Lundell Earlest Buchanan v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 23-1610
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1610 Filed January 23, 2025

LUNDELL EARLEST BUCHANAN, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady,

Judge.

An applicant for postconviction relief appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his application. AFFIRMED.

William Monroe, Burlington, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

Lundell Buchanan was driving a vehicle when a law enforcement officer

initiated a traffic stop. After stopping his vehicle, Buchanan got out and began

arguing with the officer. As the officer tried to get Buchanan to stop putting his

hands in his pockets and explain the reason for the stop, Buchanan twisted away

from the officer and took off running. He was eventually caught and charged with

five crimes: (1) possession of cocaine (third offense); (2) possession of marijuana

(third offense); (3) operating while intoxicated (third offense); (4) driving while

revoked; and (5) interference with official acts. A jury found him guilty on counts

two through five but was unable to reach a verdict on count one. Buchanan was

sentenced for the four crimes for which he was convicted.

Buchanan later filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR).1 After a

trial, the district court denied the application. Buchanan appeals. He contends the

district court erred by (1) excluding his telephone testimony at the PCR trial and

(2) finding that his trial counsel were not ineffective by failing to file a motion to

suppress challenging the traffic stop.

I. Exclusion of Telephonic Testimony

We find it unnecessary to address Buchanan’s challenge to the court’s

decision to exclude his telephonic testimony at the PCR trial. His testimony is in

the record as an offer of proof. After reviewing that testimony, we conclude it has

1 Buchanan filed a direct appeal from his convictions, and this court ordered a

limited remand. See generally State v. Buchanan, No. 17-1713, 2018 WL 6120044 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018). After the issue on remand was resolved adverse to Buchanan, he appealed again but voluntarily dismissed that appeal. The details of the original appeal and remand are not relevant to the issues in this PCR appeal, so we do not discuss them. 3

no impact on the outcome of Buchanan’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—

the only claim Buchanan raises on appeal apart from his challenge to the exclusion

of the testimony. Because his testimony has no impact on the outcome of the only

substantive claim Buchanan raises, any error is harmless—even if we assumed

for argument’s sake that Buchanan preserved error on this issue and the evidence

was wrongly excluded. See Iowa R. of Evid. 5.103(a) (explaining that “[a] party

may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a

substantial right of the party” and other conditions are met).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prevail on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Buchanan must

prove that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice

resulted. State v. Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Iowa 2020). “To prove counsel

failed to perform an essential duty, the [applicant] ‘must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient,’ meaning counsel ‘made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [applicant] by the Sixth

Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88

(1984)). Because Buchanan raises a constitutional claim based on ineffective

assistance of counsel, our review is de novo. See Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723,

727 (Iowa 2017).

Buchanan had three different attorneys during the district court

proceedings. He contends all three were ineffective for failing to file a motion to

suppress challenging the legality of the stop of his vehicle. He contends the stop

was racially motivated and there was no legal basis for the stop, so counsel was

ineffective for not challenging it. 4

In reaching the conclusion that Buchanan’s lawyers were not ineffective, the

PCR court identified multiple reasons why the stop was valid and the subsequent

searches were permissible, which would have made a motion to suppress futile.

While all reasons identified by the PCR court may be valid, we choose to focus on

one—Buchanan’s failure to drive on the right-hand side of the roadway. We

choose to focus on this reason because it is the one most clearly established by

the objective evidence of a dashcam video without the need to rely on the

testimony of the officer or Buchanan.

While the officer started following Buchanan for other claimed traffic

violations, as the officer followed Buchanan, the officer’s dashcam video shows

Buchanan driving on the left-hand side of the street. Iowa Code

section 321.297 (2016) requires vehicles to be driven on the right half of the

roadway, with certain exceptions. Buchanan does not argue that any of the

statutory exceptions apply. Instead, he contends that he was not required to drive

on the right-hand side of the street because there was no centerline marking on

that stretch of street where he drove on the left-hand side. But section 321.297’s

directive to drive on the right half of the roadway says nothing about centerline

markings, and it provides no exception for roadways without markings.

The video shows Buchanan clearly driving on the left half of the street.

Buchanan’s actions gave the officer following him reasonable suspicion and

probable cause to believe a violation of section 321.297 occurred, making the

traffic stop permissible. See State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Iowa 2019)

(requiring traffic stops to be reasonable and noting that “a traffic stop is reasonable

when the police have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the 5

motorist violated a traffic law”). As the stop was legal, a motion to suppress

challenging the stop would have been futile, so Buchanan’s lawyers were not

ineffective for failing to file such a motion. See id. at 855 (“Counsel is not burdened

with the duty to raise an issue that has no merit.”).

Before leaving this topic, we find it appropriate to comment on a sub-issue

raised in Buchanan’s appellate brief. He contends there was evidence available

at his criminal trial that the officer who initiated the stop was investigated in another

case for preparing a report of the incident in that case that contradicted video

evidence. Buchanan also contends that, after his criminal trial, the officer was

eventually fired due to the officer’s misconduct in the other case.

The record from Buchanan’s criminal trial shows that his trial counsel

attacked the officer’s credibility with the information that the officer had been

investigated for submitting a report in another case that conflicted with video

evidence. Buchanan does not articulate what more counsel could have done with

the available information or in what way counsel was ineffective. As such, we

cannot discern any avenue for relief for Buchanan based on this issue. We

reiterate, however, that our finding that the officer had probable cause and

reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop for a suspected violation of

section 321.297 is based on the video evidence establishing the violation rather

than the officer’s testimony on the issue.

As we agree with the district court’s determination that Buchanan failed to

prove his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Buchanan’s application for PCR.

AFFIRMED.