Luis Fernando Vega v. Jannia Jaramillo

Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 6D2025-0532

Lower Tribunal No. 2023-CA-012678

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LUIS FERNANDO VEGA,

Appellant,

v.

JANNIA JARAMILLO,

Appellee.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County.

Michael Deen, Judge.

September 4, 2026

SMITH, J.

Appellant Luis Fernando Vega challenges the trial court’s partition of the former marital residence of Vega and Appellee Jannia Jaramillo which remained solely in Vega’s name after entry of the final judgment in the parties’ prior dissolution of marriage action. Because this was error, we reverse.

Facts

The parties were married on April 25, 2006. At the time, Vega was in the

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process of purchasing a home; on May 4, 2006, a deed for the home was issued solely in Vega’s name. The home was secured by a mortgage only in Vega’s name.

Vega later filed for divorce, and a final judgment dissolving the marriage (“dissolution judgment”) was entered on April 14, 2023. At the time the dissolution action was filed, Vega remained the sole named grantee on the title of the residence. At no point during marriage did Vega add Jaramillo to the title. Pursuant to the dissolution judgment, the house was deemed marital property and sole possession was awarded to Vega along with sole responsibility for the mortgage:

12. It is adjudged and decreed that the real property referred to herein as the “7901 Bayflower Way” is the marital property of Petitioner and Respondent. Respondent shall vacate the property.

13. There is a mortgage owing to 5/3 Bank secured by said property, with a current balance of approximately $391,692.00. As of November 1, 2022, said mortgage shall be the sole responsibility of Petitioner, and Petitioner shall indemnify and hold Respondent and her property harmless from any failure to pay the same.

Various property items and liabilities were awarded to one party or the other, and no equalizing payment was required by either party.

Approximately six weeks after the entry of the dissolution judgment, Jaramillo filed a separate action for partition of the Bayflower property, arguing that because the home was marital property, the parties were joint owners, and she was entitled to partition. Vega opposed the partition, arguing, among other things, that

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Vega solely owned the property and, therefore, Jaramillo lacked standing to pursue partition.

For reasons that will be discussed more fully below, the trial court found Vega and Jaramillo owned the property as tenants in common and entered its final judgment of partition (“partition judgment”) requiring that the property be sold and the proceeds divided equally. Additionally, the partition judgment gave Vega no contribution credit for his exclusive liability relative to the existing mortgage on the property. This appeal followed.

Analysis

Generally, “[p]artition determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”

Knott v. Knott, 395 So. 3d 1147, 1150 n.4 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing Green v. Green, 16 So. 3d 298, 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)). However, the appellate standard of review for pure questions of law is de novo. D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003) (citing Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000)). We therefore interpret the terms of the final judgment of dissolution de novo.

In the portion of its final judgment entitled “Partition is Proper Under Florida Law,” the trial court held as follows:

1. Partition is a matter of right for tenants in common under Chapter 64, Florida Statutes.

2. Upon dissolution of marriage, property previously held as tenants by the entirety automatically converts into a tenancy. See Fla. Stat.

689.15; Aderhold v. Aderhold, 983 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

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3. The property at issue was classified as marital property in the Final Judgment of Dissolution of marriage entered in Case No. 2021-DR-

10127-O.

4. Because the Final Judgment did not award exclusive ownership to either party, the parties remain tenants in common, giving Plaintiff standing under Fla. Stat. 64.031.

Problematically, the trial court’s partition judgment incorrectly presumes that Vega and Jaramillo held the property as tenants by the entireties during the marriage—seemingly based at least in part on the fact that the trial court in the dissolution action classified the property as marital. None of the authorities cited by the trial court stand for that proposition. Rather, as set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 52 (Fla. 2001), property held as tenants by the entireties possesses six characteristics:

(1) unity of possession (joint ownership and control); (2)

unity of interest (the interests in the account must be identical); (3) unity of title (the interests must have originated in the same instrument); (4) unity of time (the interests must have commenced simultaneously); (5)

survivorship; and (6) unity of marriage (the parties must be married at the time the property became titled in their joint names).

Here, notably absent is the third characteristic, that being unity of title. The property was titled solely in Vega’s name and not jointly in the names of Vega and Jaramillo.

The trial court appeared to be in some part confused by the fact that the dissolution judgment declared the property to be marital. However, this was merely

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a classification for purposes of equitable distribution and did not accomplish a transfer of title or a right to a transfer of title. See Sigmund v. Elder, 631 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“[I]t is well-established that the title to property is not always determinative of whether the property is a marital asset for equitable distribution purposes.” (citing Hamm v. Hamm, 492 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Holmes v. Holmes, 613 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993))).

A home purchased during the marriage but titled in only one spouse’s name may be properly considered a marital asset, and therefore subject to equitable distribution. King v. King, 273 So. 3d 233, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (holding that trial court was required to determine if a home purchased during the marriage but titled in one spouse’s name only was marital or nonmarital); Wertkin v. Wertkin, 763 So. 2d 461, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“Since title [in the husband’s own name] was acquired during the marriage, it is marital property.”); Sigmund v. Elder, 631 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ( “[I]t is well-established that the title to property is not always determinative of whether the property is a marital asset for equitable distribution purposes.”); Holmes v. Holmes, 613 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that a home in wife’s name only was marital property subject to equitable distribution because the closing date occurred during the marriage).

However, a partition action may only be filed by “joint tenants, tenants in common, or coparceners.” § 64.031, Fla. Stat (2026). In other words, to maintain a

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partition action, a petitioner must be able to show title – even if they have some other equitable interest in the property. Dietrich v. Winters, 798 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“In order to maintain a complaint for partition, the plaintiff must show title or a right to partition. Where title is not established in the plaintiff, partition is not available even if the plaintiff might have an equitable interest in the land.” (citing Rountree v. Rountree, 101 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1958))). Jaramillo was never a joint owner of the property, and the classification of the property as marital by the trial court in the dissolution action did not, by itself, create any type of joint ownership. The property was purchased solely in the name of Vega and remained solely in the name of Vega throughout the marriage—nothing in the dissolution judgment required transference of ownership from Vega to Jaramillo. 1 Thus, partition of the property was error.

In her answer brief, Jaramillo cites several authorities which she argues are supportive of the idea that property purchased during a marriage, even if purchased and titled solely in the name of one spouse, somehow converts to tenancy by the entireties. However, to the contrary, each of the cases cited by Jaramillo involved

1 Certainly, there is a presumption that a home deeded to both spouses is intended to be held via a tenancy by the entirety. Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., (“[R]eal property titled in the name of both spouses that is presumptively considered to be a tenancy by the entireties as long as the other unities are established[.]”). This presumption is not at play here, given that the parties both concede the property was always in Vega’s name only.

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property which was already held by the parties involved either jointly or as tenants by the entireties. Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. 1991) (property was titled to husband and wife as tenants by the entireties); Ibanez-Vogelsang v. Vogelsang, 601 So. 2d 1303, 1303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (property conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by the entireties on their wedding day); Sharp v. Hamilton, 520 So. 2d 9, 9 (Fla. 1988) (husband and wife owned property as tenants by the entireties); Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1985) (property at issue was jointly held); Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 1986) (husband and wife held property during marriage as tenants by the entireties).

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the final judgment of partition.

REVERSED.

BROWNLEE and KAMOUTSAS, JJ., concur.

Javier D. Alvarez, Kissimmee, for Appellant. Gabriela A. Bonilla, of Bonilla Law PLLC, Orlando, for Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED