Lufkin v. Department of Revenue

11 Or. Tax 410
CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 27, 1990
DocketTC 2916
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 11 Or. Tax 410 (Lufkin v. Department of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lufkin v. Department of Revenue, 11 Or. Tax 410 (Or. Super. Ct. 1990).

Opinion

CARL N. BYERS, Judge.

Defendant disallowed a net operating loss (NOL) car-ryforward on plaintiffs 1985 individual income tax return. As *411 a result, plaintiff incurred a minimum tax on certain preference items. Plaintiff appealed. The parties have stipulated the facts and thoroughly briefed the issues. The matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

During the years 1981 through 1984 plaintiff was a resident of Connecticut but owned a ranch in Oregon. During those years the ranch incurred substantial losses. As of December 31, 1984, plaintiff had a NOL carryforward attributable to Oregon sources of $4,879,253. However, overall plaintiff reported a positive federal taxable income (from sources outside Oregon) during the years 1982 through 1984. At the end of 1984 plaintiff had no federal NOL carryforward. In 1985, plaintiff moved to Oregon and filed a “full-year resident” Oregon income tax return. In that year he had items of tax preference totaling $3,325,841 but otherwise had a negative Oregon taxable income (loss) of $1,557,823.

The parties agree that if plaintiff cannot use his 1984 NOL carryforward in computing his 1985 Oregon taxable income, his 1985 tax is $48,631. On the other hand, if plaintiff can use his 1984 NOL carryforward of $4,879,253, his 1985 tax is zero.

The focus of this dispute is ORS 316.014(1). That statute provides:

“Notwithstanding ORS 316.012, in the computation of state taxable income the net operating loss, net operating loss carryback and net operating loss carry forward shall be the same as that contained in the Internal Revenue Code as it exists at the close of the tax year for which the return is filed and shall not be adjusted for any changes or modifications contained in this chapter or by the case law of this state.”

The parties agree that Bechtold v. Dept. of Revenue, 273 Or 762, 543 P2d 665 (1975), had the effect of complicating the computation of NOLs for Oregon. The 1985 legislature enacted ORS 316.014 to overrule Bechtold and simplify the computation of a NOL. Or Laws 1985, ch 802, § 18.

The parties also agree that the statute, as enacted, is unclear. It falls in the class described by the Oregon Supreme Court as “inexact terms.” Such terms may embody “complete expressions of legislative meaning, even though that meaning *412 may not always be obvious.” Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 224, 621 P2d 547 (1980).

Having agreed that the statute is unclear, each party proposes a word to make it clear. Plaintiff believes that the statute refers to “definitions” contained in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). In plaintiffs view, this clarifies the intent that NOL carryforwards be computed as defined by the IRC. So defined, a NOL based on Oregon sources will be allowed without regard to a taxpayer’s federal NOL. Defendant, on the other hand, contends the statute refers to the “amount” of the NOL. By referring to “amount,” defendant concludes that a NOL for Oregon purposes cannot exceed the taxpayer’s federal NOL.

The duty of the court is to determine what the legislature intended. The first step in that process is to examine all the words used by the legislature to express its intent. Consideration of the legislative history is appropriate only to aid the court in discerning the intent behind the words of the statute.

From that perspective, defendant’s position has much to commend it. Use of the terms “the” and “that,” when referring to NOL, seem to suggest an “amount” more than a “definition.” Since the legislative intent was to simplify the computation of NOLs, choosing an “amount” would be a quick way to do so. As defendant points out, its representative explained the proposed law to the legislative committee in terms of amounts.

Nevertheless, the court does not find defendant’s view acceptable. If we insert the word “amount” in the statute, it reads:

“Notwithstanding ORS 316.012, in the computation of state taxable income the net operating loss [amount], net operating loss carryback [amount] and net operating loss car-ryforward [amount] shall be the same as that [amount] contained in the Internal Revenue Code as it exists at the close of the tax year for which the return is filed and shall not be adjusted for any changes or modifications contained in this chapter or by the case law of this state.”

As plaintiff points out, there is no “amount” in the relevant provisions of the IRC. Consequently, defendant’s interpretation, to make sense, requires substantial rewriting *413 of the statute. For example, can we assume the legislature intended to refer to the amount contained in the taxpayer’s federal tax return? If that were true, why did it specify “as it exists at the close of the tax year” since tax returns do not usually exist at that time?

Defendant also argues that it previously used federal “definitions” of NOL and such use did not eliminate the complexity of the computations. However, that use was before ORS 316.014(1). Defendant’s argument ignores the specific direction of the statute that a NOL “shall not be adjusted for any changes or modifications contained in this chapter or by the case law of this state.” That language simplifies the computation of a NOL without changing any definitions.

The problems with defendant’s interpretation are suggested by its administrative rule. That rule explains that the amount of NOL “is the same amount as the resident computes for federal purposes.” OAR 150-316.014(3)(a). It is more than a little difficult to formulate that rule from the words used by the legislature. The “amount” a taxpayer computes for federal purposes is not “contained in the Internal Revenue Code” and certainly not at the “close of the tax year.” The rule ignores the words of the statute.

Since the IRC does not contain the amount of NOL, ORS 316.014(1) must be referring to the definitions of NOL which are “contained in the Internal Revenue Code.” Further evidence is found in the beginning phrase of the statute, “[notwithstanding ORS 316.012.” ORS 316.012 refers to the meaning of the terms found in the IRC as of December 31, 1984. 1 In other words, NOLs are to be determined under the IRC as it exists at the close of the tax year without regard to a “connection” date.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
11 Or. Tax 410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lufkin-v-department-of-revenue-ortc-1990.