Luis Lomeli v. Universal Protection Service, LP

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: January 10, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-09754
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JS-6 perk Ue ee er □□□□□ 3 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COLRT

5 “BL OFC □□ 6 Luis Lomeli, - Plaintiff, 2:19-cv-9754-VAP-AGRx 8 “ Order GRANTING Plaintiff's Universal Protection Service, LP Motion to Remand 9 (Dkt. 11) 10 and Salvador Villegas, = Defendant. 11 12

13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (“Motion,” Dkt. 11). 15 | Defendants filed their Opposition on December 23, 2019 (Dkt. 12), and Plaintiff replied on December 30, 2019 (Dkt. 13). The Court finds the matter 1/ | suitable for decision without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. After 18 | considering all papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion, 19 | the Court GRANTS the Motion to Remand. 20 21 1. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Luis Lomeli (“Plaintiff’) was hired as a security guard by 23 | Defendant Universal Protection Service, LP (“UPS”) in 2009. (Dkt. 11 at 2). 24 | He was baptized into the Seventh-day Adventist Church in November 2017, 25 | and requested a schedule change in January 2018 so that he would no 26 | longer have to work Saturdays, on the Sabbath. (Dkt. 1-2, “Complaint,” ]

1 11-19). Plaintiff alleges that not only did UPS not respond to his request for 2 religious accommodation, but that UPS and Defendant Salvador Villegas 3 (collectively, “Defendants”) also harassed him for making the request. 4 (Complaint ¶ 37). As a result of Defendants’ alleged refusal to 5 accommodate and ongoing harassment, Plaintiff resigned on December 12, 6 2018. (Complaint ¶ 38). 7 8 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in California state court on October 3, 2019, 9 alleging violations of FEHA (religious discrimination-failure to accommodate, 10 religious discrimination-disparate treatment, harassment, and failure to 11 prevent discrimination and harassment) and wrongful constructive 12 termination in violation of public policy. (Motion at 2). Defendants timely 13 removed the case to federal court on November 13, 2019. (Dkt. 1). 14 15 In his Motion, Plaintiff argues remand is appropriate because his claims 16 for religious discrimination and failure to accommodate neither arise from 17 nor require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), 18 and therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Motion at 4—5). 19 Defendants concede that Plaintiff’s third cause of action for harassment 20 against Defendant UPS and Defendant Salvador Villegas does not require 21 the Court to interpret the CBA, and request that the Court exercise 22 supplemental jurisdiction over the third claim. (Dkt. 12 at 2 n.1). 23 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, provides that any civil 26 action brought in state court may be removed to a federal district court that 2 1 would have had original jurisdiction over the same matter. A federal court 2 must, however, remand the case if it finds there is no diversity of citizenship 3 or the claims do not arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (“If at 4 any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 5 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); see also Int’l Primate 6 Prot. League v. Admin. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991). 7 Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. 8 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941); Gaus v. 9 Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 10 11 Section 301(a) of the LMRA gives federal courts subject matter 12 jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a 13 labor organization.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 185. “Section 301 is on its face a 14 jurisdictional statute, under which ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between 15 an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry 16 affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor 17 organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States 18 having jurisdiction of the parties.’” Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 19 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Aug. 27, 2001) (quoting 29 20 U.S.C. § 185(a)). 21 22 The Supreme Court has long held that § 301 “preempts the use of state 23 contract law in CBA interpretation and enforcement.” Id. at 689 (citing Local 24 174, Teamsters of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103–04 (1962)). 25 Not all claims implicating collectively bargained agreements raise a federal 26 question, however: § 301 preempts only “claims founded directly on rights 3 1 created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially 2 dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar, 3 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (quotation marks and citation 4 omitted); see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122–24 (1994) 5 (“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the 6 bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the 7 course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be 8 extinguished.”). “If the plaintiff’s claim cannot be resolved without 9 interpreting the applicable CBA . . . it is preempted. Alternatively, if the claim 10 may be litigated without reference to the rights and duties established in a 11 CBA . . . it is not preempted.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691 (internal citations 12 omitted). 13 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 A. Religious Discrimination in Violation of FEHA 16 Plaintiff makes several religious discrimination claims, each based on 17 the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 et. seq. 18 (“FEHA”). Plaintiff argues that because his claims are based entirely on his 19 rights under FEHA, they do not derive from or substantially depend on 20 analysis of the CBA. Defendants, respond, unpersuasively, that because 21 the CBA includes provisions governing seniority, scheduling, and job 22 vacancies, Plaintiff’s claims, which touch on those same issues, require 23 interpretation of the CBA. (Dkt. 12 at 5). 24 25 The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “just because a CBA provides a 26 remedy or duty related to a situation that is also directly regulated by non- 4 1 negotiable state law does not mean the employee is limited to a claim based 2 on the CBA.” Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) 3 (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-09, 4 (1988)). Indeed, “Section 301 preemption is not intended to shield an 5 employer from substantive duties that the state might impose.” Id. Section 6 301, therefore, “does not preempt every public policy claim brought by an 7 employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, a claim is 8 not preempted if it poses no significant threat to the collective bargaining 9 process and furthers a state interest in protecting the public transcending 10 the employment relationship.” Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 11 F.2d 993, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 1987). 12 13 The Ninth Circuit has considered § 301 preemption in precisely this 14 factual scenario. In Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, the court considered 15 whether an employer’s alleged failure to accommodate an employee’s 16 religious beliefs—and, specifically, the prohibition on working during the 17 Sabbath—in violation of California law requires interpretation of the 18 employee’s CBA such that the employee’s claims are preempted by federal 19 law. 911 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1990). The court found that “[t]here is no doubt 20 that § 12940(a) establishes a California public policy against religious 21 discrimination in the workplace,” and therefore that “enforcement of the 22 California statute” did not “require interpretation of the CBA.” Cook v. 23 Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d at 238. 24 25 26 5 1 The instant case presents the same issue, and this Court reaches the 2 same conclusion. Plaintiff’s FEHA claims do not require interpretation of the 3 CBA, and therefore are not preempted by federal law. 4 B. Wrongful Constructive Termination in Violation of Public Policy 5 The same analysis applies to Plaintiff’s constructive termination in 6 violation of public policy claim: “[T]he mere fact that a broad contractual 7 protection against discriminatory ... discharge may provide a remedy for 8 conduct that coincidentally violates state law does not make the existence 9 or the contours of the state law violation dependent upon the terms of the 10 private contract.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 11 412–13 (1988), quoted in Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 12 1517 (9th Cir.1988). See also Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 13 238 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiff’s “claim of wrongful discharge in violation 14 of public policy,” premised on failure to accommodate religious beliefs and 15 inability to work through the Sabbath, “survives federal preemption”). 16 Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim does not require interpretation of 17 the CBA, and therefore is not preempted by federal law. 18 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 21 The Court finds Plaintiff’s claims not preempted by federal law, and 22 declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. The 23 Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the action to the 24 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. 25 26 6 1 2 3 The Court declines to impose sanctions on Defendants for removing this 4 | case. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: 1/10/20 Vip ~. Oe, Phat □ A 9 Virginia A. Phillips _ 10 Chief United States District Judg 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26