Ludovic Hall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 29, 2019
Docket18A-CR-2314
StatusPublished

This text of Ludovic Hall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ludovic Hall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ludovic Hall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 29 2019, 9:07 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Barbara J. Simmons Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Jesse R. Drum Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ludovic Hall, April 29, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-2314 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven Rubick, Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49G07-1805-CM-14892

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2314 | April 29, 2019 Page 1 of 5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE [1] Appellant-Defendant, Ludovic Hall (Hall), appeals from his conviction for

disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE [3] Hall presents one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State

produced sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

committed disorderly conduct.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [4] On April 17, 2018, Hall was at the City County Building in Indianapolis to

attend a hearing in the Marion Superior Court, Civil Division 13. Hall became

irate and began repeatedly yelling, “it’s not fair[!]” (Transcript p. 6). The bailiff

and magistrate of the Marion Superior Court, Civil Division 10, both heard

Hall yelling from their offices. There was a boom, and Hall began yelling even

louder. Then the bailiff and the magistrate heard the sound of breaking glass.

They went out into the hallway where they saw that the glass panel of one of

the building’s doors was shattered. They also encountered Hall, who was the

only person there. Hall told them that he did not intend to break the door.

[5] On May 9, 2018, the State filed an Information, charging Hall with Class B

misdemeanor criminal mischief and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

On August 23, 2018, the trial court conducted Hall’s bench trial. The trial court

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2314 | April 29, 2019 Page 2 of 5 found Hall guilty as charged but entered judgment of conviction on the

disorderly conduct offense only. The trial court proceeded directly to

sentencing and sentenced Hall to 180 days, fully suspended to time-served. The

trial court also ordered Hall to pay $586.74 to the City of Indianapolis for the

cost of replacing the broken door.

[6] Hall now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION [7] Hall contends that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

committed the offense of disorderly conduct. It is well-established that when

we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider

only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is not our role as an appellate

court to assess witness credibility or to weigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm

the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] The State charged Hall with disorderly conduct as follows:

On or about April 17, 2018, [Hall] did recklessly, knowingly or intentionally engage in fighting or tumultuous conduct[.]

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 12). At trial, the State proceeded on a theory that

Hall committed tumultuous conduct, which is defined as “conduct that results

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2314 | April 29, 2019 Page 3 of 5 in, or is likely to result in, serious bodily injury to a person or substantial

damage to property.” I.C. § 35-45-1-1.

[9] Hall does not dispute that he broke the glass plate of the door; rather, he

contends that the State did not prove that he did so with the requisite intent. A

defendant’s intent is ordinarily a matter of circumstantial proof which may be

inferred from the defendant’s conduct. Henson v. State, 86 N.E.3d 432, 439 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2017). A person acts intentionally if, “when he engages in the

conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).

[10] Here, the evidence showed that immediately prior to breaking the glass, Hall

was irate and yelling “it’s not fair[!]” repeatedly through the City County

Building, moments before he caused a booming sound and broke the glass in

the door. (Tr. p. 6). This evidence supports a reasonable inference that Hall

was angry at the time and, as a result of that anger, made contact with the door

in a manner that resulted in its breaking. This evidence supported a reasonable

conclusion that Hall acted intentionally—with the conscious objective to

damage property and, as a result, break the glass.

[11] The gravamen of Hall’s argument on appeal is that the State did not make its

case because no one directly observed him break the glass and the only evidence

of his intent was his statement that he did not intend to do so. However, “[a]

trier of fact may infer the requisite intent for a crime exists based solely on

circumstantial evidence.” Brown v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1127, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App.

2017). Therefore, it was not necessary for the State to produce direct evidence

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2314 | April 29, 2019 Page 4 of 5 in the form of an eye witness to the glass breaking in order to make its case.

The circumstances surrounding the offense showing that Hall was angry prior

to breaking the glass supported a reasonable inference that Hall acted

intentionally when he broke the glass, and we will not consider contrary

evidence, given our standard of review. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

CONCLUSION [12] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the State proved that Hall committed

disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

[13] Affirmed.

[14] Bailey, J. and Pyle, J. concur

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2314 | April 29, 2019 Page 5 of 5

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Related

Drane v. State
867 N.E.2d 144 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Christopher C. Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
67 N.E.3d 1127 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2017)
Kevin Henson v. State of Indiana
86 N.E.3d 432 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2017)

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