Lugo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

950 F. Supp. 743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 572
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJanuary 22, 1997
DocketCivil Action 2:97cv42
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 950 F. Supp. 743 (Lugo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lugo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 950 F. Supp. 743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 572 (E.D. Va. 1997).

Opinion

OPINION AND DISMISSAL ORDER

REBECCA BEACH SMITH, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs Motion for a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Plaintiff, an incarcerated ülegal alien, was convicted and sentenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for importing cocaine into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). Plaintiff is currently serving his sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution in Peters-burg, Virginia. He wants the court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to initiate deportation proceedings immediately pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i). 1 For the reasons set forth below, the court denies plaintiffs motion.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 2 The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or fañs to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” or “seeks *745 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Based upon careful- consideration of the plaintiffs motion, the court finds that dismissal of this action is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), because the motion fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In enacting § 1915A, Congress appropriated the familiar standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing plaintiffs motion pursuant to the mandated screening process, therefore, the court applies the same standard. Under that standard, the facts alleged in a pro se complaint must be taken as true. Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1292 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1865, 64 L.Ed.2d 281 (1980). A pro se complaint, no matter how unartfully pleaded, must survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). A pro se complaint involving civil rights issues should be liberally construed. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 464, 58 L.Ed.2d 431 (1978). Dismissal may be appropriate where the complaint contains a detailed description of underlying facts which fail to state a viable claim. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-09, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292-93, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). However, where the complaint is broad, dismissal for failure to state a claim is improper. Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 121, 58 L.Ed.2d 133 (1978). Finally, where a pro se complaint contains a potentially cognizable claim, plaintiff should be allowed to particularize the claim. Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir.1965).

Originally, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) provided in its entirety that:

In the case of an alien who is convicted of an offense which makes the alien subject to deportation, the Attorney General shall begin any deportation proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction.

Plaintiff contends that the Attorney General violated § 1252(i) by failing to expeditiously initiate deportation proceedings after his conviction in 1994. In effect, he claims that § 1252(i) grants him a private right of action to compel the INS to begin his deportation proceedings immediately.

Congress recently added the following language to the end of § 1252(i):

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person. 3

Since Congress has clearly stated that § 1252(i) does not create a private right of action, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under which relief can be granted. 4 Accordingly, the court DENIES plaintiffs Motion for a Writ of Mandamus and DISMISSES this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The court does not rule on plaintiffs request to proceed informa pauperis.

Plaintiff is advised that Congress recently amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915 by, inter alia, adding 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which prohibits a prisoner from bringing a civil action or ap *746 pealing a judgment in a civil action under § 1915 if

the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical harm.

28 U.S.C.

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Bluebook (online)
950 F. Supp. 743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lugo-v-immigration-naturalization-service-vaed-1997.