Luis Alvarado v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 12, 2022
DocketNY-1221-16-0281-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Luis Alvarado v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Luis Alvarado v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luis Alvarado v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LUIS A. ALVARADO, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, NY-1221-16-0281-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: August 12, 2022 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Luis A. Alvarado, Cidra, Puerto Rico, pro se.

Ana M. Margarida, Esquire, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). 2 ¶2 The appellant, a Podiatric Physician at the VA Medical Center in San Juan, Puerto Rico, filed an IRA appeal in which he argued that the agency had retaliated against him by suspending him for 14 days because he encouraged a subordinate to pursue allegations of sexual harassment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 4. With his appeal, the appellant submitted a copy of a July 5, 2016 letter of decision, mitigating his proposed removal for misconduct to a 14 -day suspension, effective July 25 through August 11, 2016. Id. at 8-9. The appellant also submitted a May 17, 2016 letter from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) notifying him that it was closing its file on “his complaint” and affording him the right to pursue the matter to the Board. Id. at 12. The appellant requested a hearing. Id. at 3. ¶3 In acknowledging the appeal, the administrative judge alerted the appellant to a possible jurisdictional issue related to exhaustion. IAF, Tab 3. She explained the means by which he could establish exhaustion , and she ordered him to demonstrate that he exhausted his OSC remedy as to the matter being appealed 2 We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal. 3

and to otherwise establish the Board’s jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. The appellant did not respond. ¶4 In an initial decision based on the written record, the administrative judge first found that, as a health care professional appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1), the appellant can bring an IRA appeal to the Board . Harding v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 448 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Hawker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 62, 64 n.1 (2015); IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. The administrative judge further found, however, that the appellant failed to establish that he exhausted his remedy with OSC regarding the 14-day suspension. ID at 4. Accordingly, she dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 5. ¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1, to which the agency has responded in opposition , PFR File, Tab 3. ¶6 On review, the appellant argues that he did not respond to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order because it was sent to him while he was serving the 14-day suspension, that, during that time, he was not at his address of record, but rather on “free time away from home,” and that, when he returned on August 12, 2016, he read the Board’s letter with a “past due date of 8/10/16.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. It is well established that an appellant is responsible for ensuring the receipt of his mail. Lima v. Department of the Air Force, 101 M.S.P.R. 64, ¶ 4 (2006). We find, therefore, that the appellant’s delayed receipt of the administrative judge’s order was the product of his failure to advise the Board that he would not be at his address of record during the 15 calendar days the administrative judge gave him to respond to the jurisdictional order. Moreover, he has failed to explain why he did not respond to the administrative judge’s order when he returned to his home, notwithstanding the due date, since the initial decision was not issued until approximately 2 weeks later. See, e.g., Young v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 961 F.3d 1323, 1326 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (outlining that in her IRA appeal, the appellant did not 4

respond to the administrative judge’s order on jurisdiction nor did she seek an extension to do so). Nor has the appellant set forth what his response to the administrative judge’s order would have been and how it would have affected the outcome of his appeal. ¶7 The appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on his failure to show that he exhausted his remedy with OSC as to his 14-day suspension. As the administrative judge correctly found, the closure letter the appellant submitted could not relate to the suspension because OSC closed its file on that complaint nearly 2 months before the appellant learned that the suspension would be imposed. ID at 5. Although ordered to do so, IAF, Tab 3 at 3, the appellant did not submit a copy of the OSC complaint he filed, or any additional correspondence, that relates to the closure letter he submitted. As such, he has not shown that the administrative judge erred in finding that he failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, 3 Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 26 (2013), and that therefore his appeal was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1).

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Related

Mohammed Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs
242 F.3d 1367 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Young v. MSPB
961 F.3d 1323 (Federal Circuit, 2020)

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Bluebook (online)
Luis Alvarado v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luis-alvarado-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2022.