Lupton v. American Fidelity Assurance Co.

22 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68985, 2014 WL 2112688
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedMay 20, 2014
DocketCase No. CIV-13-1068-M
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 22 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (Lupton v. American Fidelity Assurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lupton v. American Fidelity Assurance Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68985, 2014 WL 2112688 (W.D. Okla. 2014).

Opinion

ORDER

VICKI MILES-LaGRANGE, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant American Fidelity Assurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, For a More Definite Statement, filed November 18, 2013. On December 9, 2013, plaintiff responded, and on December 16, 2013, defendant replied. Based on the parties’ submissions, the Court makes its determination.

I. Background

Plaintiff, a Caucasian male over 50 years of age, was employed continuously with defendant from on or about June 1, 1983, until he was terminated on or about January 24, 2013. Plaintiff filed this action on October 7, 2013, alleging employment discrimination due to race, gender, and age in violation of federal and state laws including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (“ADEA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 25, §§ 1101 et seq. (“OADA”).

II. Standard for Dismissal

Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the United States Supreme Court has held:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not shown— that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] [1192]*1192pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir.2012). Finally, “[a] court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiffs factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.1991).

III. Discussion

Under Title VII,

It is unlawful to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)) (internal quotations omitted). Further under the OADA,

A. It is a discriminatory practice for an employer:

1. To fail or refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, privileges or responsibilities of employment, because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, genetic information or disability,

Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1302(A)(1). Lastly, under the ADEA,

It shall be unlawful for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age;....

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).

Plaintiff alleges that the reasons for his termination were pretextual and the real reasons were discrimination based on age, gender, and plaintiffs association with and support of hiring African-American employees. Compl. ¶ 17. Defendant asserts that “none of plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to nudge his claims across the fine from ‘conceivable to plausible’ and, therefore, should be dismissed.” Mtn. to Dis. at 4.

A Gender Discrimination

The McDonnell Douglas framework is applied in Title VII discrimination cases and requires plaintiff to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, (3) he was, qualified for the position at issue, and (4) he was treated less favorably than others not in the protected class. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192. However, in a situation such as the case at bar, where plaintiff is a not a member of a traditionally protected class, the Tenth Circuit has found that

[A] plaintiff who presents direct evidence of discrimination, or indirect evidence'sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that but for the plaintiffs status the challenged employment decision would have favored the plaintiff states a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under Title VII.

Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir.1992). As stated in Khalik, a plaintiff is not required to make [1193]*1193out a prima facie case to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but setting forth the elements in the Complaint helps the Court determine if plaintiff has a plausible claim. The Tenth Circuit further stated in Khalik

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22 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68985, 2014 WL 2112688, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lupton-v-american-fidelity-assurance-co-okwd-2014.