Luis ALBORS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee

817 F.2d 146, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 36940, 17 Soc. Serv. Rev. 687
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedDecember 10, 1986
Docket86-1482
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 817 F.2d 146 (Luis ALBORS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luis ALBORS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, 817 F.2d 146, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 36940, 17 Soc. Serv. Rev. 687 (1st Cir. 1986).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Claimant has a back and neck ailment. Both claimant’s treating physician and the Secretary’s consulting doctor have reported various “objective” findings. These include CAT scan reports of severe osteoarthritic changes of cervical spine with foraminal narrowing, less severe degenerative changes of the lumbar spine, and limited cervical (neck) and lumbar spine range of motion. The doctors disagree, however, both on the particular diagnosis to assign to claimant’s condition and on the extent claimant’s functional capacity is limited. Dr. Nater, the treating physician, concluded claimant cannot perform any type of work, has to spend most of his time in bed, and will never be able to work because the condition is progressive. In contrast, a nonexamining physician who filled out a residual functional capacity form on the basis of the consulting neurologist’s exam concluded claimant had a “moderate impairment due to severe skeletal changes [with] marked decrease in ROM [range of motion] of cervical spine” but nevertheless could lift up to fifty pounds, sit six hours, walk or stand six hours, and generally do medium work except that requiring repetitive head movements.

*147 Claimant, who was sixty-one at the time of the hearing, testified he has constant neck and back pain which is intensified by movement. He can stand or walk an hour or drive short distances, but not the long distance required in his former work as an assistant sales manager, and sitting is painful, he said. On an average day, he will get up, walk awhile, sit awhile, read a little, and do walking exercises. He has had physical therapy in the past or heat therapy. Presently, he apparently takes no stronger pain medication than aspirin.

A vocational expert (VE) testified that claimant’s past work — assistant sales manager in a brewery — was skilled and that claimant had acquired various intellectual, analytical, and interpersonal skills transferable to such jobs as quality control clerk in the pharmaceutical industry or billing clerk. None of the named positions, the VE said, required repetitive neck movements and claimant would be able to alternate positions.

The ALJ concluded claimant’s complaints of pain were not credible to the degree of disfunction alleged. He ruled claimant could not return to his former work which required so much driving, but could perform the jobs listed by the VE. The AU also applied grid rule 201.07 (residual functional capacity for sedentary work, advanced age, high school graduate, past skilled work, transferable skills) which directs a finding of not disabled.

Claimant makes two main arguments: 1) that the AU should have given more weight to claimant’s complaints of pain and 2) that the VE and AU erred in concluding claimant had transferable skills.

1. Pain. According to the consulting neurologist, claimant has normal muscle tone and strength and no atrophy or involuntary movements. True, studies of claimant’s spine have shown some severe osteoarthritic changes, and claimant has mild spasms and decreased range of motion. The non-examining physician, however, specifically took this into account in assessing claimant’s residual functional capacity. This, together with the fact that claimant apparently takes nothing stronger than aspirin, supports the AU’s rejection of claimant’s assertions of disabling pain.

2. Transferable skills. Grid rule 201.07, which the AU applied, directs a finding of not disabled. Grid rule 201.06 directs a finding of disabled. The only difference between the two rules is that rule 201.06 (disabled) applies when a claimant’s skills are not transferable whereas rule 201.07 (not disabled) applies when the skills are transferable. 1 Consequently, a critical issue is whether claimant has transferable skills.

Claimant’s past work was as an assistant sales manager, a position he held from 1968 to 1982. He had three supervisors and eight to thirteen salesmen under his direction. He trained these persons, instructed them on sales policy, credit policy, and relating to clients, checked their work, and prepared reports. He travelled daily, meeting with the employees and visiting clients.

In response to the AU’s request to enumerate the skills claimant has acquired in *148 his past job as sales supervisor, the VE testified as follows:

“There are activities such as dealing with persons that is a skill that is acquired; to be able to supervise persons; to be able to communicate effectively with other persons; to coordinate his movements; capacity to interpret reports; capacity to prepare reports.”

The VE said these skills were transferable:

“Well, I understand that they could be transferable to this type of activity. Activities that we could find, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry, the work as quality control clerks. Works such as ... tablet inspector.
“Within the medical/hospital industry, we could find works as billing clerks; works such as statistics officers.
“Basically in billing clerk, his analysis capacity, the capacity to interpret, the capacity to prepare reports; obviously these are skilled activities that he has already acquired and he could transfer easily in this type of activity.”

Claimant argues that the various transferable “skills” the VE identified were not in actuality skills, but rather were common traits or aptitudes that even the most unskilled worker would have.

Of course, the majority of all workers do have to think, communicate, and deal with other persons, at least to some small degree, and thus at that minimal level, basic thinking and communication many not technically be skills, as that term is used in the regulation. But the VE was testifying with respect to claimant’s past job which required claimant to visit clients daily, to supervise supervisors, and to prepare reports. The question is whether the communicative, intellectual, and interpersonal abilities necessary to perform successfully at that level could be properly classified as acquired “skills.”

Social Security Ruling 82-41 defines skill as follows:

“a. What a ‘skill’ is. A skill is knowledge of a work activity which requires the exercise of significant judgment that goes beyond the carrying out of simple job duties and is acquired through performance of an occupation which is above the unskilled level (requires more than 30 days to learn). It is practical and familiar knowledge of the principles and processes of an art, science or trade, combined with the ability to apply them in practice in a proper and approved manner. This includes activities like making precise measurements, reading blueprints, and setting up and operating complex machinery. A skill gives a person a special advantage over unskilled workers in the labor market.”

As an example of a job requiring highly developed interpersonal skills, the ruling refers to a president or chief executive officer of a business organization who “may need exceptional ability to deal with people____” The ruling continues,

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817 F.2d 146, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 36940, 17 Soc. Serv. Rev. 687, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luis-albors-plaintiff-appellant-v-secretary-of-health-and-human-ca1-1986.