Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Schrem

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Schrem

227 A.D.2d 280, 642 N.Y.S.2d 668, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5397

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 21, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 227 A.D.2d 280 (Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Schrem) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Schrem, 227 A.D.2d 280, 642 N.Y.S.2d 668, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5397 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment, denominated an order, Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart Cohen, J.), entered August 22, 1994, which, after a non-jury trial, granted petitioner’s application to permanently stay arbitration, is unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, the petition is denied and the judgment is vacated. Appeal from the order, same court and Justice, entered November 3, 1995, which denied respondent’s motion to vacate the judgment, is dismissed as moot, without costs.

Despite the fact that both parties erroneously relied on the standard, rather than the supplemental insurance policy, which was noted by the IAS Court, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law which can be raised for the first time on appeal (State of New York v U.W. Marx, Inc., (209 AD2d 784). As a result, we may consider the language of both the standard and supplemental policies in determining whether arbitration was properly stayed.

A review of the applicable language reveals that although the standard policy contains a requirement that a sworn statement be provided within 90 days of the occurrence, the uninsured coverage section of the supplemental policy issued to respondent contains no written notification requirement. In view of the ambiguity created by the clauses, it was not necessary for respondent to submit a sworn statement concerning the accident (see, Matter of Empire Ins. Co. v Kaparos, 183 AD2d 566).

Accordingly, the notification to the petitioner of the accident by the respondent and his attorney, in addition to the detailed statement containing a diagram of the accident and the fact that it was "hit and run”, which was forwarded to the petitioner within 90 days of the incident, were sufficient to place the petitioner on notice that respondent was seeking to file an uninsured motorist claim. Concur — Milonas, J. P., Kupferman, Williams and Tom, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Judgment, denominated an order, Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart Cohen, J.), entered August 22, 1994, which, after a non-jury trial, granted petitioner’s application to permanently stay arbitration, is unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, the petition is denied and the judgment is vacated. Appeal from the order, same court and Justice, entered November 3, 1995, which denied respondent’s motion to vacate the judgment, is dismissed as moot, without costs.

Despite the fact that both parties erroneously relied on the standard, rather than the supplemental insurance policy, which was noted by the IAS Court, the interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law which can be raised for the first time on appeal (State of New York v U.W. Marx, Inc., (209 AD2d 784). As a result, we may consider the language of both the standard and supplemental policies in determining whether arbitration was properly stayed.

A review of the applicable language reveals that although the standard policy contains a requirement that a sworn statement be provided within 90 days of the occurrence, the uninsured coverage section of the supplemental policy issued to respondent contains no written notification requirement. In view of the ambiguity created by the clauses, it was not necessary for respondent to submit a sworn statement concerning the accident (see, Matter of Empire Ins. Co. v Kaparos, 183 AD2d 566).

Accordingly, the notification to the petitioner of the accident by the respondent and his attorney, in addition to the detailed statement containing a diagram of the accident and the fact that it was "hit and run”, which was forwarded to the petitioner within 90 days of the incident, were sufficient to place the petitioner on notice that respondent was seeking to file an uninsured motorist claim. Concur — Milonas, J. P., Kupferman, Williams and Tom, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

227 A.D.2d 280, 642 N.Y.S.2d 668, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5397, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lumbermens-mutual-casualty-co-v-schrem-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack