Luis A. Rodriguez-Ocasio, Etc. v. I.C. System, Inc.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: A-3857-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3857-23

LUIS A. RODRIGUEZ-OCASIO, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

I.C. SYSTEM, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________

Argued September 30, 2025 – Decided November 12, 2025

Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2761-22.

Monica M. Littman argued the cause for appellant (Kaufman Dolowich, LLP, attorneys; Monica M. Littman and Richard J. Perr, on the briefs).

Yongmoon Kim argued the cause for respondent (Kim Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Philip D. Stern and Yongmoon Kim, on the brief).

PER CURIAM In this class action appeal, defendant I.C. System, Inc, a debt collection

agency, appeals from a June 25, 2024 order granting class certification,

establishing two subclasses based on the version of the collections letter a party

received, and appointing plaintiff Luis A. Rodriquez-Ocasio as class

representative. Although the court detailed its reasoning for granting class

certification, it did not adequately articulate its rationale for the appointment of

plaintiff as class representative of both subclasses. Therefore, we affirm the part

of the order granting class certification. We remand in part for the court to make

findings on whether plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately represent the

interests of both subclasses.

I.

The pertinent facts are not disputed. In 2017, plaintiff sought pet services

from Banfield Pet Hospital (Banfield) and signed a payment agreement for those

services. The agreement contained a provision for collection costs in the event

of nonpayment, stating:

Whether or not a legal action is commenced, Member agrees to pay and reimburse Provider for any and all fees and costs of any collection agency, which may be based on a percentage of the debt (up to the maximum percentage of 33%), and all fees, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Provider in such collection efforts.

A-3857-23 2 Plaintiff incurred a debt to Banfield. When plaintiff failed to pay, the

matter was transmitted to defendant for collection. In June 2018, defendant sent

plaintiff a collection letter regarding the delinquent account. The letter set forth

the following amounts and balance due:

Principal Due: $593.45 Collection Charge Due: $103.85 BALANCE DUE: $697.30

In August 2022, plaintiff filed a single-count putative class action

complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692 to 1692p. Plaintiff alleged defendant's June

2018 collection letter violated the FDCPA by seeking improper collection fees.

Plaintiff brought the action individually and on behalf of others similarly

situated whose alleged creditor was Banfield. After the close of discovery,

plaintiff moved for class certification, seeking a single class composed of any

New Jersey resident to whom defendant sent a Banfield collection letter between

June 5, 2018 through May 11, 2021.

Defendant sent collection letters to approximately 11,000 New Jersey

residents. There were three versions of the collection letter, corresponding to

the version of the Banfield customer agreement signed by each individual, dated:

(1) July 2014; (2) October 2014; and (3) October 2017. In each version,

A-3857-23 3 defendant included language regarding collection costs it purportedly incurred.

Plaintiff alleged this provision in the agreement, which was also in the collection

letter, improperly included collection costs that were not yet incurred.

The July 2014 version contained the following collection costs provision:

Collection Costs: Whether or not legal action is commenced, Member agrees to pay and reimburse Provider for any and all fees and costs of any collection agency, which may be based on a percentage of the debt (up to the maximum percentage of 33%), and all fees, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by Provider in such collection efforts.

In October 2014, Banfield revised its letter and the collection costs

provision stated:

Collection Costs: Whether or not a legal action is commenced, Member agrees to pay and reimburse Provider for any and all fees and costs of any collection agency, which may be based on a percentage of the debt (up to the maximum percentage of 33%), and all fees, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Provider in such collection efforts, in each case such amounts may be added to the debt owing when the account is placed into collections.

[emphasis added].

In October 2017, Banfield again revised the collection costs provision,

now stating:

Collection Costs: Whether or not legal action is commenced, Member agrees to pay and reimburse

A-3857-23 4 Provider for any and all fees and costs of any collection agency, which may be based on a percentage of the debt (up to the maximum percentage of 33%), and all fees, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Provider in such collection efforts.

The July 2014 and October 2017 collection costs provisions were identical; the

October 2014 provision differed by inclusion of the phrase, "in each case such

amounts may be added to the debt owing when the account is placed into

collections." Plaintiff received the October 2017 version of the provision.

After hearing oral argument on plaintiff's motion, the court granted class

certification as memorialized in the June 25, 2024 order. The court found it

appropriate to divide the class into two subclasses based on the "two distinct

[']Collection Costs['] provisions in the Banfield contracts." Because the court

found the July 2014 and October 2017 provisions identical, it did not find it

necessary to include a third subclass. The court also appointed plaintiff as class

representative.

On appeal, defendant contends reversal of class certification is warranted

on two grounds, alleging the trial court erred by: (1) appointing plaintiff as the

class representative of the subclass of persons subject to the October 2014

version of the Banfield contract because plaintiff is not a member of that class;

and (2) certifying the classes given the undisputed evidence that there is no

A-3857-23 5 administratively feasible means to determine which collection costs provision is

in any putative class member's Banfield contract.

II.

We review a trial court's class certification determination for an abuse of

discretion. Cerciello v. Salerno Duane, Inc., 473 N.J. Super. 249, 257 (App.

Div. 2022) (citing Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50 (2017)). An

abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is "made without a rational

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis." Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Trautner, 478 N.J. Super.

426, 437 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J.

561 (2002)).

Class actions "developed . . . as a means of consolidating numerous claims

involving common issues in a single action." In re Cadillac V8 6-4 Class Action,

93 N.J. 412, 423-34 (1983). Rule 4:32-1 sets forth the standard for class

certification. To obtain class status, the party seeking class certification must

demonstrate:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties

A-3857-23 6 will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

[Cameron v. S. Jersey Pubs, Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 156, 178 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting R. 4:32-1(a)).]

These four initial requirements are commonly referred to as: numerosity,

commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Baskin v. P.C.

Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 173 (2021). Additionally, "plaintiffs

pursuing class certification must also satisfy one of the three requirements of

subsection (b)" of Rule 4:32-1. Ibid.

A.

In this case, the trial court found that the case satisfied these four

requirements and granted class certification pursuant to Rule 4:32-1(a) and (b).

The court noted that plaintiff and each class member received essentially the

same form collection letter and that defendant's alleged violations of the FDCPA

constituted "action[s] generally applicable to the class."

The court nonetheless deemed it appropriate to divide the class into two

subclasses based on the two distinct "Collection Costs" provisions in the

Banfield contracts. It reasoned this subdivision was warranted because "the

[c]ourt will likely be required to engage in an interpretation analysis of the

[']Collection Costs['] provisions to determine whether [defendant] was entitled

A-3857-23 7 to seek fees prior to incurring those fees." Although the court found two distinct

categories based on the language of the July 2014/October 2017 Banfield

agreements and the October 2014 agreement, the court appointed plaintiff as

class representative for the entire class.

As a prerequisite to a class action, Rule 4:32-1(a) requires that one or more

members of the class become the representative party only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.

In certain circumstances, "a class may . . . be divided into subclasses and each

subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed

and applied accordingly." R. 4:32-2(d). "The rule makes clear, as had been the

practice, that a class may be divided and, if so, that these rules apply to each

[class]." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, History and Analysis

of Rule Amendments to R. 4:32-2(d), note 3.5, www.gannlaw.com (2026)

(citing Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443 (Ch. Div. 1978), certifying

two discrete plaintiff classes).

A-3857-23 8 Generally, a "class representative must be part of the class and possess the

same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members." In re Pet Food

Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 343 (2010) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)). A class representative must "be able to

'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class[,]' as required by Rule

4:32-1(a)(4)." Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 385 N.J. Super.

172, 181 (App. Div. 2006). This requirement is "closely related to the

requirement of typicality." Id. at 182. "To satisfy this requirement, 'the plaintiff

must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class.'" Ibid. (citing

Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super. 169, 188 (App. Div. 1993). However, those

interests need not be identical. Id. (citing Moore's Federal Practice §

23.25[4][b][i]. "[T]he named representative only needs to be adequate[.]" Ibid.

In the present case, the trial court found that "plaintiff and the proposed

class share[d] the common fact[] that [defendant] mailed each of them [a]

collection letter[] to collect on [the Banfield debt,] allegedly misstating the

[']Collection Charge Due.[']" The court determined there was a common

question of law central to the case; namely, "whether [defendant's] practice of

adding collection charges before they [are] incurred" violates the FDCPA. As

for the typicality requirement, the trial court found that plaintiff and the

A-3857-23 9 proposed class's claims "arise out of the same events" where defendant "mailed

standardized letters" seeking to "collect a collection charge before it was due in

violation of the FDCPA."

Plaintiff contends that the trial court's findings demonstrate that his

interests are not adverse to those of the class members and therefore, he is

capable of representing the entire class. Said differently, all class members,

including plaintiff, share a common question of law regardless of which version

of the Banfield agreement governs. Defendant counters that because plaintiff's

contract did not include the October 2014 version of the collection costs

provision, he cannot serve as representative of the October 2014 subclass.

Although the trial court ruled that the class shared common questions of

law and fact and plaintiff's claims and defenses were typical of the claims or

defenses of the class, it also determined it appropriate to divide the class into

two subclasses based on the differing collection costs provisions. The court

reasoned that the subclasses were necessary because it "will likely be required

to engage in an interpretation analysis" of these provisions. The court, however,

did not further explain why a single class representative could "fairly and

adequately" represent the interests of the entire class.

A-3857-23 10 Plaintiff further argues that the creation of subclasses was for case

management purposes and not because of an inherent conflict of interest. Thus,

plaintiff contends, the court did not abuse its discretion in appointing one class

representative. We recognize that subclasses may be created for various

reasons. Here, however, the trial court did not state that the subclasses were

established for case management purposes only. Nor did the court explain why

it found plaintiff fit to represent the October 2014 subclass. Our ability to fully

analyze the parties' arguments on this issue is hampered by the trial court's lack

of findings on this issue. Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103, 110-111 (2004).

We do not agree that the court's lack of findings as to plaintiff's

appropriateness to serve as class representative warrants a reversal of class

certification. We hold, rather, that a reversal and remand is necessary solely for

the trial court to make findings as to whether plaintiff is fit to serve as class

representative for both subclasses and to make the requisite findings and

conclusions of law on this issue. We leave to the court's discretion whether to

permit supplemental arguments on this limited issue, and if warranted, whether

to permit the parties to propose an alternative representative for the October

2014 subclass. We take no position on these questions.

A-3857-23 11 B.

Defendant next contends that class certification should be reversed

because there is no administratively feasible method to determine which class

members are part of which subclass. Defendant asserts the trial court did not

address the "administratively feasible" requirement to class certification, and

because the subclasses are not readily identifiable, class certification must be

reversed. We disagree.

We begin by recognizing that "[c]lass certification presupposes the

existence of a properly defined class"—one that is "sufficiently identifiable

without being overly broad." Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 106,

(2007). Here, the trial court identified the class as those persons:

. . . to whom, from June 5, 2018, through and including May 11, 2021, [d]efendant mailed one or more letters in an attempt to collect a consumer debt on behalf of Banfield Pet Hospital, where [d]efendant added a 'Collection Charge' to the debt.

This scope is defined and not overly broad.

Plaintiff's primary argument is that it is not easy to identify which subclass

a member belongs to. Banfield contends it has "no readily available

information, method, and/or code that would allow it to identify which of the

three [']Collection Costs['] provisions apply to any of the approx[imate] 10,985

A-3857-23 12 Banfield accounts at issue." This argument is without merit for the following

reasons.

There is no dispute that Banfield has access to the agreements containing

the relevant provisions. Moreover, as plaintiff acknowledges, an individual

review of those records would produce the information necessary to identify the

subclass members. See Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F. 3d 154, 163 (3rd Cir. 2015)

(holding class must be ascertainable in order to be certified). Although an

individual review of those accounts and relevant documents is undoubtedly

time-consuming, this fact does not invalidate class certification. Id. at 171.

Furthermore, there is nothing unreasonable about conducting an independent

review of accounts and records contained therein.

In sum, we discern no abuse of the court's discretion in its class

certification determination. We reverse in part and remand the matter for the

court to make findings as to whether plaintiff, who is not a member of the

subclass of persons subject to the October 2014 version of the Banfield

agreement, is fit to represent this subclass.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain

jurisdiction.

A-3857-23 13