Lundy v. Lundy

81 S.E. 129, 141 Ga. 387, 1914 Ga. LEXIS 214
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 23, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 81 S.E. 129 (Lundy v. Lundy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lundy v. Lundy, 81 S.E. 129, 141 Ga. 387, 1914 Ga. LEXIS 214 (Ga. 1914).

Opinion

Hill, J.

Where heirs of a decedent seek by equitable proceedings to set aside a purchase by the administrator at his own sale of land belonging to the estate, and where the element of time during which they have delayed to bring such action is controlling, by former rulings of this court it has been declared that, in the absence of special circumstances modifying the rule, it will be declared as matter of law that a delay to bring such action for more than seven years will operate as a bar as to those who are sui juris. Candler v. Clarke, 90 Ga. 550, 557 (16 S. E. 545); Word v. Davis, 107 Ga. 780 (33 S. E. 691); Griffin v. Stephens, 119 Ga. 138 (46 S. E. 66).

[388]*388February 23, 1914. Equitable petition. Before Judge James B. Park. Greene superior court. January 31, 1913. George A. Merritt and Joseph, P. Brown, for plaintiffs. Samuel H. Sibley, for defendants.

(а) Whether'or not under the facts of a particular case the heirs may be found as matter of fact to be barred by laches, if they have delayed to bring such a suit for a time less than seven years, is not now in question.

(б) In the present case the proceeding to set aside the purchase by the administrator at his own sale was not instituted until twenty-six years after the sale. The petition contained no allegations of fraud or concealment, or the like, which would suffice to prevent the general rule above announced from applying.

(c) One of the plaintiffs became of age within less than seven years before the commencement of the action; and it can not be declared as matter of law that the allegations of the petition show that he delayed for an unreasonable time in bringing the action. Accordingly, as to him it was erroneous to sustain a demurrer based on that ground.

(d) In accordance with the preceding headnotes, the judgment is affirmed so far as it dismissed the action as to all of the plaintiffs except the one last above mentioned, and reversed so far as it sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action as to him.

Judgment affirmed in part, and reversed m part.

All the Justices coneur.

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Related

Hadaway v. Hadaway
14 S.E.2d 874 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1941)
Thomas v. Couch
156 S.E. 206 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1930)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
81 S.E. 129, 141 Ga. 387, 1914 Ga. LEXIS 214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lundy-v-lundy-ga-1914.