NUMBER 13-23-00183-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
LUIS DELEON JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 454TH DISTRICT COURT OF MEDINA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellant Luis Deleon Jr. appeals his conviction for murder, a first-degree felony.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02. By two issues, Deleon argues that the trial court erred
in (1) limiting his cross-examination of a witness, and (2) prohibiting him from
subpoenaing jurors for a hearing on his motion for new trial alleging jury misconduct. We
affirm. I. BACKGROUND 1
In a one-count indictment, Deleon was charged with murdering Roger Palacios
with a knife. See id. 2 The evidence adduced at trial shows that on July 18, 2021, Deleon
joined members of his family at a bar in Hondo, Texas. Among the bargoers were Lisa
Brieden, Christina Luna, Emilio Luna, TJ Maldonado, Stephanie Santellan, and Deleon.
Brieden had been dating Deleon for around five or six years. Christina and TJ are
Brieden’s children. Christina is married to Emilio and TJ is married to Stephanie. At some
point in the night, Deleon walked across the bar at a quick pace toward Palacios, grabbed
him, stabbed him three times, and slit his throat. Emilio and TJ grabbed Deleon, at which
point TJ picked up the knife which had fallen. Emilio then attempted to aid Palacios, while
TJ took the knife to Stephanie. Stephanie and TJ went to her grandmother’s house and
hid the knife. They ultimately decided that they needed to go back to the bar and
cooperate with the police. Stephanie and TJ led the police to the knife, and they provided
information which led to Deleon’s arrest.
Emilio, TJ, and Stephanie each testified that they personally observed Deleon
strike at Palacios. Emilio testified that he saw Deleon “punch at [Palacios] about three
times.” Stephanie testified that she saw Deleon walk past her and “grab [Palacios] and
stab him in the stomach and in the neck.” On cross-examination, both Emilio and
1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio
pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer).
2 Deleon was charged under two alternative subsections of the murder statute. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2). The particularities of the subsections are not relevant to this appeal.
2 Stephanie admitted that they never saw Deleon with the knife in his hand. TJ testified that
he directly observed Deleon “take the knife and start stabbing Roger.”
On cross-examination, Deleon sought to question TJ regarding some topics he
mentioned in an interview with police; namely, his supposed fear of members of a biker
gang, the “Banditos.” Defense counsel argued that TJ had told police that certain Banditos
members were threatening him, and that he had reasons to fear for his safety. As defense
counsel stated, “He’s afraid of somebody. Therefore[,] my argument, for multiple reasons
I think, we have the right to confrontation to get into these facts. [Why it is] relevant, I think
it goes to his bias and motive to testify. He’s basically looking for somebody to protect
him.” The trial court ruled against Deleon, concluding that whether TJ is a victim in an
unrelated crime was not relevant to the case; but it permitted Deleon to question TJ about
pending criminal charges and whether he was a Banditos member.
After both sides rested, the jury found Deleon guilty and assessed punishment at
life imprisonment. Deleon filed a motion for new trial alleging juror misconduct and
attached an affidavit from bailiff Ramiro Guedea who averred that, while collecting
cellphones from the jurors prior to deliberations, he had seen that one of the juror’s
cellphones “had the name T.J. Maldonado displayed on the screen.” After the trial court
set Deleon’s motion for a hearing, Deleon subpoenaed the jurors in the case. The State
filed a motion to quash, and the trial court conducted a hearing on that motion as well. At
the hearing, the State informed the trial court that it had reached out to most of the jurors
and each of them stated that there was no misconduct and that they had not been
contacted by defense counsel to inquire about juror misconduct. The trial court granted
the State’s motion to quash, concluding that juror testimony was not permissible under
3 Texas Rule of Evidence 606, which only allows a juror to testify during an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict if such testimony is “about whether an outside influence was
improperly brought to bear on any juror,” “or to rebut a claim that the juror was not qualified
to serve.” TEX. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A), (B).
At the motion for new trial hearing, defense counsel stated that because his
subpoenas were quashed, he was not going to present any evidence. Guedea testified
on behalf of the State. Guedea affirmed that, although he saw TJ’s name on one of the
juror’s cellphones, he could not provide “any specifics as to the context on the phone in
which [he] saw the name,” and could not say whether he had seen the name as part of
an “Internet search or a note or a screen saver.” He also confirmed that at no point during
or after the trial did any juror approach him regarding any concerns of misconduct. The
hearing concluded without a ruling from the trial court, and Deleon’s motion was
subsequently overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
II. LIMITATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
By his first issue on appeal, Deleon argues the court erred and violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses by limiting his cross-examination of TJ.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, including a trial
court’s decision to limit cross-examination, for an abuse of discretion. Flowers v. State,
438 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Martinez v. State,
327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)); Lempar v. State, 191 S.W.3d 230, 236
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. ref’d). “Abuse of discretion occurs only if the decision
is ‘so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might
4 disagree.’” Flowers, 438 S.W.3d at 103 (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990) (op. on reh’g))). “We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial
court.” Id. (citing Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “We will
uphold an evidentiary ruling if it was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.”
Id. (citing De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right to
cross-examine witnesses. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220,
222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). We
review Confrontation Clause complaints on “on a case-by-case basis, carefully taking into
account the defendant’s right to cross-examine and the risk factors associated with
admission of the evidence.” Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 222 (citation omitted). “In weighing
whether evidence must be admitted under the Confrontation Clause, the trial court should
balance the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced against the risk its
admission may entail.” Id. (citation omitted). “The trial court maintains broad discretion to
impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, endangering the witness, and the injection of cumulative or collateral
evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
“A defendant is entitled to pursue all avenues of cross-examination reasonably
calculated to expose a motive, bias, or interest for the witness to testify, and therefore,
the scope of appropriate cross-examination is necessarily broad.” Smith v. State, 352
S.W.3d 55, 64 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (citing Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d
5 494, 497 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)). “But this does not mean that a defendant can explore
every possible line of inquiry.” Smith, 352 S.W.3d at 64 (citing Walker v. State, 300
S.W.3d 836, 844 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d)). “Rather, ‘the Confrontation
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’” Id.
(emphasis in original) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).
The proponent of evidence concerning a witness’s alleged bias or motive “must
show that the evidence is relevant.” Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004). “The proponent does this by demonstrating that a nexus, or logical
connection, exists between the witness’s testimony and the witness’s potential motive to
testify in favor of the other party.” Id. (citing Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998)); see Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138, 149–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(“The reasoning and result in Carpenter is in accord with numerous Texas cases in which
the cross-examiner failed to show a logical connection between the fact or condition that
could give rise to a potential bias or motive and the existence of any bias or motive to
testify.” (emphasis in original)).
B. Discussion
Both in the trial court and on appeal, Deleon has failed to articulate how, precisely,
any testimony from TJ regarding fear of Banditos members has any nexus or logical
connection to an alleged bias or motive to testify in favor of the State. See Woods, 152
S.W.3d at 111. At trial, Deleon argued that such testimony would be relevant because it
shows that TJ was “afraid and . . . seeking assistance from [law enforcement] to protect
him.” According to Deleon, this may mean that TJ would be “looking at the officers to do
6 him a favor,” and may be a reason for TJ to testify against Deleon.
Deleon’s conclusory assertion that TJ’s testimony could be biased because of
some undefined benefit he might receive from law enforcement for his testimony is too
speculative to demonstrate a logical connection between TJ’s fear of Banditos members
and any potential bias or motive to testify in favor of the State. See Irby, 327 S.W.3d at
149–50. For example, in Carpenter, appellant argued that the trial court improperly limited
his cross-examination of a State’s witness regarding pending federal conspiracy charges.
979 S.W.2d at 633. The Carpenter Court concluded:
Appellant has not established a causal connection or logical relationship between the pending federal charges and the witness’[s] testimony at trial. Appellant does not argue, and the record does not demonstrate, why prosecution by the federal government for theft and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances would tend to show that the witness’[s] testimony in this unrelated state prosecution for tampering with government documents might be biased. Appellant asserts that “[i]t is possible the witness believed his testimony in this case would be of some benefit,” but does not provide evidence to support her assertion. . . . Appellant has simply not provided any indication that the pending federal charges were relevant to potential bias or prejudice.
Id. at 635.
As in Carpenter, Deleon has “not established a causal connection or logical
relationship between” TJ’s fear of Banditos members and his “testimony at trial.” Id.
Although provided the opportunity to do so, Deleon failed to “provide [any] evidence to
support his assertion” that TJ believed his testimony against Deleon “would be of some
benefit.” Id. Consequently, Deleon failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate the
relevancy of his proposed impeachment evidence. See Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 111;
Carpenter, 979 S.W.2d at 634; Irby, 327 S.W.3d at 149–50. At most, any relevancy of the
proposed line of questioning would have been “marginal,” and the trial court could have
7 reasonably concluded that it may confuse the issues. See Walker, 300 S.W.3d at 846 (“A
trial court has the discretion to limit testimony that may confuse the issues or be only
marginally relevant.”); see also TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-
examination of TJ concerning his fear of Banditos members. See Flowers, 438 S.W.3d at
103; see also Smith, 352 S.W.3d at 68 (“Although we are mindful of Appellant’s right to
pursue all avenues of cross-examination reasonably calculated to expose motive, bias,
or interest in a witness to testify . . . we agree with the trial court’s determination that
Appellant failed to show a logical connection between the evidence of the separate
checking account and Moss’s alleged bias or motive; at a minimum, the trial court’s
decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.”). We therefore overrule Deleon’s
first issue.
III. EXCLUSION OF JUROR TESTIMONY
By his second issue on appeal, Deleon contends the trial court erred by quashing
the subpoenas issued to jurors to testify at his new trial hearing. We construe this issue
to include the matter of whether the trial court erred by allowing the motion for new trial
to be overruled by operation of law.
We review a trial court’s decision to quash a subpoena or to deny a motion for new
trial, under an abuse of discretion standard. See Emenhiser v. State, 196 S.W.3d 915,
8 921 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d); Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs only if the decision is so clearly wrong
as to lie outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.
The court may not receive evidence of a juror’s statement that concerns any
incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations, or the effect of anything on that
juror’s or another juror’s vote, or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or
indictment. TEX. R. EVID. 606(b)(1). However, a juror may testify about whether an outside
influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror, or to rebut a claim that the juror
was not qualified to serve. Id. 606(b)(2)(A), (B). An “outside influence” is something
originating from a source outside of the jury room and other than from the jurors
themselves. McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
To obtain a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct, an appellant is required
to allege facts that amount to misconduct “through the affidavit of a juror or another person
who was in a position to know the facts.” Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 537 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) (citation omitted); see Prince v. State, 254 S.W.2d 1006, 1011 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1953) (“Where the misconduct was of such a nature that it would be known only by
members of the jury, then an affidavit of a juror is proper. But this is not the exclusive
method. Where the appellant is unable to secure such an affidavit, it is incumbent upon
him to show this, and why, and, further, to show reasonable grounds for believing that
such misconduct actually occurred.”). “This Court has required something more than a
mere allegation of juror misconduct to avoid fishing expeditions by defendants.” Prystach,
3 S.W.3d at 537 (cleaned up).
Where an appellant fails to show that testimony from jurors would have been
9 permitted by Rule 606, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in quashing subpoenas
and denying a motion for new trial or permitting the motion to be overruled by operation
of law. See Anderson v. State, 665 S.W.3d 743, 758 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2023, pet. ref’d) (“After reviewing the juror’s affidavit in this case, we find that it addressed
only matters which the juror learned during jury deliberations. These matters clearly came
from the other jurors and, as such, do not constitute outside influences. Accordingly, the
trial court properly quashed the juror affidavit and denied appellant’s motion for new
trial.”); see also Dunn v. State, No. 06-96-00026-CR, 1997 WL 271776, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Jan. 6, 1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“The trial court acted
within its discretion when it refused to provide Dunn with a hearing on his motion for new
trial and allowed it to be overruled by operation of law.”).
Deleon argues that “[t]he affidavit of the bailiff in this case provided the [trial court]
with the basis for allowing the questioning of the entire jury panel regarding any outside
influence.” He claims that “[t]estimony of the jurors would have shown which juror was
researching [TJ]. Further, juror testimony would have revealed any other jurors that had
knowledge of the outside influence, and crucially, if that outside influence made its way
into jury deliberations.”
Contrary to Deleon’s assertion, neither Guedea’s affidavit nor his testimony shows
that an “outside influence” was at play during deliberations. See TEX. R. EVID.
606(b)(2)(A). Guedea only stated that he saw the name of a witness on a cellphone
screen, but he was unable to provide any other context, and did not allege that the name
as he saw it was indicative of any kind of outside research. As the trial court noted, a
10 name appearing on a cellphone screen is consistent with a juror taking notes on the phone
and does not indicate that a juror obtained any information that originated from a source
outside of the jury room. Cf. McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 154 (concluding that appellant
had sufficiently alleged an “outside influence” where juror affidavits supported that
“internet research occurred outside of the jury room and outside of deliberations—the
juror conducted a private investigation at her home during an overnight break,” and noting
that the “information obtained originated from a source on the internet, a source other
than the jurors themselves”).
Even assuming that the mere presence of a witness’s name on a cellphone screen
supports a finding of “outside influence,” Deleon has also failed to satisfactorily allege that
this outside influence “was improperly brought to bear on any juror.” TEX. R.
EVID. 606(b)(2)(A); see Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 129 (“An ‘outside influence’ is problematic
only if it has the effect of improperly affecting a juror’s verdict in a particular manner—for
or against a particular party.” (emphasis in original)); Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 42–
43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial because, although a juror’s use of a
dictionary during deliberations involved an “outside influence,” appellant could not show
that this outside influence was “improperly brought to bear upon any juror” sufficient to
show harm). For example, in McQuarrie, the appellant’s motion for new trial included
affidavits from two jurors, one of whom explicitly stated that the online research conducted
by a third juror “changed his mind” and “that the information had changed the mind of the
third juror.” 380 S.W.3d at 148 (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding juror testimony which should have been allowed pursuant to Rule 606(b)(2)(A)).
11 We further note that, despite being provided the opportunity to do so, Deleon did
not obtain any supporting affidavits for his motion for new trial from any jurors, nor did he
attempt to explain to the trial court why he failed to obtain such affidavits. See Prystash,
3 S.W.3d at 537; Prince, 254 S.W.2d at 1011; see also Dunn, No. 06-96-00026-CR, 1997
WL 271776, at *3 (“The key consideration is whether the affidavits provide the court with
reasonable grounds for believing that juror misconduct took place. . . . [Defense counsel]’s
supporting affidavits focus on a single juror despite the fact that other jurors were in a
position to know what transpired during jury deliberations. [Defense counsel] makes no
reference in his affidavits to attempts to either obtain supporting affidavits from other
jurors or interview other jurors about [misconduct] allegations.”). 3 Consequently,
Deleon’s motion for new trial fails to amount to more than a “mere allegation” of juror
misconduct. Prystach, 3 S.W.3d at 537; see Prince, 254 S.W.2d at 1011 (“[Properly
alleging jury misconduct] is not done by a motion which tells the trial court, ‘I think
misconduct has occurred and, though unable to verify it, I want to examine the jury to
determine whether or not such did occur.’”).
Because Deleon has not shown that any juror testimony would have been
permitted under Rule 606, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
quashing his juror subpoenas or allowing his motion for new trial to be overruled by
operation of law. See Emenhiser, 196 S.W.3d at 921; Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 122;
Anderson, 665 S.W.3d at 758. We overrule Deleon’s second issue.
3 At the hearing on the State’s motion to quash, the State informed the trial court that it had reached
out “to all but four of the jurors,” all of whom denied any juror misconduct, and the State noted that those jurors had not been contacted by defense counsel. When the trial court asked defense counsel if he had been in contact with any juror who could provide an affidavit, defense counsel argued that such conversations with jurors could not be disclosed because they were “attorney work product.”
12 IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the 15th day of August, 2024.