1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 LUISVIC GABRIEL IBARRAS Case No.: 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP VIZCAINO, 10 ORDER GRANTING PETITION Petitioner, 11 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 12 [Doc. 1] KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as 13 Secretary of the Department of Homeland 14 Security, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Luisvic Gabriel Ibarras Vizcaino’s 18 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 (Doc. 1.) On March 9, 2026, Respondents filed a Response to the Petition (“Response”). 20 (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed a Traverse (“Reply”) on March 13, 2026. (Doc. 5.) For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, was paroled into the United States on 24 December 6, 2024, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 16; see Doc. 5-2, Ex. 2 at 25 2.) 1 Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that same day. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) 26 27 28 1 1 On May 23, 2025, during Petitioner’s third court date, the United States Department 2 of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “moved to terminate proceedings against Petitioner to 3 place him in expedited removal proceedings.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Petitioner was then “detained by 4 ICE officers when he exited the courtroom.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Petitioner alleges that he did not 5 receive notice, information on why he was being re-detained, or an individualized hearing 6 to assess whether his re-detention was warranted due to danger or flight risk. (Id. ¶¶ 20– 7 22.) While in detention, Petitioner received a credible fear interview before an asylum 8 officer “to assess whether he presented a credible fear of return to Venezuela.” (Id. ¶ 23.) 9 On July 17, 2025, after he received a positive credible fear determination, Petitioner 10 was issued a second NTA. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) The second NTA charged Petitioner as 11 removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an “arriving alien” not in possession of 12 valid travel documents. (Id. ¶ 24.) On October 6, 2025, Petitioner filed an asylum 13 application, which remains pending. (Id. ¶ 25.) Since his arrest on May 23, 2025, 14 Petitioner has been detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 20.) 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 17 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 18 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 19 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 20 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 21 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 22 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 23 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 24 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Petitioner claims that Respondents revoked his release on humanitarian parole and 27 re-detained him without notice, a pre-deprivation hearing, or an opportunity to be heard in 28 violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act 1 (“APA”), and the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 37, 40–65.) Respondents contend that 2 “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), because Petitioner was 3 present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) In support, 4 Respondents attempt to incorporate by reference arguments regarding the government’s 5 authority for mandatory detention under § 1225(b) made in similar cases. (See id. at 2–3 6 & n.2.)2 Respondents, however, do not substantively address Petitioner’s due process 7 claims.3 8 This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners 9 who were released from ICE detention on humanitarian parole and later re-detained. In 10 Perez v. LaRose, the Court applied the due process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 11 U.S. 319 (1976) and found that “all three factors support a finding that Respondents' 12 revocation of Petitioner’s parole [under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)] without reasoning or an 13 opportunity to be heard deprived Petitioner of his due process rights.” Case No.: 3:25-cv- 14 02620-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025); see also Faizyan v. 15 Casey, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 16 2025) (reaching the same conclusion as to the revocation of a petitioner’s release on his 17 own recognizance). The Court concluded the petitioner’s detention was unlawful “because 18 19 20 2 “Generally, courts do not allow incorporation by reference of arguments or ‘substantive 21 materials’ not contained within the relevant motions’ briefs.” Flores v. Bennett, 635 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 2022), aff’d, No. 22-16762, 2023 WL 4946605 (9th Cir. 22 Aug. 3, 2023) (collecting cases); see Williams v. Cnty. of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925, 23 947 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (declining to consider arguments plaintiff “improperly [sought] to incorporate by reference”). 24
25 3 Respondents “request[ ] an opportunity to submit [a more formal response] within a reasonable timeframe” (Doc. 3 at 2 n.1), but notably failed to properly request an extension 26 of time. See also Sosa Inzuna v. Warden of Adelanto Det. Facility, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2026 27 WL 233211, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (noting “the current volume of habeas petitions . . . being filed can be attributed to Respondents’ deliberate choice to continue defying the final 28 1 Respondents detained [the petitioner] by revoking his parole in violation of the Due Process 2 Clause.” Perez, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5. 3 The Court reached the same conclusion in Velazquez-Chinga v. Noem, finding the 4 revocation of the petitioner’s parole without an individualized determination or an 5 opportunity to be heard “was neither consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) nor the 6 demands of due process.” Case No.: 3:26-cv-00105-RBM-KSC, 2026 WL 311507, at *3 7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026) (citing Araujo, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2.) As the Court noted, 8 “[d]ue process for parole terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate official on 9 whether the purpose of parole has been served; (2) written notice of the reasons for the 10 termination; and (3) an opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the termination.” Id. 11 (quoting Araujo v. LaRose, No. 25cv2942-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2 (S.D. 12 Cal. Nov. 24, 2025)); see Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164–66 (S.D. Cal. 2025) 13 (analyzing Mathews factors). 14 Like in Perez and Velasquez-Chinga, Petitioner was released from his initial 15 detention on humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Doc. 1 ¶ 2; 16 Doc. 5-2, Ex.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 LUISVIC GABRIEL IBARRAS Case No.: 3:26-cv-01219-RBM-MMP VIZCAINO, 10 ORDER GRANTING PETITION Petitioner, 11 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 12 [Doc. 1] KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as 13 Secretary of the Department of Homeland 14 Security, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Luisvic Gabriel Ibarras Vizcaino’s 18 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 (Doc. 1.) On March 9, 2026, Respondents filed a Response to the Petition (“Response”). 20 (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed a Traverse (“Reply”) on March 13, 2026. (Doc. 5.) For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, was paroled into the United States on 24 December 6, 2024, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 16; see Doc. 5-2, Ex. 2 at 25 2.) 1 Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that same day. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17.) 26 27 28 1 1 On May 23, 2025, during Petitioner’s third court date, the United States Department 2 of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “moved to terminate proceedings against Petitioner to 3 place him in expedited removal proceedings.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Petitioner was then “detained by 4 ICE officers when he exited the courtroom.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Petitioner alleges that he did not 5 receive notice, information on why he was being re-detained, or an individualized hearing 6 to assess whether his re-detention was warranted due to danger or flight risk. (Id. ¶¶ 20– 7 22.) While in detention, Petitioner received a credible fear interview before an asylum 8 officer “to assess whether he presented a credible fear of return to Venezuela.” (Id. ¶ 23.) 9 On July 17, 2025, after he received a positive credible fear determination, Petitioner 10 was issued a second NTA. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) The second NTA charged Petitioner as 11 removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an “arriving alien” not in possession of 12 valid travel documents. (Id. ¶ 24.) On October 6, 2025, Petitioner filed an asylum 13 application, which remains pending. (Id. ¶ 25.) Since his arrest on May 23, 2025, 14 Petitioner has been detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 20.) 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 17 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 18 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 19 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 20 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 21 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 22 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 23 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 24 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Petitioner claims that Respondents revoked his release on humanitarian parole and 27 re-detained him without notice, a pre-deprivation hearing, or an opportunity to be heard in 28 violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act 1 (“APA”), and the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 37, 40–65.) Respondents contend that 2 “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), because Petitioner was 3 present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) In support, 4 Respondents attempt to incorporate by reference arguments regarding the government’s 5 authority for mandatory detention under § 1225(b) made in similar cases. (See id. at 2–3 6 & n.2.)2 Respondents, however, do not substantively address Petitioner’s due process 7 claims.3 8 This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners 9 who were released from ICE detention on humanitarian parole and later re-detained. In 10 Perez v. LaRose, the Court applied the due process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 11 U.S. 319 (1976) and found that “all three factors support a finding that Respondents' 12 revocation of Petitioner’s parole [under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)] without reasoning or an 13 opportunity to be heard deprived Petitioner of his due process rights.” Case No.: 3:25-cv- 14 02620-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025); see also Faizyan v. 15 Casey, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 16 2025) (reaching the same conclusion as to the revocation of a petitioner’s release on his 17 own recognizance). The Court concluded the petitioner’s detention was unlawful “because 18 19 20 2 “Generally, courts do not allow incorporation by reference of arguments or ‘substantive 21 materials’ not contained within the relevant motions’ briefs.” Flores v. Bennett, 635 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 2022), aff’d, No. 22-16762, 2023 WL 4946605 (9th Cir. 22 Aug. 3, 2023) (collecting cases); see Williams v. Cnty. of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925, 23 947 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (declining to consider arguments plaintiff “improperly [sought] to incorporate by reference”). 24
25 3 Respondents “request[ ] an opportunity to submit [a more formal response] within a reasonable timeframe” (Doc. 3 at 2 n.1), but notably failed to properly request an extension 26 of time. See also Sosa Inzuna v. Warden of Adelanto Det. Facility, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2026 27 WL 233211, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (noting “the current volume of habeas petitions . . . being filed can be attributed to Respondents’ deliberate choice to continue defying the final 28 1 Respondents detained [the petitioner] by revoking his parole in violation of the Due Process 2 Clause.” Perez, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5. 3 The Court reached the same conclusion in Velazquez-Chinga v. Noem, finding the 4 revocation of the petitioner’s parole without an individualized determination or an 5 opportunity to be heard “was neither consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) nor the 6 demands of due process.” Case No.: 3:26-cv-00105-RBM-KSC, 2026 WL 311507, at *3 7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026) (citing Araujo, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2.) As the Court noted, 8 “[d]ue process for parole terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate official on 9 whether the purpose of parole has been served; (2) written notice of the reasons for the 10 termination; and (3) an opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the termination.” Id. 11 (quoting Araujo v. LaRose, No. 25cv2942-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2 (S.D. 12 Cal. Nov. 24, 2025)); see Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164–66 (S.D. Cal. 2025) 13 (analyzing Mathews factors). 14 Like in Perez and Velasquez-Chinga, Petitioner was released from his initial 15 detention on humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Doc. 1 ¶ 2; 16 Doc. 5-2, Ex. 2 at 2.) Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner was not provided with an 17 individualized determination or an opportunity to be heard before his parole was 18 terminated. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 22; see generally Doc. 4.) Although Petitioner’s I-94 form 19 shows an “admit until date” of April 18, 2025, (see Doc. 5-2, Ex. 2 at 2), “numerous courts 20 in the Ninth Circuit have found that when a noncitizen is paroled under [8 C.F.R § 212.5], 21 [his] ‘liberty interest does not expire along with [his] parole.’” Velasquez-Chinga, 2026 22 WL 311507, at *3 (quoting D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP (HC), 2026 23 WL 145646, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026)); see Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 24 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the express terms of the [§ 1182] parole notice 25 allowed for discretionary termination or expiration does not somehow obviate the need for 26 the Government to provide [an] individualized hearing prior to re-detaining the parolee.”). 27 The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Perez and Velasquez-Chinga applies it 28 here. For those same reasons, the revocation of Petitioner’s humanitarian parole and his 1 ||subsequent re-detention violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 2 ||rendered his detention unlawful. 3 IV. CONCLUSION‘ 4 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 5 1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 6 subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole and Form I-94. 7 2. Respondents MAY NOT re-detain Petitioner without compliance with 8 C.F.R. 8 § 212.5, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and the Due Process Clause. 9 3. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any such re-detention, Petitioner is entitled to 10 notice of the reasons for revocation of his parole and a hearing before an 11 immigration judge to determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents 12 shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that 13 Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 |}DATE: March 19, 2026 6 Ge tiormads, Mpegs D 7 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 * In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining grounds for relief.