Luis Pilataxi v. Attorney General United States

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedApril 14, 2022
Docket20-1037
StatusUnpublished

This text of Luis Pilataxi v. Attorney General United States (Luis Pilataxi v. Attorney General United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luis Pilataxi v. Attorney General United States, (3d Cir. 2022).

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________

Nos. 20-1037 & 21-1678 _____________

LUIS PILATAXI, Petitioner v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________________________________

On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A215-664-365) Immigration Judge: Jason L. Pope _______________________________________

Argued: March 3, 2022

Before: McKEE, AMBRO, SMITH Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 14, 2022)

Regis Fernandez [Argued] 7 Federal Square Newark, NJ 07102 Counsel for Petitioner

Matthew B. George [Argued] Vanessa M. Otero Dana M. Camilleri United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Respondent

__________________

OPINION* __________________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Luis Pilataxi seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denials of his

motions to remand and reopen. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the BIA’s

decision and deny the petition for review as to his motion to remand, but we will reverse

the BIA’s decision and grant the petition for review as to his motion to reopen.

I.

Petitioner Luis Pilataxi pled guilty to shoplifting in state court in 2004.1 That is a

felony under New Jersey law.2 In 2019, Pilataxi initiated post-conviction proceedings in

the Superior Court of New Jersey to vacate this plea based upon ineffective assistance of

counsel.3 In November 2019, the Superior Court vacated that guilty plea.4 However, the

order granting relief did not state a reason for the vacatur.5

Four months before the vacatur, an immigration judge had found Pilataxi

removable because the shoplifting conviction was categorically a crime involving moral

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 Appx. 156. 2 Appx. 156. 3 Appx. 27–36, 432–33. 4 Appx. 50. 5 See Appx. 50–51. 2 turpitude that rendered Pilataxi ineligible for cancellation of removal.6 Pilataxi appealed

to the BIA and filed a motion to remand.7 The BIA dismissed Pilataxi’s appeal and

denied his remand motion because he failed to show the vacatur was based on a

procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings.8 Pilataxi petitioned for

review of that dismissal.

Pilataxi also moved to reopen so that he could provide more documentation that

would establish that the state court’s vacatur was based on a procedural or substantive

defect in his state court conviction.9 The documentation he submitted included inter alia

the state court order,10 a recommendation for the pretrial intervention program,11 a

transcript of his post-conviction relief hearing,12 and a copy of his legal brief supporting

his request for vacatur of his guilty plea.13 The BIA denied the motion because it

concluded that the basis for vacatur was “not clear from the record.”14 This petition for

review of that decision followed.15 We consolidated review of Pilataxi’s motion to

reopen with our review of his petition for remand.

6 Appx. 151. 7 Appx. 2. 8 Appx. 66. 9 Appx. 12–15. 10 Appx. 71–72. 11 Appx. 79. 12 Appx. 169–200. 13 Appx. 27–36. 14 Appx. 3. 15 Appx. 3. 3 II.16

During oral argument on the consolidated petitions, Pilataxi conceded that the BIA

did not err in denying his motion to remand. We will therefore dismiss his petition for

review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. Thus, the only question before us is

whether the BIA erred in denying Pitataxi’s motion to reopen.

A non-permanent resident with a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude

is not eligible for cancellation of removal.17 A petitioner is no longer so convicted under

the Immigration and Nationality Act if “the conviction was vacated on the basis of a

substantive or procedural defect in the underlying criminal proceedings.”18 The petitioner

has the burden of showing that he or she is no longer convicted for immigration

purposes.19 Where a state court vacates a conviction, the state court record must be

reviewed to determine if the vacatur was based upon a procedural or substantive defect as

opposed to compassion.20

16 The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a), and the BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). Our jurisdiction is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act. We review the denials of motions to reopen and remand for abuse of discretion. Contreras v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 578, 583 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we disturb the BIA decision only if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law. We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Calderon-Rosas v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2020). 17 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). 18 Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen., 844 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted) (quoting In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003)). 19 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A); see Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). 20 See Rodriguez, 844 F.3d at 397. 4 The order that vacated the conviction is first examined to see if it explains the

reason for vacatur.21 Here, the state order does not explain the reason for vacating the

conviction, but it does mention Pilataxi’s participation in a Pretrial Intervention Program

as a condition of the vacatur.22 Pinho instructs that such participation is considered a

product of settlement negotiations, not a potential reason for vacatur.23 Thus, to the extent

that the government argues that the Pretrial Intervention Program is a potential basis for

vacatur, we disagree.

Where the state order fails to provide a specific reason for vacatur, we must

examine the rest of the state court record.24 In doing so, “the IJ may rely only on reasons

explicitly stated in the record and may not impute an unexpressed motive for vacating a

conviction.”25 There can be no “speculation . . . about the secret motive of state judges

and prosecutors.”26 Accordingly, when the record includes only one possible reason on

21 Id. (“A petitioner whose criminal conviction was vacated is no longer convicted under the INA where the conviction was vacated on the basis of a substantive or procedural defect in the underlying criminal proceedings. Conversely, where a court vacates a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, such as for rehabilitation or to allow a petitioner to avoid the immigration effects of the conviction, then the petitioner remains convicted for immigration purposes.”)(quotations and citations omitted). 22 Appx. 50. 23 Pinho, 432 F.3d at 215. 24 Id.

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Related

Pareja v. Attorney General of the United States
615 F.3d 180 (Third Circuit, 2010)
Contreras v. Attorney General of United States
665 F.3d 578 (Third Circuit, 2012)
Pinho v. Atty Gen USA
432 F.3d 193 (Third Circuit, 2005)
Raul Rodriguez v. Attorney General United State
844 F.3d 392 (Third Circuit, 2016)
PICKERING
23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2003)

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