Lundeen v. Hackbarth

171 N.W.2d 87, 285 Minn. 7, 1969 Minn. LEXIS 945
Supreme Court of Minnesota·Decided September 19, 1969·No. 41470·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

Peterson, Justice.

Plaintiffs in this negligence action were granted summary judgment against defendant special administratrix of decedent’s estate upon the issue of liability on grounds of estoppel by the verdict against defendant in other litigation arising out of the same injury-producing event. Our disposition of this issue upon appeal is dictated by the anomalous result which collateral estoppel would produce under the unusual facts of the case.

Plaintiffs, Clinton and Mae Lundeen, close friends of Joseph R. and Angeline Breit, were passengers in a new Buick automobile owned and driven by Joseph R. Breit, which was involved in a collision with an older-model Plymouth automobile owned and driven by defendant Vincent Hackbarth. The collision occurred on October 21,1962, at the electrically controlled Broadway-Central intersection in northeast Minneapolis. Successive negligence actions were instituted to recover for personal injuries sustained by the three passengers. The sole question of fact, that of right-of-way, hinged upon an answer to this question: Which driver entered the intersection against the red light? 1

The first action was that of Angeline Breit against defendant Hackbarth and defendant special administratrix of the estate of Joseph R. Breit, who died some time after this accident. Her injuries, apparently less severe than those of the Lundeens, consisted of a broken collarbone and a “gash” in the head that was simply sutured, with total medical and hospital expenses amounting to slightly over $200. Notwithstanding the unequivocal *9 testimony of Angeline Breit and both Lundeens that the light was green in favor of Joseph R. Breit’s right-of-way over Hackbarth, the jury returned a verdict against the special ad-ministratrix, in the amount of $3,850, and exonerated defendant Hackbarth. Hackbarth, as the jury may well have divined, was uninsured. 2

The second action, the subject of this appeal, was that of plaintiffs Clinton and Mae Lundeen against the same defendants, claiming $35,000 in general damages and $1,600 in special damages for medical and hospital expense. The Lundeens could not recover against the special administratrix of Joseph R. Breit if they testified — as they did in the first action — that the light was green for Breit’s right-of-way. 3 The unconscionable result of *10 collateral estoppel would, without taint of perjury, now turn that traffic light from green to red by operation of law.

*11 The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Knutson in McCarty v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 282 Minn. 497, 502,165 N. W. (2d) 548, 551, quoted this pertinent comment of Professor Currie in his article, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 25, 37:

“* * * No legal principle, perhaps least of all the principle of collateral estoppel, should ever be applied to work injustice.”

Collateral estoppel may not be applied to the facts of this case, we hold, because it would work a manifest injustice.

Reversed.

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Lundeen v. Hackbarth, 171 N.W.2d 87, 285 Minn. 7, 1969 Minn. LEXIS 945 (Mich. 1969).

171 N.W.2d 87 (Lundeen v. Hackbarth) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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