Luring v. Midland Mortgage Co. (In re White)

465 B.R. 146
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 28, 2012
DocketBankruptcy No. 11-32695; Adversary No. 11-3312
StatusPublished

This text of 465 B.R. 146 (Luring v. Midland Mortgage Co. (In re White)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luring v. Midland Mortgage Co. (In re White), 465 B.R. 146 (Ohio 2012).

Opinion

Decision Denying the Chapter 7 Trustee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Midland Mortgage Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment

GUY R. HUMPHREY, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. Introduction

The Chapter 7 trustee seeks to avoid a mortgage encumbering property of this bankruptcy estate because of the manner [147]*147in which the acknowledgment clause was certified by the notary public. The trustee argues that the certification of the mortgagors’ acknowledgment of their signatures upon the mortgage is not in substantial compliance with Ohio law because the notary’s name is not typed, printed, or stamped on the acknowledgment. The only placement of the notary’s name on the acknowledgment is through an illegible signature. The court finds that the notary’s illegible signature on the acknowledgment is sufficient to comply with Ohio law.

II. Procedural Background

On September 2, 2011 the Chapter 7 trustee, Roger E. Luring (the “Trustee”), filed a complaint to avoid a mortgage held by Midland Mortgage Company (“Midland”) on the debtor’s residence (doc. 1). The complaint seeks to avoid Midland’s mortgage and recover the value of the property for the bankruptcy estate. Midland filed an answer on October 28, 2011 (doc. 14). On December 2, 2011 the Trustee moved for summary judgment against Midland (doc. 27). Midland responded and filed its own motion for summary judgment (doc. 84) and the Trustee responded to that motion (doc. 35). The Trustee originally pled in his complaint that the notarial seal was omitted, but later stipulated that the acknowledgment clause in question does have a notarial seal (doc. 36).

The relevant facts are undisputed. The Debtors, Charles Michael White and Robin Marie White (the “Whites”), own real property located at 606 Second Street in Piqua, Ohio (the “Property”). Midland is the current holder of a loan obligation undertaken by the Whites. The loan is secured by an open-end mortgage the Whites granted which created a lien against the Property in favor of Midland (the “Mortgage”). The Mortgage was recorded in Volume 1283, Page 279 on April 26, 2002 in the records of Miami County, Ohio. The Mortgage was originally held by First Choice Mortgage Corporation prior to the assignment of the secured obligation to Midland. On page 7 of the Mortgage, the Whites executed the Mortgage, and the acknowledgment clause appears immediately below the Whites’ signatures. The acknowledgment clause is as follows:

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[148]*148III. Jurisdiction

This court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and this is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (F), (K) and (0).

IV. Analysis

A Chapter 7 trustee may avoid certain defectively executed mortgages and recover the property or its value for the benefit of the estate’s creditors using the trustee’s “strong arm powers” under Bankruptcy Code § 544.1 See Rieser v. Fifth Third, Mtge. Co. (In re Wahl), 407 B.R. 883, 892-94 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2009). A mortgage granted upon Ohio real estate may be avoided by the trustee when the mortgage is not executed in substantial compliance with Ohio law. Noland v. Burns (In re Burns), 435 B.R. 503, 511-12 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2010) (discussion of Ohio law regarding defectively executed acknowledgment clauses and the doctrine of substantial compliance). A mortgage not executed in substantial compliance with Ohio law is not entitled to be recorded. Id. at 508. If such a mortgage is recorded, it is treated as though it had not been recorded. Id.

The motions for summary judgment require the court to determine whether the Mortgage’s acknowledgment clause is in substantial compliance with the requirement that the mortgagors’ acknowledgment be certified by a notary public or other proper public official. Absent a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court of Ohio on the issue raised by the parties — in this case whether the illegible signature of the notary is sufficient by itself to comply with Ohio law — this court must make the best prediction of what Ohio’s highest court would do if confronted with this issue. Hazlett v. Chase Home Fin. (In re Nowak), 414 B.R. 269, 275-76 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2009).

The Trustee argues the certification was not in substantial compliance because the name of the notary was not printed on the seal or separately printed, typed, or stamped legibly upon the certification as described in Ohio Revised Code § 147.04. Even if a notary’s signature was sufficient, the Trustee further asserts this particular signature is not because it appears to be illegible. Finally, the Trustee states extrinsic evidence cannot be used to prove that the signatory is a notary. Midland argues that all of the issues and arguments raised by the Trustee in this proceeding were addressed adversely to the trustee in the recently reported decision of Stubbins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (In re Sunnafrank), 456 B.R. 885 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2011) (Preston, J.) and that its reasoning should be followed.

Ohio Revised Code § 5301.01(A) sets forth the requirements for the proper execution of instruments conveying interests in real estate in Ohio. It states that:

A deed, mortgage, land contract as referred to in division (A)(2)(b) of section 317.08 of the Revised Code, or lease of any interest in real property and a memorandum of trust as described in division (A) of section 5301.255 of the Revised Code shall be signed by the grantor, mortgagor, vendor, or lessor in the case of a deed, mortgage, land contract, or lease or shall be signed by the trustee in the case of a memorandum of trust. The signing shall be acknowledged by the grantor, mortgagor, vendor, or lessor, or by the trustee, before a judge or clerk of a court of record in this state, or a county auditor, county engineer, nota[149]*149ry public, or mayor, who shall certify the acknowledgement and subscribe the official’s name to the certificate of the ac-knowledgement.

As this statute makes clear, the acknowledgment clause must include an execution of the certificate by a proper officer. Id. at 890, citing Mid-American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Gymnastics Int’l, Inc., 6 Ohio App.3d 11, 451 N.E.2d 1243, 1244 (1982). The individual authorized to certify the acknowledgment must “subscribe” his name to the certificate. Fund Comm’rs of Muskingum County v. Glass, 17 Ohio 542, 544-45 (1848); Sunnafrank, 456 B.R. at 892. Thus, the issue presented in this proceeding relating to the Mortgage is what “subscribe the official’s name to the certificate” means in Ohio Revised Code § 5301.01(A).

The Trustee argues that “subscribe” one’s name in § 5301.01(A) means to print, stamp, or type one’s name on the acknowledgment. There is some support for this position.

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Related

Noland v. Burns (In Re Burns)
435 B.R. 503 (S.D. Ohio, 2010)
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandy
690 N.E.2d 1280 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1998)
Lessee of Johnston v. Haines
2 Ohio 55 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1825)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
465 B.R. 146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luring-v-midland-mortgage-co-in-re-white-ohsb-2012.