Luis Angel Del Valle Seijo v. U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Assistance Loan Trust 2003-AL2, Series 2003-AL2; Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper; Aldridge Pite, LLP

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
• Decided: September 13, 2021
• Docket: 21-00007
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2 IN RE: CASE NO. 20-01105 (ESL) 3 LUIS ANGEL DEL VALLE SEIJO CHAPTER 13 4 Debtor 5 ADV. PROC. NO. 21-00007 (ESL) 6 LUIS ANGEL DEL VALLE SEIJO

7 Plaintiff

8 vs.

9 U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 10 as Trustee for STRUCTURED ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION 11 ASSISTANCE LOAN TRUST 2003-AL2, SERIES 2003-AL2; NATIONSTAR 12 MORTGAGE LLC D/B/A MR. COOPER; ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP 13

14 Defendants

15 OPINION AND ORDER 16

17 This adversary proceeding is before the court upon the Motion to Dismiss Complaint and 18 the Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 19 & 20) filed by 19 defendant Aldridge Pite, LLP (hereinafter referred to as the “Defendant” or “Aldridge Pite”) 20 arguing that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. 21 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because: (i) the complaint fails to allege well pleaded facts to establish that 22 the Defendant is a “debt collector” and/or a “collection agency” as defined in section 1692(a)(6) 23 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). “Plaintiff’s self-serving allegation that 24 “Defendant Aldridge is a law firm regularly engaged to collect or attempt to collect directly or 25 indirectly, [debts] owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another’ is a conclusory allegation 26 unsupported by any fact and ought not to be considered to defeat a motion to dismiss;” and (ii) 27 courts have consistently ruled that filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy court does not constitute 1 the sort of abusive collection practice proscribed by the FDCPA, and that such a filing cannot 2 serve as the basis for an FDCPA action (Docket No. 20). The Plaintiff/ Debtor filed his Opposition 3 to Motion to Dismiss Count III, But Agreement or Consent to Dismissal of Count II contending 4 that: (i) the Complaint sufficiently pleads that Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined under 5 the FDCPA. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss lacks any factual basis to oppose Plaintiff’s 6 allegations; and (ii) “Defendant’s legal contention that the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy 7 Rules preempt an FDCPA claim for the filing of a violative proof of claim, has been universally 8 rejected by all, but one court, which have recently considered the issue.” (Docket No. 32). For 9 the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. 10 Jurisdiction 11 The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a). This is a core 12 proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§157(b)(1) and (b)(2). Venue of this proceeding is proper under 13 28 U.S.C. §§1408 and 1409. 14 15 Procedural Background 16 The Debtor filed his first bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on 17 May 6, 2016 (Case No. 16-03694). The Debtor included in Schedule A/B: Property a fee simple 18 ownership interest in a single-family home in Bo. Candelaria Carr 647, Km. 5.6 in Vega Alta, PR 19 and disclosed that the current value of the entire property was in the amount of $60,000.00 and 20 the current value of the portion he owned was in the amount of $60,000.00. The debtor also 21 disclosed that the property was made of concrete and had three (3) bedrooms, bathroom, kitchen, 22 living and dining rooms. (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 1). The Debtor in Schedule C: The 23 Property You Claim as Exempt included the same property as in Schedule A/B and disclosed that 24 the amount of the exemption was $60,000.00 pursuant to PRLA §§ 385(a), 1851-1857. The 25 Debtor in Schedule D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property disclosed that there were 26 no creditors that had secured claims over his property. (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 1). The 27 Debtor in Schedule E/F: Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims included Nationstar Mortgage 1 with an unsecured claim for a personal loan in the amount of $35,900.00 (Case No. 16-03694, 2 Docket No. 1). On June 16, 2016, U.S. Bank National Association as Indentured Trustee for 3 Structured Asset Securities Corporation Assistance Loan Trust 2003-AL2, Series 2003-AL2 4 (“U.S. Bank”) filed a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay based upon a mortgage that is 5 secured with the real property Debtor claimed as exempt. U.S. Bank requested the court relief 6 from the stay to proceed with foreclosure proceedings and obtain possession of the property. 7 (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 8). On June 21, 2016, the Debtor filed a Motion to Amend its 8 Chapter 7 Statement of Intention by which the Debtor informed its intention of retaining the real 9 property that secures a debt and direct payments to mortgage creditor Nationstar Mortgage, LLC 10 (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 12). On July 4, 2016, the Debtor filed his Response to the Motion 11 for Relief from Stay requesting thirty (30) days to reach an agreement or cure all post-petition 12 arrears with U.S. Bank (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 15). On July 12, 2016, a hearing was 13 held as to U.S. Bank’s request for relief from the automatic stay and the Court ordered that, 14 “[u]pon the parties agreement, the Debtor to cure arrears within fifteen (15) days. Failure to do 15 so, the stay will be lifted automatically.” (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 16). On July 19, 2016, 16 the parties filed a Settlement Agreement. As part of the terms and conditions of the Settlement 17 Agreement, the following were included: (i) “[t]he Debtors recognize and admit that Secured 18 Creditor is secured by virtue of a validly perfected mortgage lien that encumbers a real property 19 of the estate described in the preamble;” (ii) “[i]f the Debtor fails to cure the arrearage owed to 20 Secured Creditor by July 27, 2016, Secured Creditor is granted in rem relief from the automatic 21 stay, without any further order of the Court;” and (iii) [t]his Settlement settles the issues raised 22 by Secured Creditor’s Motion for Relief from Stay (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 17). On July 23 29, 2016, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a Notice of Abandonment of Property in which he abandoned 24 Debtor’s interest in the real property which he claimed as exempt in the amount of $60,000.00. 25 (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 20). On August 9, 2016, the Court approved the Settlement 26 Agreement/ Stipulation (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 25). On September 8, 2016, the court 27 ordered the Debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. §727 (Case No. 16-03694, Docket No. 29). 1 Thereafter, on February 28, 2020, the Debtor filed his second bankruptcy petition under 2 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code (Case No. 20-01105). The Debtor included in Schedule A/B: 3 Property, a fee simple ownership interest in a single-family home in Bo. Candelaria Carr 647, 4 Km. 5.6 in Vega Alta, PR and disclosed that the current value of the entire property was in the 5 amount of $40,000.00 and the current value of the portion he owned was in the amount of 6 $40,000.00. (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 1). The Debtor in Schedule C: The Property You 7 Claim as Exempt included the same property as in Schedule A/B and disclosed that the amount 8 of the exemption of the real property in Barrio Candelaria was $13,622.79 pursuant to 11 U.S.C.§ 9 522(d)(1). The Debtor in Schedule D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property disclosed 10 that the only secured claimant was Oriental Bank with a claim in the amount of $5,465.95 and the 11 value of the collateral (vehicle: 2014 Toyota Yaris) that supported this claim was in the amount 12 of $5,500.00. (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 1). The Debtor in Schedule E/F: Creditors Who 13 Have Unsecured Claims, the only unsecured claimant that was included was Nationstar Mortgage, 14 LLC with an unsecured claim in the amount of $0.00 (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 1). 15 On March 27, 2020, U.S. Bank filed proof of claim number 1-1 as a secured mortgage 16 creditor and disclosed that its claim was secured by the debtor’s principal residence and the 17 amount of the claim that was secured is in the amount of $45,289.29 and the amount of the claim 18 that was unsecured is in the amount of $0.00 and the amount necessary to cure any default as of 19 the date of the petition was $22,208.73. The court notes that this is the only proof of claim that 20 has been filed in this case. 21 On April 23, 2020, U.S. Bank filed an Objection to Confirmation of Debtor’s Chapter 13 22 Plan because the Chapter 13 plan did not include treatment of U.S. Bank’s secured claim. The 23 subject property and claim are listed in Debtor’s schedules. (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 15). 24 On May 8, 2020, a confirmation hearing was held, and the plan was not confirmed (Case No. 20- 25 01105, Docket No. 20). On May 12, 2020, the Debtor filed an Amended Schedule C in which the 26 Debtor included the same property as in Schedule A/B and disclosed that the amount of the 27 exemption of the real property in Barrio Candelaria was $40,000.00 pursuant to 31 P.R. Laws 1 Ann. §§385(a), 1851 et seq. (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 19). On June 26, 2020, the Debtor 2 filed the First Amended Plan (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 25). On June 26, 2020, the Debtor 3 filed an Objection to Proof of Claim #1 due to the following: (i) the proof of claim was not filed 4 with evidence that the alleged underlying debt is secured by the real property in question and the 5 title search attached to the POC indicated that the real property is free and clear of liens; and (ii) 6 any in personam claim against the Debtor by US Bank was previously discharged in bankruptcy 7 case number 16-03694. (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 26). The court notes that the title study 8 attached to the proof of claim by US Bank and referenced by the Debtor is dated March 17, 1999 9 which predates the date the mortgage was executed which was April 19, 1999. On July 31, 2020, 10 the Court granted the Debtor’s objection to proof of claim #1 given that the same was unopposed 11 (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 31). On August 19, 2020, the Debtor filed a Second Amended 12 Chapter 13 Plan (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 34). On September 15, 2020, the Order 13 confirming the Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan was docketed (Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 14 39). 15 Thereafter, on January 27, 2021, the Debtor filed the instant adversary proceeding based 16 upon willful violation of the discharge injunction, FDCPA, willful violation of the automatic stay 17 and actual and punitive damages. On March 25, 2021, U.S. Bank as serviced by its authorized 18 servicing agent Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper filed its Answer and Affirmative 19 Defenses to Complaint (Docket No. 18). The court notes that U.S. Bank as part of its Answer and 20 Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint attached as Exhibit A, a Title Study dated November 13, 21 2020 that evinces that the mortgage deed and the subsequent modification of the mortgage deed 22 were registered on the Debtor’s parents’ real property (Docket No. 18, Exhibit A, pgs. 29-30). 23 On April 5, 2021, Aldridge Pite filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint and the 24 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Docket Nos. 19 & 20) arguing that the 25 complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 12(b)(6) because: (i) the complaint fails to allege well pleaded facts to establish that the Defendant 27 is a “debt collector” and/or a “collection agency” as defined in section 1692(a)(6) of the FDCPA. 1 “Plaintiff’s self-serving allegation that “Defendant Aldridge is a law firm regularly engaged to 2 collect or attempt to collect directly or indirectly, [debts] owed or due or asserted to be owed or 3 due to another’ is a conclusory allegation unsupported by any fact and ought not to be considered 4 to defeat a motion to dismiss;” and (ii) courts have consistently ruled that filing a proof of claim 5 in bankruptcy court does not constitute the sort of abusive collection practice proscribed by the 6 FDCPA, and that such a filing cannot serve as the basis for an FDCPA action (Docket No. 20). 7 Also, on April 5, 2021, Aldridge Pite filed a Request for Judicial Notice as to certain documents 8 that had been filed as part of the public record in Debtor’s prior bankruptcy petition case (Docket 9 No. 21). On April 20, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Motion Requesting Extension of Time to answer 10 the motion to dismiss and the same was granted on April 21, 2021 (Docket Nos. 22 & 23). On 11 May 20, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a second Motion Requesting Extension of Time to file a response 12 to the motion to dismiss and the same was granted on May 21, 2021 (Docket Nos. 25 & 26). On 13 June 3, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a third Motion Requesting Extension of Time to reply to the motion 14 to dismiss. (Docket Nos. 28). On June 10, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Continuance of 15 Preliminary Pre-Trial and Scheduling Conference (Docket No. 29). On June 10, 2021, the court 16 granted both the Plaintiff’s third request for an extension of time and the motion requesting that 17 the pretrial be continued without a date. (Docket No. 30). On June 17, 2021, the Debtor/Plaintiff 18 filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Count III, But Agreement or Consent to Dismissal 19 of Count II contending that: (i) the Complaint sufficiently pleads that Defendant is a “debt 20 collector” as defined under the FDCPA. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss lacks any factual basis to 21 oppose Plaintiff’s allegations; and (ii) “Defendant’s legal contention that the Bankruptcy Code 22 and Bankruptcy Rules preempt an FDCPA claim for the filing of a violative proof of claim, has 23 been universally rejected by all, but one court, which have recently considered the issue.” (Docket 24 No. 32). 25 Legal Issues 26 The court wants to clarify that the Plaintiff in its Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 27 disclosed that it consents to the dismissal of count II of the complaint which was for willful 1 violations of the discharge injunction but that it opposes count III which is for violations under 2 the FDCPA. The two (2) legal issues regarding the alleged FDCPA violations are: (i) whether the 3 complaint includes well-pleaded facts that establish that Aldridge Pite is a “debt collector” and/or 4 a debt “collection agency” as defined by the FDCPA; and (ii) whether filing a proof of claim in 5 bankruptcy court constitutes the sort of abusive collection practice proscribed by the FDCPA.

6 7 Applicable Law and Analysis 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 9 “The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to assess the legal 10 feasibility of a complaint, not to weigh the evidence which the plaintiff offers or intends to offer.” 11 Velez-Arcay v. Banco Santander de P.R. (In re Velez-Arcay), 499 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. D.P.R. 12 2013), citing Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 13 779 (2nd Cir.1984); Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 745 F. Supp. 899, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 14 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), applicable to adversary proceedings through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 16 7008, mandates that complaints contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 17 the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the Rule 18 does call for sufficient factual matter”. Surita-Acosta v. Reparto Saman Inc. (In re Surita-Acosta), 19 464 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr.D.P.R. 2012). Therefore, to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to 20 dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that, accepted as true, “state[s] a claim 21 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 22 23 A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the 24 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The 25 Twombly standard was further developed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622 (2009), advising 26 lower courts that “determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a 27 context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 556 U.S. at 679. “In keeping with these principles, a court considering a motion 1 2 to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 3 conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the 4 framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well- 5 pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 6 plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. In sum, allegations in a complaint 7 cannot be speculative and must cross “the line between the conclusory and the factual”. 8 Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011). “[A]n adequate complaint 9 10 must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim.” Ocasio- 11 Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011). 12 In Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Committee, 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012), the 13 U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit”) established a two-step standard 14 for motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Step one: isolate legal conclusions. Step 15 two: take the complaint’s well-pleaded (non-conclusory) allegations as true, drawing all 16 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff and determine if they plausibly narrate a claim for 17 18 relief. Also see Pérez v. Rivera (In re Pérez), 2013 WL 1405747 at *3, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1561 19 at **9-10 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2013); Zavatsky v. O’Brien, 902 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140 (D. Mass. 2012); 20 Guadalupe-Báez v. Pesquera, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 7173, *7 (1st Cir. 2016). 21 However, before considering Aldridge Pite's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 12(b)(6), the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the FDCPA claim. 23 Jurisdiction of bankruptcy court to consider actions under the FDCPA 24 25 This court in Roman-Perez v. Operating Partners Co. LLC (In re Roman Perez), 527 B.R. 26 844, 864 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2015) held that, “… remedies under the FDCPA are available in 27 bankruptcy when Debtors have no other remedies for damages under the Bankruptcy Code for the same actions. The court follows the reasoning in Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC: ‘[t]he 1 2 FDCPA is designed to protect defenseless debtors and to give them remedies against abuse by 3 creditors… [t]here is no need to protect debtors who are already under the protection of the 4 bankruptcy court, and there is no need to supplement the remedies afforded by bankruptcy itself. 5 622 F. 3d. at 96.’” 527 B.R. at 864. 6 The Debtor in the instant adversary proceeding before the court consented to the dismissal 7 of count II of the complaint, which was for willful violation of the discharge injunction, but it 8 opposes count III which pertains to violations under the FDCPA for defendant Aldridge Pite. 9 10 This court in In re Roman-Perez, 527 B.R. at 850 provided the legal basis regarding the 11 obligation of a court to sua sponte inquire into its subject matter jurisdiction. The analysis was 12 the following: 13 “[t]he jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts is created and limited by statute. See Celotex Corp. 14 v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 131 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1995). "[A] court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed no 15 further if such jurisdiction is wanting." White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 806 (1st Cir. 1997). Also see In re Sheridan, 362 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2004) ("courts are duty-bound to 16 inquire, sua sponte, even absent objection by any party" into the question of jurisdiction); McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) ("It is black-letter law that a federal 17 court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own subject matter jurisdiction.") 18 Accordingly, jurisdictional issues may be raised by the court sua sponte. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), applicable in bankruptcy adversary proceedings through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 19 7012(b); In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1988) ("a court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed no 20 further if such jurisdiction is wanting"); Goldsmith v. Massad (In re Fiorillo), 494 B.R. 119, 142 (Bankr. D. Ma. 2013) (bankruptcy courts are "obligated to determine whether 21 and to what extent [they] have jurisdiction to hear and determine all counts of the 22 complaints."); Feliciano v. DuBois, 846 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (D. Mass. 1994) ("a court always has an obligation to consider, even on its own initiative as well as on motion of an 23 opposing party, whether it has subject matter jurisdiction"); County Schools, Inc. v. United States Department of Education (In re County Schools), 163 B.R. 424, 426 (Bankr. 24 D. Conn. 1994) (a court may raise jurisdiction issues sua sponte); Trager v. Internal 25 Revenue Service (In re North Star Contracting Corp.), 146 B.R. 514, 518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); In re Perry, 391 F.3d 282, 284-285 (1st Cir. 2004) (requesting, 26 sua sponte, supplemental briefing on a jurisdictional issue). "No matter how tantalizing a problem may be, a federal [] court cannot scratch intellectual itches unless it has 27 jurisdiction to reach them." Director, OWCP v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11, 13 1 (1st Cir. 1988).” In re Roman-Perez, 527 B.R. at 850-51. 2 3 The court in Martinez Arzuaga v. Quantum, Servicing Corp. (In re Martinez Arzuaga), 4 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1443 at *12-13, 2012 WL 1120673 at *5 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012) analyzed 5 whether a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under the FDCPA and its 6 analysis was the following: 7 “[w]hether the claims are sufficiently "related to" a bankruptcy case is a question of 8 whether they are "sufficiently connected" to the debtor's reorganization. The Third Circuit has established a much-cited standard for determining whether a proceeding is "related." 9 In Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3rd Cir. 1984), the court described the test as 10 whether "the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy." The First Circuit has recognized this standard. See In 11 re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir. 1991). In addition, numerous First Circuit, district and bankruptcy courts have accepted and applied this test. See, e.g., In re Santa 12 Clara County Child Care Consortium, 223 B.R. 40, 45 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998) [*13] (providing a lengthy list of First Circuit district and bankruptcy courts 13 adopting the Pacor test). Simply stated, if the determination of the controversy could have 14 an effect on the bankruptcy estate, the controversy is a "related matter." 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(a). 15 A FDCPA claim does not "arise under" or "arise in" a Title 11 case, nor is it "related to" 16 a Title 11 case because win, lose or draw, the outcome of Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim cannot conceivably have any effect on the bankruptcy estate because the Plan has been completed 17 and because the discharge has been entered. See McGlynn v. Credit Store, Inc., 234 B.R. 18 576, 584 (D.R.I. 1999) quoting In re Goldstein, 201 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr.D.Me. 1996) and Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (reversed on other grounds). An 19 FDCPA claim regarding post-discharge conduct that does not impact in any way the bankruptcy estate does not fall under Title 11's jurisdictional umbrella because any 20 remedies gained under the FDCPA inure to the plaintiff and not to the bankruptcy estate. Id.” 21

22 See also In re Roman-Perez, 527 B.R. at 852-854; Torres Melendez v. Collazo Connelly & Surillo, LLC (In re Torres Melendez), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 297, at *4-5 (Bankr. D.P.R. 23 Feb. 3, 2020). 24 “Hence, an action is ‘related to’ bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor’s rights, 25 liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any 26 way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankruptcy estate.” In Pacor, 27 Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d at 994. The amended chapter 13 plan of reorganization was confirmed on September 15, 2020 (Lead Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 39). The amended confirmed plan dated August 19, 2020 3 (Lead Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 34) only pays attorney’s fees under part 4.3 of the plan. 4 || The only proof of claim in this case was filed by U.S. Bank. The Debtor objected to this claim 5 || and the same was granted on July 31, 2020 because no response was filed (Lead Case No. 20- 6 || 91105, Docket No. 31). In the instant case, if the Plaintiff successfully prosecutes the FDCPA 7 claim, any recovery would be for his personal benefit, not the estate’s given that pursuant to the confirmed amended plan there are no claims to be paid through the plan, except for the attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,635.00 (Lead Case No. 20-01105, Docket Nos. 34 & 39). The plan base ? was in the amount of $10,800 and thus far $3,900.00 has been paid as of July 29, 2021 pursuant 10 || to the Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss (Lead Case No. 20-01105, Docket No. 63). As of August 2, 11 2021, the total amount of $4,900.00 has been approved for attorney’s fees through four (4) 12 || applications for compensation (Lead Case No. 20-01105, Docket Nos 29, 38, 43 & 64). The 13 confirmed amended plan dated August 19, 2020 only contemplates to pay for attorney’s fees. 4 Moreover, the only claim filed in the instant case was disallowed. Thus, the only party that would benefit if the Debtor pays the plan arrears would be the attorney. More importantly if the 1S prosecution of the claim is successful, any recovery would be for the Debtor’s personal benefit, 16 |! not the Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate’s. There is no nexus between the determination of this 17 || controversy and the administration of the estate. Therefore, this court finds that it has no 18 || jurisdictional authority over Plaintiff's FDCPA claim. 19 20 Conclusion 21 In view of the foregoing, this court finds that it has no jurisdictional authority over 22 || Plaintiff's FDCPA claim. Therefore, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. 23 SO ORDERED. 24 In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 13" day of September, 2021. 25 26 Axfacnguile

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