COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Frank and Clements Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
LUIS ALBERTO NAVARRETTE MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0403-01-4 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS OCTOBER 8, 2002 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY Paul F. Sheridan, Judge
Gary H. Smith for appellant.
Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Luis Alberto Navarrette was convicted in a jury trial of
three counts of rape of a child under the age of thirteen, in
violation of Code § 18.2-61. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress the inculpatory
statements he involuntarily made to police during a custodial
interrogation that violated his constitutional rights and (2) the
Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm Navarrette's
convictions.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this
case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. value, this opinion recites only those facts and other incidents
of the proceedings as necessary to the parties' understanding of
the disposition of this appeal.
I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
On appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, the burden is on the appellant to show that the denial
of the motion constituted reversible error. See Fore v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980). In
reviewing such a denial, we consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to the Commonwealth
all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407
S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
pertinent evidence presented in this case established that, on
March 2, 2000, Kaiser Permanente informed the Arlington County
Police Department that M.N., an eleven-year-old patient of theirs,
was pregnant. During an interview with the police that same day,
M.N. reported that Navarrette, her uncle, who lived with her
family, had had sexual intercourse with her.
That same day, two detectives in plain clothes and a
Spanish-speaking uniformed officer, Isaac Ruiz, went to
Navarrette's apartment around 11:30 p.m. The officers knocked on
the front door of the apartment. When M.N.'s father opened the
door, Ruiz told him that they were there about his daughter's case
- 2 - and wanted to speak to Navarrette. The father let the officers
in, telling them his brother, Navarrette, was asleep in the
bedroom. Accompanied by Ruiz, the father knocked on the bedroom
door, opened it, and pointed out Navarrette.
Not turning on the lights in the room because other people
were asleep in the room, Ruiz saw Navarrette sitting on the bed.
As a precaution, Ruiz scanned the room with his flashlight but saw
nothing of concern. Identifying himself as a police officer, Ruiz
informed Navarrette he was there in reference to M.N.'s case and
asked him to get dressed and come into the other room.
Although initially groggy, Navarrette quickly woke up and was
responsive. He got dressed, came out of the bedroom, and sat at
the kitchen table next to M.N.'s father. With Ruiz translating,
the detectives told Navarrette they were there about M.N.'s case
and asked if he minded coming to the police station with them to
answer some questions. Navarrette replied, "No problem." Ruiz
told Navarrette he was not under arrest. He was not handcuffed.
Ruiz testified that the demeanor of the officers in the apartment
was "passive" throughout their encounter with Navarrette. They
never, Ruiz testified, raised their voices in speaking to
Navarrette.
Before leaving, Navarrette went back to the bedroom to get
his wallet. Ruiz accompanied him and used his flashlight to
assist him in finding his wallet.
- 3 - Leaving the apartment, Navarrette walked "causally" with the
officers to Ruiz's marked police cruiser. When Ruiz unlocked the
car, Navarrette opened the rear door himself and got in. The car
had no "cage," the doors were unlocked, and the interior door
handles were operational. One of the detectives sat up front with
Ruiz, who drove. M.N.'s father rode to the police station with
the other detective. The drive to the police station took five
minutes. M.N.'s father testified that, before they left for the
police station, the officers told Navarrette and him, "[W]e'll
bring you back," which he understood to mean that they would bring
both of them back to the apartment following the questioning at
the police station.
At the police station, Officer Ruiz escorted Navarrette to
the interview room on the eighth floor. Arriving at the room,
Ruiz showed Navarrette where to sit and offered to get him a Coke
to drink. Navarrette initially declined the offer but accepted
when Ruiz again offered to get him a drink five minutes later.
Later, while they awaited the arrival of the investigating
detective, Ruiz showed Navarrette to the bathroom. Ruiz waited
for Navarrette outside the bathroom in the hall because a "pass
card" was needed to get back into the interview room area.
Navarrette "seemed a little tired" to Ruiz, but he had no problems
communicating and was responsive to the questions asked.
At approximately 1:45 a.m., Detective Skeens, who was in
plain clothes, arrived at the interview room. Navarrette had his
- 4 - head resting on his hands when Skeens and Ruiz first entered the
interview room, but looked up as they came in. According to
Skeens, Navarrette "seemed to be alert" and was "pretty
responsive." Neither officer had a weapon. The door remained
open during the interview, and Navarrette was not handcuffed.
Skeens, who spoke only English, asked Navarrette if he would
answer some questions, and Navarrette, who appeared "really awake"
to Ruiz, agreed to speak with him. Skeens explained to Navarrette
that there were allegations that Navarrette had engaged in sexual
intercourse with his eleven-year-old niece. Skeens further
informed Navarrette that he was not under arrest, that he did not
have to talk to the police, and that arrangements would be made to
get him a ride home if he wanted to leave.
According to Ruiz, Navarrette began the interview speaking to
Skeens in English. Later, Ruiz testified, Navarrette would
sometimes respond immediately in Spanish to Skeens' question
without needing Ruiz to translate the question. Ruiz would then
translate Navarrette's response into English for Skeens. Other
times, Navarrette would immediately restate Skeens' question in
Spanish to Ruiz, who would confirm that it was the correct
question. Navarrette would then respond to the question in
English or Spanish. Ruiz testified he had no trouble speaking
with Navarrette or understanding what he was saying.
Navarrette initially denied the allegations that he had had
sexual relations with his niece, saying "he would have to be some
- 5 - kind of animal to do that." However, when Skeens informed
Navarrette that his niece was pregnant and suggested Navarrette
may have been forced to do things against his will by her,
Navarrette admitted he had had sexual intercourse with her at
least ten different times, stating it was her fault for flirting
with him. After confirming with Navarrette that the admitted acts
indeed constituted sexual intercourse, Skeens placed him under
arrest. Skeens then had Ruiz read Navarrette a Miranda rights
form in Spanish, which Navarrette signed at 3:05 a.m.
During the interview, Navarrette never stated he wanted to
leave or stop answering questions. He never asked to speak to his
brother. Skeens and Ruiz both testified the officers did not bang
on the table, raise their voices to Navarrette, become angry with
him, or threaten him during the interview.
Testifying at the suppression hearing, Navarrette denied he
ever had sex with his niece. He testified he repeatedly told the
police during the interrogation he did not have sexual intercourse
with M.N. He further testified, however, that, after Skeens
became upset, banged on the table, and demanded the truth, he told
the police he had had sexual intercourse with M.N. in the hope he
would be released. Acknowledging neither officer at the interview
told him he would be released if he admitted he had had sexual
intercourse with his niece, he was, he testified, tired at the
time and thought he would be let go if he said he had done so. He
was tired, he stated, because he had gotten up on March 2, 2001,
- 6 - at 4:00 a.m., worked nine hours at his construction job pouring
concrete for house foundations, driven his girlfriend to her job
where he helped her clean an office building until 9:30 p.m., and
gone to bed at 10:30 p.m., before being woken by the police a
short time later.
Dr. Gloria Morote, a neuro-psychologist, testified she
determined from testing that Navarrette was in the mentally
deficient range for verbal intelligence and in the low average
range for nonverbal intelligence. Such a deviation in the two
intelligence ranges, Morote testified, was characteristic of
someone with a "language-related processing disorder[]." Such a
disorder, Morote explained, would cause one to have problems
receiving and processing information and communicating clearly.
Based on the results of a test for malingering, Dr. Morote
concluded that Navarrette did not purposefully score low on the
verbal intelligence test. Based on the results of a test
administered to Navarrette's sister to measure Navarrette's
compliance in the presence of authority figures, Morote concluded
that Navarrette was "more compliant than ninety-five percent of
the population," meaning he would be likely to "give in or to cave
under pressure, . . . or to just not stand up for himself."
Dr. Morote further testified she performed a "thorough"
history of Navarrette's educational background. According to her
testimony, however, Navarrette told her he attended school from
the age of five until he was sixteen, but only completed sixth
- 7 - grade because he repeated first grade. Timewise, Morote
testified, this "didn't . . . make sense," but she offered no
explanation.
A. Voluntariness of Confession
Navarrette contends that his admission to the police that he
had sexual intercourse with his niece was not made voluntarily.
Specifically, he argues that, given his low intelligence, his
language-related processing disorder, his inordinate propensity to
comply with authority figures, and his extreme state of fatigue at
the time of the interrogation, his will was overborne when the
police woke him in the middle of the night, took him to the police
station, and interrogated him for nearly three hours, at times
banging on the table and demanding the truth while confronting him
with accusations that he raped his niece. Having initially denied
having had sexual intercourse with his niece, Navarrette
eventually told the police he did, he asserts, as a result of his
confusion and stress, in the hope that he would be released.
Thus, Navarrette concludes, his inculpatory statements were not
voluntary and the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress them.
"The Commonwealth has the burden to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a defendant's confession was freely and
voluntarily given." Bottenfield v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 316,
323, 487 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997). The issue of voluntariness is a
question of law requiring an independent determination on appeal.
- 8 - E.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 551, 413 S.E.2d
655, 656 (1992). However, in making that independent
determination, "we are bound by the trial court's subsidiary
factual findings unless those findings are plainly wrong." Id.
"In assessing voluntariness, [we] must determine whether 'the
statement is the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker," or . . . whether the maker's will "has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired."'" Roberts v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 557, 445
S.E.2d 709, 711 (1994) (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va.
124, 140, 314 S.E.2d 371, 381 (1984) (quoting Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))). To make that
determination, we must look to the "'totality of all the
surrounding circumstances,'" Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App.
486, 488, 424 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1992) (quoting Gray v.
Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1987)),
including "the defendant's age, intelligence, mental and physical
condition, background and experience with the criminal justice
system, the conduct of the police, and the circumstances of the
interview." Bottenfield, 25 Va. App. at 323, 487 S.E.2d at 886.
While the "mental condition of the defendant is 'surely relevant
to [his] susceptibility to police coercion[,]' . . . evidence of
coercive police activity 'is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not "voluntary."'" Peterson, 15 Va. App. at
488, 424 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.
- 9 - 157, 167 (1986)). In other words, "some level of coercive police
activity must occur before a statement or confession can be said
to be involuntary." Id. Furthermore, the police misconduct must
be "'causally related to the confession.'" Williams v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 73, 354 S.E.2d 79, 90 (1987)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164). In
considering the conduct of the police, we "must consider the
interrogation techniques employed, including evidence of trickery
and deceit, psychological pressure, threats or promises of
leniency, and duration and circumstances of the interrogation."
Terrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 291, 403 S.E.2d 387, 390
(1991).
We are further mindful, in assessing whether Navarrette's
inculpatory statements were voluntarily made, that "[c]onflicts in
evidence present factual questions that are to be resolved by the
trial court," which "'must evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses, resolve the conflicts in their testimony and weigh the
evidence as a whole.'" Mills v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 459,
468, 418 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1992) (quoting Albert v. Commonwealth, 2
Va. App. 734, 738, 347 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1986)). The trier of fact
is not required to accept a party's evidence in its entirety, but
is free to believe or disbelieve in part or in whole the testimony
of any witness. Rollison v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 537, 547,
399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991).
- 10 - Here, the trial judge rejected Dr. Morote's testimony
regarding Navarrette's intelligence and cognitive abilities,
finding the "premise of [her] factual collection of information
. . . inconsistent with the facts" of the case. In reaching that
decision, the trial judge found:
Officer Ruiz spent time with this man, heard him speak in English, heard him mentally work out what was being said to him, had him translate the English question accurately to Spanish, turn to Ruiz and go back to the English-speaking questioner. His cognitive ability, his language skills, his responsiveness, his state-of-mind, Ruiz is the one who is very important in that decision.
* * * * * * *
The expert is very qualified and very persuasive and very helpful to the Court, but the facts upon which she relies are not facts that appear persuasive to this Court.
I'm not persuaded these I.Q. numbers are right.
I had the opportunity to witness this man and listen to him, watch him. He is – I mean in fifteen years of watching criminal defendants under the pressure of litigation, indictment and courtroom proceedings, he is certainly not in the bottom in terms of intelligence, verbal and otherwise.
His communication skills are right – there is no way he is retarded.
- 11 - [H]e persuades me both by demeanor and responsiveness and apparent intelligence today, that he does have the capacity to make reasonable choices and voluntary choices, and have a free will in what he chooses to do or what he chooses not to do.
These subsidiary factual findings by the trial court are
supported by credible evidence in the record and are not plainly
wrong. As noted by the trial judge, Officer Ruiz's testimony
regarding Navarrette's capacity to correctly translate Skeens'
questions into Spanish before Ruiz translated them evinces
Navarrette's ability to effectively process language and
communicate. Moreover, the transcript of Navarrette's testimony
at the suppression hearing clearly does not reflect the
declarations of a person with a low level of intelligence, a
language-related processing disorder, or a problem with excessive
compliance. To the contrary, Navarrette's answers to the
questions asked during direct and cross-examination, as translated
into English by the in-court interpreter, were consistently
articulate, responsive, precise, and given without apparent
hesitation or confusion. Additionally, several times during
cross-examination and questioning by the trial judge, Navarrette
unwaveringly denied having done the act addressed in the question.
Accordingly, because it is supported by credible evidence and not
plainly wrong, we are bound by the trial court's factual finding
that Navarrette's intelligence and mental condition did not impair
his capacity for self-determination.
- 12 - As to Navarrette's claim that his extreme state of fatigue at
the time of the interview rendered his inculpatory statements
involuntary, our review of the record convinces us that this
contention is also without merit. While Navarrette was plainly
awakened in the middle of the night from a short sleep after a
long workday, 1 no evidence shows that his capacity for
self-determination was impaired by fatigue. He was groggy at his
apartment when he first awoke, but he quickly became alert. At
the police station, he appeared to be "a little tired" to Ruiz,
but he was alert and responsive. Although he was at the police
station for nearly two hours before Detective Skeens arrived for
the interview, the interview itself lasted only a little over an
hour. There was no indication that he was falling asleep during
the interview or that he was disoriented or confused. According
to Ruiz, he was "really awake" during the interview. To Skeens,
he "seemed alert" and "responsive."
Moreover, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the evidence does not establish any coercive police
misconduct. There is no evidence that the police used trickery or
deceit, psychological pressure, or threats or promises of leniency
to elicit Navarrette's confession. According to Skeens and Ruiz,
neither officer raised his voice during the interview, got angry,
banged on the table, or threatened Navarrette. Furthermore,
1 Nothing in the record indicates the police knew of Navarrette's long workday.
- 13 - Skeens told Navarrette he was not under arrest, did not have to
speak with the police, and would be given a ride home if he wanted
to leave.
Additionally, Navarrette is an adult. He attended school
until he was sixteen years old, regularly drove a car, and had a
job.
Considering the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances, we conclude, as did the trial court, that
Navarrette's will was not overborne, his capacity for
self-determination was not critically impaired, and his confession
was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.
Accordingly, we hold that Navarrette's admission to the police
that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with M.N. was freely and
voluntarily given.
B. Custodial Status
Navarrette also contends his confession was given during a
custodial interrogation conducted by the police. Although not
arrested at the time of his confession, Navarrette argues that,
based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding his
confession, a reasonable person in his shoes would have understood
that he was not free to ignore the officers' requests to answer
questions or to leave the police station. Therefore, he argues,
he was entitled to Miranda warnings before he made the inculpatory
statements, and the failure of the police to give such warnings
- 14 - prior to his inculpatory statements required suppression of his
confession. We disagree.
A person who "has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" is
entitled to be given Miranda warnings before being questioned by
police. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Miranda
applies when a person has been deprived of his freedom of action
to the "degree associated with a formal arrest." California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). To make this
determination, "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man
in the suspect's shoes would have understood the situation."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). "The totality of
circumstances must be considered in determining whether the
suspect is in custody when questioned . . . ." Wass v.
Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 32, 359 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1987).
The circumstances may include factors such as the familiarity or neutrality of the surroundings, the number of officers present, the degree of physical restraint, the duration and character of the interrogation, the presence of probable cause to arrest, and whether the suspect has become the focus of the investigation.
Cherry v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 135, 140, 415 S.E.2d 242, 245
(1992).
The record before us indicates that, when the three police
officers went to Navarrette's home, they explained to him that
they were there about M.N.'s case and asked him to voluntarily
- 15 - come to the police station to answer some questions. Two officers
were in plain clothes, and the uniformed officer was there to
interpret for Navarrette and the other officers. No guns were
displayed, and Navarrette was told he was not under arrest. He
was never handcuffed. Navarrette had the opportunity to speak to
other family members. Navarrette was allowed to return to his
room to get his wallet before leaving, and Officer Ruiz assisted
in finding the wallet with his flashlight.
When they left for the police station, Navarrette got into
Officer Ruiz's vehicle on his own. The doors of the unmarked
police car were unlocked, the car had no "cage," and the rear
interior door handles were operational. Navarrette and his
brother were told that the officers would bring them back home
after the questioning.
At the police station Navarrette was given a Coke and
permitted to use the bathroom. The door to the interview room was
open. Neither of the officers present at the interview displayed
a weapon. At the beginning of the interview Navarrette was again
told that he was not under arrest, did not have to talk to the
officers, and arrangements would be made to take him home if he
wanted to leave. Navarrette was not constrained in any way prior
to or during the interview. The officers remained calm throughout
the interview.
Although Navarrette was a subject of Skeens' investigation,
Skeens did not initially confront Navarrette with M.N.'s specific
- 16 - allegations against him. Instead, he told Navarrette that there
were allegations that something might have happened between
Navarrette and his niece and he wanted to get Navarrette's side of
the story. Eventually, Skeens revealed that M.N. was pregnant and
that she had indicated Navarrette might be involved. Skeens
suggested M.N. may have forced Navarrette to do things against his
will. Only then did Navarrette admit he had had sexual
intercourse with his niece, at which point Skeens placed him under
arrest.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that a reasonable man in Navarrette's shoes would not have
considered himself in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way during the interview with Skeens.
We hold, therefore, that Navarrette was not in custody for Miranda
purposes.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to
suppress Navarrette's inculpatory statements.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Navarrette contends the evidence was insufficient to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime of rape because his
extrajudicial confession was not sufficiently corroborated. The
Commonwealth contends Navarrette is procedurally barred from
raising this argument on appeal because he made no such argument
before the trial court. Navarrette concedes he did not
specifically raise the issue of corpus delicti in his motions to
- 17 - strike. He maintains, however, that his general sufficiency
argument at trial was sufficient to preserve this issue for
appeal. In the alternative, Navarrette asks us to invoke the
"ends of justice" exception to Rule 5A:18 to consider his claim.
Rule 5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial court
. . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the
objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the
time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the
Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice." "The purpose
of the rule is to ensure that the trial court and opposing party
are given the opportunity to intelligently address, examine, and
resolve issues in the trial court, thus avoiding unnecessary
appeals." Andrews v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 479, 493, 559
S.E.2d 401, 408 (2002). Consequently, we "will not consider an
argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court."
Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488
(1998). Likewise, we will not consider an argument on appeal that
is different from the specific argument presented to the trial
court, even if it relates to the same general issue. See Floyd v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 584, 249 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1978)
(holding that only the same specific sufficiency argument
presented to the trial court may be considered on appeal).
Here, it is clear the trial court had no opportunity to
consider Navarrette's claim that his confession was not
sufficiently corroborated to establish the corpus delicti.
- 18 - Indeed, the only issue raised by Navarrette in his motion to
strike was the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the dates
cited in the indictments. We hold, therefore, that, because the
trial court never had the opportunity to consider whether
Navarrette's confession was sufficiently corroborated to establish
the corpus delicti, we are barred by Rule 5A:18 from considering
that issue on appeal.
Moreover, our review of the record in this case does not
reveal any reason to invoke the "ends of justice" exception to
Rule 5A:18. "[T]he ends of justice exception is narrow and is to
be used sparingly . . . ." Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126,
132, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989). "In order to avail oneself of the
exception, a defendant must affirmatively show that a miscarriage
of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have
occurred." Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221, 487
S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997). The defendant must show that he "was
convicted for conduct that was not a criminal offense or the
record must affirmatively prove that an element of the offense did
not occur." Id. at 221-22, 487 S.E.2d at 272-73.
In every criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth must prove the element of corpus delicti, that is, the fact that the crime charged has been actually perpetrated. Further, if the accused has fully confessed that he committed the crime, then only slight corroboration of the confession is required to establish corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
- 19 - Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 305, 513 S.E.2d 642, 651
(1999) (citation omitted).
Here, Navarrette fully confessed to having sexual intercourse
with M.N. on numerous occasions over a period of one and a half
years. One of M.N.'s aunts testified that she saw Navarrette and
M.N. together in M.N.'s bedroom with the door closed on several
occasions. Another aunt testified that she observed the pair
"kissing like a couple" when she entered the bedroom and found
M.N. lying on top of Navarrette in the bed. The same aunt also
testified that, on another occasion, she saw the pair in the
bedroom watching a pornographic movie.
From this record, Navarrette does not affirmatively persuade
us, as he must, that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. We
hold, therefore, that the "ends of justice" exception does not
require us to consider this argument on appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm Navarrette's convictions.
Affirmed.
- 20 -