Lumech, Inc., Etc. v. Union Venture Trading S.A., Etc.

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-1214
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 5, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-1214 Lower Tribunal No. 22-23716-CA-01 ________________

Lumech, Inc., etc., et al., Appellants,

vs.

Union Venture Trading S.A., etc., Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie Manno Schurr, Judge.

Giasi Law, P.A., Melissa A. Giasi, and Albert A. Zakarian (Tampa), for appellants.

ALGO Law Firm, LLP, and Ignacio M. Alvarez, and Gavin Sinclair, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

MILLER, J. In this garden-variety contract dispute over frozen chicken parts,

appellant, Lumech, Inc., appeals from a final judgment awarding appellee,

Union Venture, damages following a nonjury trial. Lumech raises a myriad

of issues on appeal. Union Venture, in turn, contends we lack jurisdiction to

adjudicate the merits because the appeal is untimely. For the reasons below,

we agree and therefore dismiss.

I

Union Venture executed a contract to purchase frozen chicken feet and

paws from Lumech. Union Venture wired a substantial sum of money, but

Lumech neither delivered the chicken parts nor returned the money. Union

Venture filed a multi-count complaint against Lumech and its Chief Executive

Officer, Rene Gonzalez.

Both Lumech and Gonzalez failed to file any papers, and Union

Venture obtained a clerical default and a default final judgment as to liability.

Some two weeks later, Lumech and Gonzalez moved to vacate the default

and default final judgment. The trial court denied the motion without

prejudice because the motion failed to raise a meritorious defense. Fifty-

nine days after the court denied the motion to vacate, Lumech and Gonzalez

filed a successive motion to vacate and a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

2 matter jurisdiction. Citing the lapse of time, the trial court denied the motion

to vacate.

The parties proceeded to trial. The court suspended the trial to allow

the attorneys to research the application of mitigation of damages in the

context of a default judgment of liability.

Shortly before the trial was slated to reconvene, Lumech and Gonzalez

filed emergency motions for continuance, to vacate the order granting a

nonjury trial, and to quash service of process, or, alternatively, to grant the

motion to vacate the default.

The trial court denied the motion to quash, and Lumech appealed. On

April 6, 2024, the trial court issued written factual findings and entered a final

judgment for damages against Rene Gonzalez; the court, however, reserved

ruling as to Lumech pending the outcome of the appeal. On April 22, 2024,

both Lumech and Gonzalez filed a motion for rehearing.

We later affirmed the denial of the motion to quash, citing collected

cases holding that the failure to raise defects in the service of process at the

first opportunity constitutes a waiver. See Lumech, Inc. v. Union Venture

Trading S.A., 390 So. 3d 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).

3 On June 5, 2024, the trial court once again issued factual findings and

further entered a final judgment against Lumech for breach of contract and

Gonzalez for fraudulent inducement.

On July 8, 2024, Lumech appealed the judgment dated June 5, 2024.

It then filed an amended notice of appeal on the same day, directed at the

judgment dated April 6, 2024. The trial court subsequently denied the motion

for rehearing.

II

The time parameters established for filing an appeal in Florida Rule of

Appellate Procedure 9.110(b) are jurisdictional. See Am. Auto. Ass’n v.

C.D.S. Towing & Recovery, Inc., 805 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).

Consistent with this principle, “[w]here the notice of appeal is not filed within

thirty days of rendition, the appellate court is precluded from exercising

jurisdiction over the appeal.” Id. (citation omitted).

Time computations are governed by the Florida Rules of General

Practice and Judicial Administration. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin.

2.514(a)(1)(A)-(C). When counting time for periods exceeding seven days,

the day of the event triggering counting is excluded. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac.

& Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(A). Every subsequent calendar day is counted,

including weekends and holidays. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin.

4 2.514(a)(1)(B). The rules contemplate one exception—if the last day falls on

a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period ends on the next business

day. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(C).

Here, the April 6, 2024, order was nonfinal, as further judicial labor

remained. In this vein, it was devoid of any words of finality and the trial court

expressly reserved ruling against Lumech. Consequently, the motion for

rehearing did not toll rendition. See Concierge Auctions, LLC v. Coldwell

Banker Residential Real Est., LLC, 394 So. 3d 119, 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).

In contrast, the June 5, 2024, order was final. It entered judgment

against Lumech and ended judicial labor. It was incumbent upon Lumech,

therefore, to appeal within thirty days. The thirtieth day fell on July 5, 2024.

July 5, 2024, was not a state court holiday, nor was it designated by the chief

judge as court holiday. Because Lumech’s notice of appeal and amended

notice of appeal were both filed on July 8, 2024, they were untimely.

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.