 15 is invalid and for the reasons given below, we grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 30, 1981 A.P. Lutali and Paopaoailua M. Mulitauopele brought a petition under High Court Rule 15 to issue a criminal information against Joseph M. Pereira, Aleki Sene and Ace Tago. This petition alleged that on October 30, 1980 these defendnats, in violation of Title 3, section 1511 of the American Samoa Code (1973 Edition) did use their public office to influence the election of a political candidate. Lutali then sought an investigation and ensuing information from the Attorney General. The Attorney General refused to file an information against defendants.

Under authority of the provisions of High Court Rule 15, A.P. Lutali and Paopaoailua M. Mulitauopele have petitioned this court to issue a criminal information, as the Attorney General has specifically refused to prosecute the case.

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES TO TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS

vc -it

In an unincorporated territory there is a rebuttable presumption [59]*59favoring the appliation of the constitution which may be overcome by proof that the application of a specific provision in that territory would be impractical or anomalous. It is established that where the right is crucial to the individual, the territory has a heavy burden to justify non-application. Constitutional protections may not be defeated by mere inconvenience or expediency. See Laughlin, The Application of the Constitution in United States Territories; American Samoa, A. Case Study, 2 U. Haw. L. Rev. 313 (1980). The Appellate Division of the High Court of American Samoa, in Craddick vs. Territorial Registrar, AP No. 010-79 (1980), stated: "(T)he constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection are fundamental rights which do apply in the Territory of American Samoa."

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF SEPARATION OF POWER

One of the aspects of the United States Constitution that the framers of the Samoan Constitution incorporated was that of separation of powers. Rev. Const, of Am. Samoa, art. II, art. Ill, art. IV. The importance of the tripartite structure is well established in cases arising in the United States. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Laisne v. Cal State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal 2d 831, 123 P.2d 457 (1942). The American Samoan people incorporated this framework into their constitution and underscored its importance, since the U.S. Constitution does not impose the doctrine of separation of powers upon the states. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974).

In performing judicial functions, the courts must be careful to keep within the constitutional limits of their own powers and to proceed by due process of law. Dillman vs. Tedder, 123 Fla. 188, 166 So. 590 ( ). The guarantee of a judiciary separate from the executive branch is necessary and appropriate.

The Constitutioon specifies a separate judiciary. Revised Constitution of American Samoa, articles II, III, and IV. In maintaining its separate identity, the judiciary should cautiously abstain from an invasion or usurpation of the powers' which are properly exercisable by any other departments of the government. State ex rel. Davis vs. Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1939).

AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TO PROSECUTE LIES WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The Revised Constitution of American Samoa is modelled after .the federal constitution. By article 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution, the government is divided into three departments and it is provided that "the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judiciary shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them..." (emphasis added).

*35* *3í- *3£*

The prosecutorial duties in this territory have been vested in the office of the Attorny General. "All criminal prosecution shall be brought in the name of the Government of American Samoa. The Attorney General shall prosecute all criminal cases before the High Court." Section 46.1220, . ASC (1963). Although there is no law in this territory on this specific . issue we are persuaded by the rationale of the court in Kansas v. Galen Finch, 128 Kan 665, 280 P. 910, 911 (1929), which stated: "[A]s a rule, the attorney [60]*60general has power both under the common law and by statute to make any disposition of the state’s litigation that he deems for its best interests, for instance, he may abandon, discontinue, dismiss, or compromise it." In U.S. vs. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, the Fifth Circuit stated that "the Attorney for the United States is an executive officer of the executive department that exercises discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in' a particular case."

In a more recent case, the Second Circuit stated guidelines for the federal and state courts which can serve as a model for our territorial court. Quoting Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (1973): "Substitution of a court's decision to compel prosecution for the United States Attorney’s decision not to prosecute, even on an abuse of discretion standard even if limited to directing that prosecution be undertaken in good faith, would be unwise." Id. at 380-81. "Federal Courts have traditionally and, to our knowledge, uniformly refrained from overturning, at the instance of a private person, discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not to prosecute persons regarding whom a complaint of criminal conduct is made." Id. at 379. Judicial regulation of prosecutorial discretion "would place the reviewing court in' an undesirable and injudicious posture of becoming superprosecutors." Ibid.

REVIEWABILITY OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

* * *

In almost every jurisdiction, there have been numerous attempts to employ a writ of mandamus issued by the judiciary to compel an executive to act. This remedy has obvious problems inherent in it, due to the separation of powers doctrine. The courts are always reluctant to award or sustain a writ of mandamus against an executive officer. Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U.S. 174 (1917). All courts agree that the separation of powers doctrine was to insure a system of checks and balances.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bolln v. Nebraska
176 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1900)
Crowley v. United States
194 U.S. 461 (Supreme Court, 1904)
Jordan v. Massachusetts
225 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court, 1912)
Lane v. Hoglund
244 U.S. 174 (Supreme Court, 1917)
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles
331 U.S. 549 (Supreme Court, 1947)
United States v. Michael Byron Welch
572 F.2d 1359 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)
Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry
123 P.2d 457 (California Supreme Court, 1942)
In Re Berman
287 P. 373 (California Court of Appeal, 1930)
Bryant & Chapman Co. v. Lowell
27 A.2d 637 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1942)
State Ex Rel. Dillman v. Tedder
166 So. 590 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1936)
State of Florida Ex Rel. Davis v. City of Stuart
120 So. 335 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1929)
State Ex Rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District
166 N.E. 407 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1929)
Blalock v. Johnston, Governor
185 S.E. 51 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1936)
State v. Finch
280 P. 910 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1929)
State ex rel. Burnquist v. District Court Second Judicial District
168 N.W. 634 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1918)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1 Am. Samoa 2d 58, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lutali-v-pereira-amsamoa-1981.