Luis Cordero v. Michael Benov

Ninth Circuit

Luis Cordero v. Michael Benov

574 F. App'x 788

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 22, 2014

Docket13-16442

StatusUnpublished

This text of 574 F. App'x 788 (Luis Cordero v. Michael Benov) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Luis Cordero v. Michael Benov, 574 F. App'x 788 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Luis Morant Cordero appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a section 2241 habeas petition, see Reynolds v. Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.2010), abrogated on other grounds by Setser v. United States, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012), and we affirm.

Cordero argues that he is entitled to credit toward his federal sentence for the time spent in custody between April 30, 2004 and July 29, 2005. We disagree. The state retained primary jurisdiction over Cordero from the time he was arrested in April 2004 until he was paroled in May 2006, including the time he spent in federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, see Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 445 (9th Cir.1998), and his federal sentence did not commence until May 22, 2006, when he was received in federal custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Taylor, 164 F.3d at 445. He is not entitled to federal credit for the period prior to July 29, 2005, because the record reflects that the state credited this time toward his state sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); Allen v. Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir.1998) (section 3585(b) disallows double crediting for time served).

Cordero also contends that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) abused its discretion by denying his request for nunc pro tunc designation of the state facility where he served his state sentence. The record reflects that the BOP considered the statutory factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying Cordero’s request. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); Reynolds, 603 F.3d at 1151-52. Setser v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012), does not require a different result.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Federal prisoner Luis Morant Cordero appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a section 2241 habeas petition, see Reynolds v. Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.2010), abrogated on other grounds by Setser v. United States, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012), and we affirm.

Cordero argues that he is entitled to credit toward his federal sentence for the time spent in custody between April 30, 2004 and July 29, 2005. We disagree. The state retained primary jurisdiction over Cordero from the time he was arrested in April 2004 until he was paroled in May 2006, including the time he spent in federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, see Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 445 (9th Cir.1998), and his federal sentence did not commence until May 22, 2006, when he was received in federal custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Taylor, 164 F.3d at 445. He is not entitled to federal credit for the period prior to July 29, 2005, because the record reflects that the state credited this time toward his state sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); Allen v. Crabtree, 153 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir.1998) (section 3585(b) disallows double crediting for time served).

Cordero also contends that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) abused its discretion by denying his request for nunc pro tunc designation of the state facility where he served his state sentence. The record reflects that the BOP considered the statutory factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying Cordero’s request. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); Reynolds, 603 F.3d at 1151-52. Setser v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012), does not require a different result.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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