Luke Delahoussaye v. Live Oak Gardens, Ltd.

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 7, 2009
DocketWCA-0009-0246
StatusUnknown

This text of Luke Delahoussaye v. Live Oak Gardens, Ltd. (Luke Delahoussaye v. Live Oak Gardens, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luke Delahoussaye v. Live Oak Gardens, Ltd., (La. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-246

LUKE DELAHOUSSAYE

VERSUS

LIVE OAK GARDENS, LTD.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - DISTRICT 4 PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 07-01305 SHARON MORROW, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

OSWALD A. DECUIR JUDGE

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Oswald A. Decuir, and J. David Painter, Judges.

Cooks, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Michael B. Miller Attorney at Law P. O. Box 1630 Crowley, LA 70527 (337) 785-9500 Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant: Luke Delahoussaye

W. Michael Stemmans M. Todd Alley Michael J. Taffaro Jennifer E. Frederickson Stemmans & Alley 2798 O’Neal Lane, Suite B3 Baton Rouge, LA 70816 (225) 752-5266 Counsel for Defendants-Appellees: Live Oak Gardens, Ltd. Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company DECUIR, Judge.

Luke J. Delahoussaye was a heavy equipment operator with Live Oak Gardens,

Ltd. when he was injured on the job on January 3, 2006. Delahoussaye was paid

compensation benefits until he returned to work but filed this contested claim for

benefits after his employment was terminated in November of 2006. The workers’

compensation judge awarded supplemental earnings benefits, which were subject to

a credit for all business income received by Delahoussaye as a result of his ownership

interest in two local companies. Medical benefits, penalties, and attorney fees were

also awarded. Delahoussaye has appealed the business income credit awarded in

favor of the employer. The employer has neither appealed nor answered the appeal.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

The record reveals the following chronology of events. The workers’

compensation insurer, Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company, paid weekly

indemnity and medical benefits from the time of injury through May 16, 2006. On

that date, the claimant returned to work in a light-duty supervisory position created

for him, earning pre-injury wages and benefits. He worked in that position until

November 16, 2006, when he was terminated by his employer. The evidence in the

record indicates that Live Oak management felt Delahoussaye’s continued

employment was creating morale problems, as Delahoussaye was receiving the same

pay for what was seen by other employees as less work; plus, he occasionally

conducted other business activities solely for his own profit during his work day at

Live Oak. While Delahoussaye’s other business activities did not constitute full-time

employment, the evidence shows that he did occasional work that consisted of

monitoring jobs, making contacts, picking up or hauling supplies, and answering

questions or calls. Upon termination by Live Oak, compensation benefits were not reinstated. The

defendants were aware that Delahoussaye was a one-half owner of J.L.Hydroseeding,

LLC, an erosion control business, and a one-third owner of Southern Innovative

Services, LLC, an excavation and sales business. Live Oak was aware that

Delahoussaye had income from these businesses; indeed, the companies often did

business together and the president of Live Oak, Michael Richard, authorized

Delahoussaye’s involvement in the ventures. However, neither Live Oak nor its

insurer were informed of the amount of that income. Hence, the workers’

compensation judge concluded the defendants “[were] never in a position to even

estimate an amount to tender” as supplemental earnings benefits.

The Workers’ Compensation Act requires injured employees who are receiving

indemnity benefits to report business income monthly by filing a Louisiana

Department of Labor form referred to as Form 1020. The form requires information

on self-employment or involvement in any business enterprise, including “farming,

sales work, operating a business (even if the business lost money), child care, yard

work, mechanical work, or any type of family business.” The worker must describe

the type of business, his job duties, and the amount of income received from the

business. In the instant case, Delahoussaye did not complete any Form 1020s.

The parties do not dispute Delahoussaye’s eligibility for supplemental earnings

benefits, nor do they contest the factual conclusions regarding the award of penalties

and attorney fees. Rather, the question raised in this appeal is whether the trial court

erred in concluding that Delahoussaye’s earnings from his business interests operate

as a credit against any indemnity benefits the defendants might owe after

Delahoussaye’s termination from his modified job at Live Oak. The trial court gave

the following analysis:

2 Business income is to be used in the calculation of supplemental earnings benefits. In Lafleur v. Hartford Insurance Company, 449 So.2d 725 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1984), the employee and his wife opened a sausage kitchen after his injury disabled him from his job of injury. The court found that the lower court had correctly assigned one-half of the business profits of the community business to the employee’s post- injury wage credit. In Caparotti v. Shreveport Pirates Football Club, [33,570 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/23/00), 768 So.2d 186, writ denied, 00-2947 (La. 12/15/00), 777 So.2d 1230], the court specifically held that profits from the claimant’s business would be treated in the same manner as wages for the purpose of calculating supplemental earnings benefits.

In those cases, the claimants became self-employed only after their work injuries. In the present case, Delahoussaye’s businesses existed prior to his injury with Live Oak and continued after his injury. Mr. Delahoussaye’s counsel correctly asserts that under current jurisprudence, the claimant’s business earnings cannot be included in the calculation of the average weekly wage, citing cases including Lott v. Louisiana [Power & Light], 377 So.2d 1277 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1979) and Guillory v. Interstate Hotels [& Resorts, 05-650 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918 So.2d 550.]...

Delahoussaye contends that because the business income cannot be included in the average weekly wage calculation, it cannot be credited against him as post-injury earnings....

While Delahoussaye’s counsel is correct that using income from other employment for the post-injury calculation but not in the calculation of average weekly wage deprives the employee of the maximum protection of his earnings, the Third Circuit already considered that possibility in Lott when it stated that the law, as presently constituted, may, in certain isolated cases, not fully provide for the employee’s loss of earning capacity... . Malone and Johnson also address this concern in the following discussion of the Jones [v. Orleans P. Sch. Bd., 370 So.2d 677 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1979)] case:

However, upon closer examination, the alleged unfairness is less apparent. The Act is not a wage-insurance plan. Rather, it is a legislative scheme intended to insure a basic minimum subsistence to persons now wholly or partially unable to earn their prior wage to work-related injuries. This is apparent when one considers the plight of two injured workers now wholly disabled. Even if one earned $500 per week prior to the injury and the other $1000 per week, they receive precisely the same benefit check: the statutory maximum. The higher-paid worker may argue that this is unfair, and he would be right if the legislative objective were a wage-replacement plan. But the legislative intent is to guarantee basic subsistence levels thought to be reasonable and economically feasible, not to

3 replace wages at pre-injury levels.

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Related

Lott v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.
377 So. 2d 1277 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1979)
Caparotti v. Shreveport Pirates Football Club
768 So. 2d 186 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
LaFleur v. Hartford Ins. Co.
449 So. 2d 725 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1984)
Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd.
370 So. 2d 677 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1979)
Guillory v. Interstate Hotels & Resorts
918 So. 2d 550 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2005)

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Luke Delahoussaye v. Live Oak Gardens, Ltd., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luke-delahoussaye-v-live-oak-gardens-ltd-lactapp-2009.