Lunardi v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Lunardi v. State

39 So. 3d 364, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 8246, 2010 WL 2326068

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 11, 2010

DocketNo. 5D10-263

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 39 So. 3d 364 (Lunardi v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lunardi v. State, 39 So. 3d 364, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 8246, 2010 WL 2326068 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Anthony J. Lunardi appeals the denial of his motion to correct sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). After he was convicted of robbery with a weapon, Lunardi was sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment as an habitual felony offender and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR).¹ He then filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, contending that he was erroneously sentenced as both an habitual felony offender and a PRR. Although we conclude Lunardi is not entitled to relief, the sentencing documents are confusing and we remand for clarification.

Robbery with a weapon is a first-degree felony punishable by up to thirty years’ imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Because Lunardi was properly classified as an habitual felony offender, the sentence was increased to a maximum of life. § 775.084(4)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2008). Courts are free to impose PRR and habitual offender sentences for a single offense so long as the habitual offender sentence results in a greater sentence. Austin v. State, 968 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). A PRR sentence serves as a minimum mandatory condition of a defendant’s sentence under the habitual offender laws. State v. Manning, 839 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

In this case, the sentencing documents do not clearly specify that Lunardi’s forty-five-year sentence is as an habitual offender, with the first thirty years being served as a PRR. Such confusion might cause the Department of Corrections to miscalculate Lunardi’s release date. As a result, although we affirm the denial of Lunardi’s motion to correct sentence, on remand, the trial court shall enter a corrected judgment as discussed.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CLARIFICATION.

SAWAYA, ORFINGER and COHEN, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Anthony J. Lunardi appeals the denial of his motion to correct sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). After he was convicted of robbery with a weapon, Lunardi was sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment as an habitual felony offender and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR).¹ He then filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, contending that he was erroneously sentenced as both an habitual felony offender and a PRR. Although we conclude Lunardi is not entitled to relief, the sentencing documents are confusing and we remand for clarification.

Robbery with a weapon is a first-degree felony punishable by up to thirty years’ imprisonment. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Because Lunardi was properly classified as an habitual felony offender, the sentence was increased to a maximum of life. § 775.084(4)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2008). Courts are free to impose PRR and habitual offender sentences for a single offense so long as the habitual offender sentence results in a greater sentence. Austin v. State, 968 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). A PRR sentence serves as a minimum mandatory condition of a defendant’s sentence under the habitual offender laws. State v. Manning, 839 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

In this case, the sentencing documents do not clearly specify that Lunardi’s forty-five-year sentence is as an habitual offender, with the first thirty years being served as a PRR. Such confusion might cause the Department of Corrections to miscalculate Lunardi’s release date. As a result, although we affirm the denial of Lunardi’s motion to correct sentence, on remand, the trial court shall enter a corrected judgment as discussed.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CLARIFICATION.

SAWAYA, ORFINGER and COHEN, JJ., concur.

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39 So. 3d 364, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 8246, 2010 WL 2326068, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lunardi-v-state-fladistctapp-2010.

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