Lurns v. Russell Corp.

604 F. Supp. 1335, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 949, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21431
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedDecember 6, 1984
DocketCiv. A. 79-113-E
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 604 F. Supp. 1335 (Lurns v. Russell Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lurns v. Russell Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1335, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 949, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21431 (M.D. Ala. 1984).

Opinion

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

This class action lawsuit challenging racial discrimination in employment is before the court on the parties’ joint request for approval of a consent decree. For reasons that follow, the court is of the opinion that the consent decree should be approved. *

I.

Over five years ago, present and former black employees of Russell Corporation brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17 (otherwise known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended) and 42 U.S.C.A. *1336 § 1981, alleging race discrimination in a wide range of the company’s employment practices in Tallapoosa County, Alabama. The court certified this as a class action on June 24, 1983. Thereafter, the court learned that the parties had reached a settlement and ordered that they submit the necessary papers.

In early September 1984, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree fully settling all matters of dispute, except the claims of two of the named plaintiffs. The two named plaintiffs opted out of the settlement and their individual claims are set for trial at a later date. The court preliminarily approved the consent decree, pending notice of the proposed settlement to the plaintiff class members and a hearing in this court regarding any objections to the decree.

The parties published notice of the terms of the settlement in the local newspaper and they posted such notice throughout the company mills in Tallapoosa County. The plaintiffs’ counsel also conducted an open meeting for all class members to review the consent decree. Several hundred attended this meeting.

On November 30, 1984, the court held a hearing to consider any objections to the proposed consent decree. Two objections were presented. The first objection, adopted in writing by thirty-six plaintiff class members, concerned the decree’s provision for posting of notices of job openings in Russell Corporation’s mills where class members are employed. Those objecting wished notices to be posted at all mills, not just at the central personnel office and where a given job was available, as the decree provides. The second objection, presented by one plaintiff class member, challenged many if not all of the decree’s provisions. The objector considered inadequate the amount of backpay to be distributed to class members. He also contended that Russell Corporation’s undertakings to assist black-owned banks, businesses and insurance companies were insufficient and asserted that the company should provide scholarships without the compulsion of the decree.

II.

Courts have stated many times that voluntary settlement is the preferred means of resolving class action employment discrimination disputes. See, e.g., Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1147 (11th Cir.1983); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1215 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115, 99 S.Ct. 1020, 59 L.Ed.2d 74 (1979). However, it is also well recognized that the class action “settlement process is more susceptible than adversarial adjudications to certain types of abuse. The interests of lawyer and class may diverge, as may the interest of different members of the class, and certain interests may be wrongfully compromised, betrayed, or ‘sold out’ without drawing the attention of the court.” Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1169. Therefore, the “[pjroponents of class action settlements bear the burden of developing a record demonstrating that the settlement distribution is fair, reasonable and adequate.” Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1147.

In assessing the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of a proposed settlement, a court should consider many factors. Among these is whether the settlement favors one or more named plaintiffs or any other identifiable minority of the plaintiff class. Although there is no rule that a settlement benefit all class members equally, a disparate distribution favoring the named plaintiffs or some minority within the class requires that the court carefully scrutinize whether the settlement on the whole is fair to all members. Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1148. In the present case, two of the named plaintiffs have been allowed to opt out of the settlement, and,a third is to receive $2000 in full settlement of all his claims against the company. None of these three named plaintiffs has a present job with the company. The difference in treatment of these three named plaintiffs does not warrant disapproval of the settlement.

Difference in treatment may be proper as long as it is based on legitimate considerations. Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1148. *1337 Such considerations are present here. The proposed consent decree provides for broad and substantial benefits to the class members. These benefits include, among other things, a backpay fund, scholarships, a minority vendor program, and substantially increased opportunities for hiring, training, transfer, and promotion. The two named plaintiffs who opted out have decided to run the risk of litigation rather than receive the certain benefits of settlement; and the third named plaintiff has given up his claim of a job in return for a sum certain. But more importantly, it is apparent from the actions of the plaintiff class members that these three named plaintiffs are not receiving unfair favor. None of the plaintiff class members has objected to or sought treatment similar to what the three named plaintiffs are to receive.

Another factor to be considered in assessing the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the settlement is the number of objectors. Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1215. Clearly, only a very small percentage in the present case has objected to the consent decree. Since their objections do not concern the allocation of settlement benefits among class members, “[t]he decision to approve this settlement thus may appropriately be described as an intrinsically ‘class’ decision in which majority sentiments should be given great weight.” Id. at 1217.

A court should also consider “the judgment of experienced counsel for the parties.” Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1215. Counsel here are well acquainted with this litigation, having pursued lengthy settlement negotiations, as well as detailed discovery. They have conducted a hearing on class certification and prepared for trial. They are also experienced with other class-action litigation of this kind. The court thus credits their joint representation that the consent decree constitutes a fair and reasonable outcome of this lawsuit.

Finally, the court should consider the nature and scope of the objections filed. Here, if the company were to meet the needs of those objecting, the members of the plaintiff class would receive more benefits. However, the essence of settlement is compromise.

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Bluebook (online)
604 F. Supp. 1335, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 949, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lurns-v-russell-corp-almd-1984.