Lunsford v. Asheville Manufacturing Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Lunsford v. Asheville Manufacturing Co.

146 S.E. 129, 196 N.C. 510, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 31

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedJanuary 16, 1929

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 146 S.E. 129 (Lunsford v. Asheville Manufacturing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lunsford v. Asheville Manufacturing Co., 146 S.E. 129, 196 N.C. 510, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 31 (N.C. 1929).

Pincite

Opinion

BeogdeN, J.

The evidence discloses that the plaintiff stepped in front of a heavily loaded moving truck of lumber and attempted to hold it by placing his back against it, and, as a result thereof, received the injury complained of. There is no evidence that he was directed to move the truck or to stop the truck in any such manner, or that such method of stopping the truck was in use about the plant. Therefore, as we interpret the record, the plaintiff deliberately and voluntarily chose a highly dangerous method of stopping the truck.

“When contributory negligence appears from the plaintiff’s evidence, a nonsuit is properly granted, but not when such evidence is from the defendant.” Nowell v. Baswight, 185 N. C., 142, 116 S. E., 87. And when a person sui juris knows of a dangerous condition and voluntarily goes into a place of danger, he is guilty of contributory negligence which will bar recovery. Royster v. R. R., 147 N. C., 347, 61 S. E., 179; Fulghum v. R. R., 158 N. C., 555, 74 S. E., 584.

There was evidence on behalf of plaintiff tending to show that the walkway was in a defective condition, but the plaintiff’s negligence, in order to bar recovery, need not be the sole proximate cause of the injury, for this would exclude the idea of negligence on the part of defendant. It is sufficient if his negligence is a cause, or one of the causes without *512 which the injury would not have occurred. Construction Co. v. R. R., 184 N. C., 179, 113 S. E., 672; Fulcher v. Lumber Co., 191 N. C., 408, 132 S. E., 9; Weston v. R. R., 194 N. C., 210, 139 S. E., 237; Elder v. R. R., 194 N. C., 617, 140 S. E., 298.

Certainly the injury to plaintiff could not have occurred had he not voluntarily placed himself upon the track in front of a moving truck, pressing his back against it in an attempt to hold it. Under the well established principles of law pertinent to such a state of facts, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and the motion for nonsuit duly made should have been granted.

Reversed.

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BeogdeN, J.

The evidence discloses that the plaintiff stepped in front of a heavily loaded moving truck of lumber and attempted to hold it by placing his back against it, and, as a result thereof, received the injury complained of. There is no evidence that he was directed to move the truck or to stop the truck in any such manner, or that such method of stopping the truck was in use about the plant. Therefore, as we interpret the record, the plaintiff deliberately and voluntarily chose a highly dangerous method of stopping the truck.

“When contributory negligence appears from the plaintiff’s evidence, a nonsuit is properly granted, but not when such evidence is from the defendant.” Nowell v. Baswight, 185 N. C., 142, 116 S. E., 87. And when a person sui juris knows of a dangerous condition and voluntarily goes into a place of danger, he is guilty of contributory negligence which will bar recovery. Royster v. R. R., 147 N. C., 347, 61 S. E., 179; Fulghum v. R. R., 158 N. C., 555, 74 S. E., 584.

There was evidence on behalf of plaintiff tending to show that the walkway was in a defective condition, but the plaintiff’s negligence, in order to bar recovery, need not be the sole proximate cause of the injury, for this would exclude the idea of negligence on the part of defendant. It is sufficient if his negligence is a cause, or one of the causes without *512 which the injury would not have occurred. Construction Co. v. R. R., 184 N. C., 179, 113 S. E., 672; Fulcher v. Lumber Co., 191 N. C., 408, 132 S. E., 9; Weston v. R. R., 194 N. C., 210, 139 S. E., 237; Elder v. R. R., 194 N. C., 617, 140 S. E., 298.

Certainly the injury to plaintiff could not have occurred had he not voluntarily placed himself upon the track in front of a moving truck, pressing his back against it in an attempt to hold it. Under the well established principles of law pertinent to such a state of facts, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and the motion for nonsuit duly made should have been granted.

Reversed.

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146 S.E. 129, 196 N.C. 510, 1929 N.C. LEXIS 31, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lunsford-v-asheville-manufacturing-co-nc-1929.

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