1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUIS MANUEL DE LA TORRE- Case No.: 26-CV-3129 JLS (MSB) DURAN, 12 ORDER DENYING AMENDED Petitioner, 13 PETITION FOR WRIT OF v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING 14 AS MOOT MOTION FOR TODD BLANCHE, U.S. Attorney 15 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING General, et al., ORDER 16 Respondents. 17 (ECF Nos. 3, 9) 18 19 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Luis Manuel De La Torre-Duran’s 20 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF 21 No. 9) and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). Also before the Court 22 is Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 11) and Petitioner’s Traverse 23 (ECF No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Amended 24 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 9) and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s 25 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). 26 BACKGROUND 27 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States on 28 October 1, 2002, on a tourist visa. Pet. at 2. Petitioner overstayed his tourist visa and has 1 lived in the United States ever since. Id. Petitioner was convicted of several offenses in 2 the State of Utah: alcohol/drug related reckless driving in 2006; violation of a protection 3 order in 2022; and reckless driving and misdemeanor fraud in January of 2025. Ret. at 2. 4 On January 16, 2025, ICE issued a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest and took him into custody. 5 Id. Petitioner was deemed removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an individual 6 who was admitted to the United States and remained for a time longer than permitted by 7 law (a visa overstay). Id. (citing Ret., Ex. 3). Petitioner was placed into removal 8 proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Id. 9 On September 8, 2025, Petitioner was given a Custody Redetermination Proceeding 10 in front of an immigration judge (“IJ”). Id. The IJ denied Petitioner’s request for bond, 11 finding that he had “not met his burden of demonstrating that he is not a danger to the 12 community or a flight risk.” Id. (citing Ret., Ex. 4). Petitioner waived his right to appeal. 13 Id. Petitioner then applied for Cancellation of Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), 14 which was denied on April 17, 2026. Id. (citing Ret., Ex. 5). Petitioner was ordered 15 removed to Mexico. Id. On April 29, 2026, Petitioner appealed his removal order, and his 16 appeal is still pending. Id. 17 Petitioner has been in detention for almost a year and a half and nearly ten months 18 have passed since his last bond hearing. Traverse at 1. Petitioner argues that due process 19 requires that he receive another bond hearing. Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that 20 another hearing is required to address the fact that while he has been in detention 21 Petitioner’s fifteen-year-old son has been without a father and primary financial provider. 22 Id. at 3. Petitioner argues that he is the primary provider for his son and his wife—who 23 was the complainant in one of his prior criminal convictions. Id. Petitioner also states that 24 he is suffering a mental health crisis and has developed depression, anxiety, and major 25 stress disorder due to his prolonged detention. ECF No. 1 at 4. Petitioner also claims that 26 he is not receiving proper medical care for his heart condition, which in the past has 27 required multiple open-heart surgeries and “constant treatment and appointments with 28 cardiologist.” Id. at 2. 1 Respondents argue that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 2 has already received a bond hearing. Ret. at 3. Respondents further argue that Petitioner 3 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as he did not appeal his September 2025 bond 4 denial. Id. at 3–4. 5 LEGAL STANDARD 6 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 7 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 8 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 9 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 10 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 11 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 12 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 13 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 14 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 15 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 16 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 17 (citations omitted). 18 DISCUSSION 19 Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires he 20 receive another bond hearing due to his continued prolonged detention. Pet. at 3–6. 21 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 22 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 23 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 24 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 25 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 26 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 27 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 28 1 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 2 (1990). 3 “District courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 4 319 (1976), test when addressing due process where a petitioner has already been afforded 5 at least one bond hearing.” Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-2676-JES-DDL, 2026 WL 6 1471891, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2026) (collecting cases); see also Singh v. Barr, 400 F. 7 Supp. 3d 1005, 1020–21 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (applying Matthews to determine whether due 8 process required a subsequent bond hearing after a year and two months since the 9 petitioner’s last hearing); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 23-CV-1025-AMO, 2023 WL 10 6226374, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023) (“The Court finds persuasive that when 11 significant time has passed since a prior bond hearing, a petitioner may seek a second 12 procedurally compliant bond hearing under Matthews.”) (collecting cases).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LUIS MANUEL DE LA TORRE- Case No.: 26-CV-3129 JLS (MSB) DURAN, 12 ORDER DENYING AMENDED Petitioner, 13 PETITION FOR WRIT OF v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING 14 AS MOOT MOTION FOR TODD BLANCHE, U.S. Attorney 15 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING General, et al., ORDER 16 Respondents. 17 (ECF Nos. 3, 9) 18 19 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Luis Manuel De La Torre-Duran’s 20 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF 21 No. 9) and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). Also before the Court 22 is Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 11) and Petitioner’s Traverse 23 (ECF No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Amended 24 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 9) and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s 25 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). 26 BACKGROUND 27 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States on 28 October 1, 2002, on a tourist visa. Pet. at 2. Petitioner overstayed his tourist visa and has 1 lived in the United States ever since. Id. Petitioner was convicted of several offenses in 2 the State of Utah: alcohol/drug related reckless driving in 2006; violation of a protection 3 order in 2022; and reckless driving and misdemeanor fraud in January of 2025. Ret. at 2. 4 On January 16, 2025, ICE issued a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest and took him into custody. 5 Id. Petitioner was deemed removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an individual 6 who was admitted to the United States and remained for a time longer than permitted by 7 law (a visa overstay). Id. (citing Ret., Ex. 3). Petitioner was placed into removal 8 proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Id. 9 On September 8, 2025, Petitioner was given a Custody Redetermination Proceeding 10 in front of an immigration judge (“IJ”). Id. The IJ denied Petitioner’s request for bond, 11 finding that he had “not met his burden of demonstrating that he is not a danger to the 12 community or a flight risk.” Id. (citing Ret., Ex. 4). Petitioner waived his right to appeal. 13 Id. Petitioner then applied for Cancellation of Removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), 14 which was denied on April 17, 2026. Id. (citing Ret., Ex. 5). Petitioner was ordered 15 removed to Mexico. Id. On April 29, 2026, Petitioner appealed his removal order, and his 16 appeal is still pending. Id. 17 Petitioner has been in detention for almost a year and a half and nearly ten months 18 have passed since his last bond hearing. Traverse at 1. Petitioner argues that due process 19 requires that he receive another bond hearing. Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that 20 another hearing is required to address the fact that while he has been in detention 21 Petitioner’s fifteen-year-old son has been without a father and primary financial provider. 22 Id. at 3. Petitioner argues that he is the primary provider for his son and his wife—who 23 was the complainant in one of his prior criminal convictions. Id. Petitioner also states that 24 he is suffering a mental health crisis and has developed depression, anxiety, and major 25 stress disorder due to his prolonged detention. ECF No. 1 at 4. Petitioner also claims that 26 he is not receiving proper medical care for his heart condition, which in the past has 27 required multiple open-heart surgeries and “constant treatment and appointments with 28 cardiologist.” Id. at 2. 1 Respondents argue that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 2 has already received a bond hearing. Ret. at 3. Respondents further argue that Petitioner 3 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as he did not appeal his September 2025 bond 4 denial. Id. at 3–4. 5 LEGAL STANDARD 6 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 7 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 8 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 9 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 10 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 11 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 12 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 13 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 14 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 15 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 16 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 17 (citations omitted). 18 DISCUSSION 19 Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires he 20 receive another bond hearing due to his continued prolonged detention. Pet. at 3–6. 21 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 22 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 23 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 24 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 25 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 26 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 27 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 28 1 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 2 (1990). 3 “District courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 4 319 (1976), test when addressing due process where a petitioner has already been afforded 5 at least one bond hearing.” Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-2676-JES-DDL, 2026 WL 6 1471891, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2026) (collecting cases); see also Singh v. Barr, 400 F. 7 Supp. 3d 1005, 1020–21 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (applying Matthews to determine whether due 8 process required a subsequent bond hearing after a year and two months since the 9 petitioner’s last hearing); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 23-CV-1025-AMO, 2023 WL 10 6226374, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023) (“The Court finds persuasive that when 11 significant time has passed since a prior bond hearing, a petitioner may seek a second 12 procedurally compliant bond hearing under Matthews.”) (collecting cases). Under 13 Matthews, courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official 14 action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 15 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and 16 (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the fiscal and 17 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 18 entail.” Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. 19 Regarding the first factor, “it is indisputable that ‘the private interest here is 20 fundamental: freedom from imprisonment is at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 21 Process Clause.’” Hernandez, 2026 WL 1471891, at *2 (quoting Hernandez v. Sessions, 22 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017)). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that courts should not 23 “overstate the strength of [Petitioner’s] showing under the first Matthews factor.” 24 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit also 25 reasoned that in evaluating the private interests under the first factor, courts “cannot simply 26 count [the petitioner’s] months of detention and leave it at that.” Id. at 1208. Courts “must 27 also consider the process he received during this time, the further process that was available 28 to him, and the fact that his detention was prolonged due to his decision to challenge his 1 removal order.” Id. Here, Petitioner’s detention has become prolonged—nearly a year and 2 a half in custody and ten months since his last bond hearing. Pet. at 2. Petitioner has 3 received a bond hearing, which he did not appeal and does not challenge the validity of. 4 See Ret. at 3–4. Petitioner is subject to an order of removal and has appealed this decision. 5 Id. at 2. Considering the process already provided, the Court finds that this factor weighs 6 slightly in favor of Petitioner. See Hernandez, 2026 WL 1471891, at *2; Singh, 400 F. 7 Supp. 3d at 1021 (finding this factor weighed in favor of the petitioner based on thirteen 8 months of detention since his last hearing) (collecting cases). 9 Considering the second factor, “where a noncitizen has been afforded some process, 10 ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest and the value of additional 11 procedures is very low unless he can demonstrate a material change in circumstances since 12 his last bond hearing.’” Hernandez, 2026 WL 1471891, at *3 (quoting Rubin v. U.S. 13 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 24-CV-260-TL-TLF, 2024 WL 3431914, at *8 (W.D. Wash. 14 June 28, 2024)). Here, Plaintiff argues that in the ten months since his last bond hearing, 15 his fifteen-year-old child and wife have been struggling financially as he is the primary 16 provider. Traverse at 3. Petitioner, in his pro se initial Complaint, also discusses his 17 deteriorating mental health and inadequate access to healthcare. ECF No. 1 at 2, 4. There 18 is no evidence that this information was not available to the IJ during Petitioner’s last bond 19 hearing. While the length of Petitioner’s detention tends to tip this factor in Petitioner’s 20 favor, Petitioner does not present any additional information demonstrating a material 21 change in circumstances. Therefore, this factor weighs against Petitioner. See Hernandez, 22 2026 WL 1471891, at *3 (finding this factor weighed against the petitioner where he did 23 not articulate any changed circumstances); Mercado-Arechiga v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-683- 24 JES-DEB, 2026 WL 926901, at *6 (S.D. Cal. April 6, 2026) (same); Espinoza v. Wofford, 25 No. 24-CV-1118-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 1556590, at *13 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2025) (same). 26 As to the third factor, the government has a strong interest in enforcing the INA’s 27 statutory framework for detention of “noncitizens whom Congress has deemed pose a flight 28 risk or danger to the community based on their offenses.” Rubin, 2024 WL 3431914, at 1 ||*7. “[T]he Government interest at issue is the ‘ability to detain [an immigrant detainee] 2 || without providing him with another bond hearing, not whether the government may 3 ||continue to detain him.” Henriquez, 2023 WL 6226374, at *4 (quoting Lopez Reyes v. 4 || Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 777 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). This distinction implicates a lower 5 interest than the government’s immigration enforcement interest generally. See id. (citing 6 || Zerezghi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 955 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020)). 7 || However, in the context of whether a second bond hearing is required, “the [g]overnment’s 8 |/interest is not meaningly diminished.” /d. (collecting citations). “This interest may 9 ||increase as a noncitizen’s removal ‘becomes more imminent.’” (quoting Rodriguez 10 || Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208). The Court finds that while, “generally courts have found that the 11 of providing a bond hearing is relatively minimal,” this factor weighs in favor of 12 ||Respondents. Eliazar G.C. v. Wofford, No. 24-CV-1032-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 711190, at 13 (E.D. Cal. March 5, 2025) (citations omitted). 14 Therefore, after weighing the Matthews factors, the Court finds that due process does 15 ||/not require ordering another bond hearing for Petitioner at this time. 16 CONCLUSION 17 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Petitioner’s 18 || Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 9) and DENIES AS MOOT 19 || Petitioner’s Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 3). If Petitioner can demonstrate 20 || changed circumstances at a later date, he may file an amended petition. As this concludes 21 || the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL CLOSE the file. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: July 10, 2026 . .
25 United States District Judge 26 27 28