Luker v. Starcraft Co.

358 N.E.2d 231, 171 Ind. App. 642, 1976 Ind. App. LEXIS 1135
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 30, 1976
DocketNo. 2-1075A280
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 358 N.E.2d 231 (Luker v. Starcraft Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luker v. Starcraft Co., 358 N.E.2d 231, 171 Ind. App. 642, 1976 Ind. App. LEXIS 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

White, J.

The plaintiff-appellant (Luker) asks us to overturn the Board’s dismissal of his application for increased permanent partial impairment filed within two years of his accident but more than one year after the last day for which compensation was paid. Agreeing with the Board that the application was barred by section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, we affirm.

Th¿ facts are not in dispute. Luker sustained an injury by accident on November 21, 1972, for which, pursuant to a [643]*643board approved agreement that bis body as a whole was ten percent impaired permanently, he was paid compensation from and including November 22, 1972, for fifty weeks to and including November 7, 1973. On November 19, 1974, less than two years after the accident but more than one year after the last day for which compensation was paid, he filed his application for increased permanent partial impairment.

The employer filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the Board had no jurisdiction because the application was filed more than one year after the last date for which compensation was paid. The legal basis of that motion is section 45 of the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1929, as amended, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 22-3-3-27 (Burns Code Ed., 1974) which, as amended in 1947, provides a general two-year limitation on applications for modification of awards “except that applications for increased permanent partial impairment are barred unless filed within one year from the last day for which compensation was paid.”1

Plaintiff-appellant Luker contends that since his application was filed within two years after his accident that it is timely by virtue of section 24 of the act, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 22-3-3-3 (Burns Code Ed., 1974), which bars the right to compensation [644]*644under the act “unless within two years after the occurrence of the accident ... a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the industrial board.”2 The basis of that contention is his assertion that the public policy of liberal construction of the act requires sections 24 and 45 to be read together so that employees have no less than two years in which to assert all their claims under the act. He supports that contention by a misinterpretation (1) of a statement in Dean Small’s WORKMENS COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA, § 12.9 at page 403, and (2) of Adams v. I. E. Smith Const. Co. (1930), 91 Ind. App. 529, 171 N.'E. 882.

Prior to 1947 section 24 (Code § 22-3-3-3) barred the right to compensation unless a claim was filed “within two years after the injury.”3 The 1947 amendment4 struck out “injury” and substituted “occurrence of the accident”. This had the effect of shortening the time for filing claims in cases where the injury did not manifest itself at the time of the accident.5 The same 1947 amendment also changed the time limit for modification of awards provided in section 45 (Code § 22-3-3-27)-. Prior to the 1947 amendment the Board’s jurisdiction to make any modification was limited to one year from the termination of the compensation period fixed in the original award.6. -The .amendment doubled that time limit to two years “except that applications for increased permanent par[645]*645tial impairment are barred unless filed within one year from the last day for which compensation was paid.”

Of that 1947 change which doubled the time for filing most applications for modification Dean Small said: “The extension of the time for modifications was undoubtedly made to ameliorate the shortening of time under Section 24 (Burns § 40-1224 [now § 22-3-3-3]) for bringing original applications.”7 Whatever he meant by “ameliorate”,8 it is clear that Dean Small did not mean that the extension of time created by the amendment was any greater than its words expressly state. There is nothing in his language which implies that the legislature did not intend the one-year exception to apply to all claims for increased permanent partial impairment even though such an application could thus be barred though filed within two years from date of accident. In fact, he had already stated “that applications for increased permanent impairment must be filed within one year from the last day for which compensation was paid.”9

The language of the opinion in Adams v. I. E. Smith Construction Co. (1930), 91 Ind. App. 529, 171 N.E. 882, is so lacking in clarity, precision and procedural detail that it invites the misinterpretation of its holding which Luker has borrowed from the editor of Bums Indiana Statutes Annotated, Code Edition, 1974. The editor’s annotation to § 22-3-3-27 (on page 204 of the Title 22 volume) reads:

“An injured employee’s application for adjustment of compensation because of changed conditions filed within [646]*646two years from the date of the injury was filed in time, though time for filing application for review because of change of condition had expired. Adams v. I. E. Smith Constr. Co. (1930), 91 Ind. App. 529, 171 N.E. 882.”

The Adams case involved two applications filed after termination of compensation payments made pursuant to an award by agreement to pay compensation during total disability. One application sought modification of that award so as to give Adams compensation for permanent partial disability which, because of a change in conditions, he alleged had resulted from his injury. The other was an application for an adjudication of an original claim for compensation. It was of this latter application that the Adams opinion spoke in saying: “The application for adjustment of compensation having been filed within two years from date of injury, was filed in time.” As to the modification claim, the court did not hold that it had been timely filed. It held only that the Board was mistaken in assuming “that the application for review because of change in conditions, not having been filed within one year from the date of the receipt in final settlement, was not filed in time, and was barred under § 45 ... .” (91 Ind. App. at 532.) It held that “appellant should have been permitted to introduce evidence as to the circumstances under which the receipt was given and as to when total disability actually terminated in order to fix the time when the period of limitation began to run.” (Id.)

The award is affirmed.

Buchanan, P.J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

Note. — Reported at 358 N.E .2d 231.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
358 N.E.2d 231, 171 Ind. App. 642, 1976 Ind. App. LEXIS 1135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luker-v-starcraft-co-indctapp-1976.