Lumber Co. v. . Power Co.

174 S.E. 427, 206 N.C. 515, 1934 N.C. LEXIS 229
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedMay 2, 1934
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 174 S.E. 427 (Lumber Co. v. . Power Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lumber Co. v. . Power Co., 174 S.E. 427, 206 N.C. 515, 1934 N.C. LEXIS 229 (N.C. 1934).

Opinion

This was an action brought by plaintiff against defendants, to recover damages: (1) For washing a bridge away. (2) For loss of timber that could not be marketed on account of the bridge being washed away. The defendant set up the plea of contributory negligence. The issues presented to the jury and their answer thereto was as follows: "(1) Was the plaintiff's bridge destroyed by the negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes. (2) Did the plaintiff, by its own negligence, contribute to the destruction of said bridge, as alleged *Page 517 in the answer Answer: No. (3) Was plaintiff delayed by reason of the destruction of said bridge in the completion of its timber boundary on Deep Creek and Laurel Branch, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes. (4) What damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover? (a) For the cost and expense of replacing the bridge in question ? Answer: $1,800. (b) For profits lost by reason of the delay caused by the destruction of the bridge? Answer: $6,200."

The court below rendered judgment on the verdict. The defendant made numerous exceptions and assignments of error and appealed to the Supreme Court. The material ones and necessary facts will be set forth in the opinion. At the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, defendant made motions for judgment as in case of nonsuit, C.S., 567. The court below overruled these motions and in this we can see no error.

Is is too well settled in this jurisdiction to cite authorities that on motion to dismiss or judgment as in case of nonsuit, the evidence is to be taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff and he is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment upon the evidence and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. An exception to a motion to dismiss or judgment as in case of nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence and renewed by defendant after the introduction of his own evidence, does not confine the appeal to the plaintiff's evidence alone and a judgment will be sustained for plaintiff if there is any sufficient, competent evidence on the whole record to warrant plaintiff's recovery. The evidence favorable alone to plaintiff is considered. The competency, admissibility and sufficiency of evidence is for the court to determine, the weight, effect and credibility is for the jury.

The allegations in plaintiff's complaint, in part, are as follows: "That on the morning of 3 September, 1928, defendant negligently used and operated its said dam and water gates thereon in such a reckless and imprudent manner and caused and allowed a large, excessive, dangerous and destructive volume of water to be suddenly released and discharged from its said dam with such an excessive and terrific waterhead and current below the dam, filling the channel and covering the territory there below, carrying logs, timber and debris and waste with excessive volume and velocity and force which struck the plaintiff's aforesaid railroad bridge, destroying and washing the same away." *Page 518

The defendant denied this allegation and set up contributory negligence in that: (1) It erected the railroad bridge across the Cheoah River, two or three feet or more below the high water mark. (2) Plaintiff cut logs on the Cheoah River above said bridge and tore down trees and allowed the trees, logs and laps to be in or near the river and at flood or high tide, were carried down the river and lodged against the bridge and the force of the stream against the debris caused the bridge to give way and wash out.

The principle of law involved in this controversy is thus stated in Coulson Forbes on Waters and Land Drainage, 5th Ed., pp. 143 and 144: "The general principle regulating the liabilities of landowners, with regard to the escape and overflow of water, seems to be as follows: Where the owner of the land, without wilfulness or negligence, uses his land in the ordinary manner of its use, though mischief thereby accrues to his neighbor, he will not be liable for damages; but where for his own convenience, he diverts or interferes with the course of a stream, or where he brings upon his land, water which would not naturally have come upon it, even though in so doing, he acts without wilfulness or negligence, he will be liable for all direct and proximate damages, unless he can show that the escape of the water was caused by an agent beyond his control, or by a storm, which amounts to vis major, or the act of God, in the sense that it is practically, if not physically, impossible to resist it." Kelly v. Lett,35 N.C. 50; Comrs. v. Jennings, 181 N.C. 393 (399); Jackson v. Kearns,185 N.C. 417; Winchester v. Byers, 196 N.C. 383.

The jury answered the 1st and 2d issues in favor of plaintiff and assessed the damage at $1,800. The defendant contends that there was no sufficient competent evidence to support the finding of the jury on the 1st issue. We cannot so hold. The evidence on the part of plaintiff was to the effect that the defendant constructed a large concrete dam about 214 feet in height across the Cheoah River in Graham County, North Carolina, known as the "Santeetlah Dam." It closed said dam and obstructed and impounded the waters of the said Cheoah River and its tributaries and above, creating a lake or reservoir of water of great volume and magnitude which has a shore line of about 110 miles and covers an area of about 3,000 acres of land. In the construction of its said dam, the defendant undertook to install or place as a part thereof what it terms as water or flood gates, which gates are movable and can be raised or lowered, obstructing or releasing the waters from the said lake by such action.

There are eight gates on the "Santeetlah Dam," they are 12 feet high and 24 or 25 feet wide. These gates are raised or lowered by hand power, with a worm gear. It requires about 5 minutes to raise *Page 519 one of the gates 12 inches. About 7 1/2 miles below the dam on the Cheoah River, the plaintiff built a bridge about 12 or 14 feet above the ordinary tide in the river and ran trains over it to get lumber from its holdings. The river, at this bridge, is about 150 feet wide. The bridge was 156 feet long and was built 3 1/2 to 7 feet above the high water mark and cost from $2,500 to $3,000. The following are some of the witnesses who testified, in part, for plaintiff. J. C. Crisp: "We went to the yard a short distance below Tapoco, and picked up the train and drove up to Barkers Creek bridge, and we got there between 7 and 8 o'clock. . . . We drove up to the bridge and set the train out on the main line. When we got to the bridge, we could see the water coming up rapidly, and in a few minutes the bridge went out. It broke from the opposite side of the river from where we were, and almost sprung the steel out from under the engine. When we got to the bridge, the water was around the stringers. It was about 2 1/2, or 3 feet from the bottom of the stringers to the top of the bridge. The water rose from 2 to 3 feet in from 5 to 10 minutes, in my opinion: I could see it rising; we had been there only from 5 to 15 minutes before the water was running over the bridge and washed it out. There is no other lake or dam on any of the streams above that bridge other than the Santeetlah Dam. . . . It was not raining that morning. The streams above the dam were up some on Sunday evening, just an ordinary tide. It quit raining Sunday evening about 6 o'clock; if it rained any more during the night, I was asleep and didn't hear it. . . . There was one empty gondola on the bridge, near the east side.

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Bluebook (online)
174 S.E. 427, 206 N.C. 515, 1934 N.C. LEXIS 229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lumber-co-v-power-co-nc-1934.