Ludwig v. Glaessel

New York Supreme Court

Ludwig v. Glaessel

41 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 312

DecidedNovember 15, 1884

StatusPublished

This text of 41 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 312 (Ludwig v. Glaessel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ludwig v. Glaessel, 41 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 312 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1884).

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Opinion

Learned, P. J.:

This is an action under the “ civil damage ” act. On the trial the defendant was a witness in his own behalf. Hpon cross-éxamination he was asked: “ Shortly after the commencement of this action did you put all your property in the hands of your wife ? ” The question was objected to as immaterial and improper. The objection was overruled and the defendant answered, “ I had to.” Further questions on this same point were put and allowed against his objection.

The plaintiff urges that as defendant would be liable under the act if he owned the building, this testimony was evidence of such ownership. But the plaintiff had on cross-examination proved that defendant owned the building. Although the ground of action in the com- ■ plaint is the sale of the liquor to the deceased husband of plaintiff and not the ownership of the building where the sale was made. There was no propriety then in proving that the defendant had put all his property in the hands of his wife shortly after the commencement of the action. This /was not material to the issue and was likely to prejudice the jury as a kind of admission of defendant’s liability. The conveyance to the wife might be fraudulent, or might be valid, as against creditors. But the defendant could not expect to try that question of fraud in this action and could not be prepared for that purpose.

On the question whether the claims of the children under the “ civil damage ” act might be assigned to the plaintiff, the mother, we may refer to the case of Moriarty v. Bartlett, recently decided

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Learned, P. J.:

This is an action under the “ civil damage ” act. On the trial the defendant was a witness in his own behalf. Hpon cross-éxamination he was asked: “ Shortly after the commencement of this action did you put all your property in the hands of your wife ? ” The question was objected to as immaterial and improper. The objection was overruled and the defendant answered, “ I had to.” Further questions on this same point were put and allowed against his objection.

The plaintiff urges that as defendant would be liable under the act if he owned the building, this testimony was evidence of such ownership. But the plaintiff had on cross-examination proved that defendant owned the building. Although the ground of action in the com- ■ plaint is the sale of the liquor to the deceased husband of plaintiff and not the ownership of the building where the sale was made. There was no propriety then in proving that the defendant had put all his property in the hands of his wife shortly after the commencement of the action. This /was not material to the issue and was likely to prejudice the jury as a kind of admission of defendant’s liability. The conveyance to the wife might be fraudulent, or might be valid, as against creditors. But the defendant could not expect to try that question of fraud in this action and could not be prepared for that purpose.

On the question whether the claims of the children under the “ civil damage ” act might be assigned to the plaintiff, the mother, we may refer to the case of Moriarty v. Bartlett, recently decided

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Bluebook (online)

41 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 312, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ludwig-v-glaessel-nysupct-1884.