Lucille R. Kelley v. Texas Workforce Commission, Diane D. Rath, Chair Commissioner, Ron Lehman, Commissioner, Ronald G. Congleton, Humble ISD, Dr Mary Widmire and Alicia Boston-Mace

Opinion

Opinion issued December 28, 2006

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-05-01110-CV

LUCILLE R. KELLEY, Appellant

V.

TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION; DIANE D. RATH, CHAIR; RON LEHMAN, COMMISSIONER; RONALD G. CONGLETON, COMMISSIONER; HUMBLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; DR. MARY WIDMIER; AND ALICIA BOSTON-MACE, Appellees

On Appeal from the 80th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2004-41517

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After the Texas Workforce Commission ("the Commission") denied appellee Lucille R. Kelley's applications (claim numbers 551552 and 551569) for unemployment benefits, Kelley sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions in Harris County district court. The Commission filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. This appeal followed. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2006). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

A party seeking judicial review of a Commission decision must bring her action not later than 14 days after the Commission's decision becomes final. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.201(a) (Vernon 1996). A Commission decision becomes final 14 days after it is mailed to the parties. Id. § 212.153 (Vernon 1996).

Claim numbers 551552 and 551569

The Commission mailed its final decision in claim numbers 551552 and 551569 on July 27, 2004. Thus, the decision in these claims became final 14 days later, on August 10, 2004. Accordingly, Kelley was required to seek judicial review of the Commission's decision in these claims by August 24, 2004--14 days after the Commission's decision became final.

Kelley's Lawsuit

Kelley's suit for judicial review was filed on August 4, 2004. The suit did not name Humble Independent School District ["the District"] as a defendant, even though the District, Kelley's former employer, had been a defendant in the earlier proceedings before the Commission. On December 20, 2004, Kelley amended her petition to include the District as a defendant.

The Plea to the Jurisdiction

The Commission filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending (1) that Kelley's August 4, 2004 petition did not properly invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court because it failed to name the District as a defendant, and (2) that Kelley's attempt to amend her petition on December 20, 2004, came too late. The Commission's plea is based upon section 212.201 of the Texas Unemployment Act, which provides:

(a) A party aggrieved by a final decision of the commission may obtain judicial review of the decision by bringing an action in a court of competent jurisdiction for review of the decision against the commission on or after the date on which the decision is final, and not later than the 14th day after that date.

(b) Each other party to the proceeding before the commission must be made a defendant in an action under this subchapter.

Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.201 (Vernon 1996). The trial court granted the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction.

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

Whether a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).

Is section 212.201 jurisdictional?

We must begin our analysis by first determining whether compliance with the provisions of section 212.201 is jurisdictional. Failure of a party to comply with statutory requirements is not necessarily an absolute bar to review of an agency determination. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex.2000), (overruling Mingus v. Wadley, 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084 (1926)). Some statutory prerequisites, however, remain jurisdictional. Sierra Club v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 26 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000), aff'd on other grounds, 70 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2002).

In Heart Hosp. IV v. King, the Austin Court of Appeals held that section 212.201 of the Labor Code is a "jurisdictional statutory prerequisite and a party's failure to comply with it deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to review the Commission's decision." 116 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, pet. denied). The court reasoned that section 212.201 "defines and restricts" the kind of cases a district court may hear because a "district court is generally without jurisdiction to review the agency's decision unless and until the plaintiff files a petition for judicial review within the statutorily prescribed 14 days." Id. Likewise, this Court, citing Heart Hospital, has held that a similar provision of the Labor Code is jurisdictional. See Carrington v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, No. 01-04-00424-CV, 2006 WL 66455, *2 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 12, 2006, no pet.) (holding 14-day deadline for appealing initial denial of benefits determination, found in section 208.23 of Labor Code, to be jurisdictional).

Did Kelley comply with section 212.201?

Having determined that the provisions of section 212.201 are jurisdictional, we next must decide whether Kelley complied with section 212.201 when she filed her petition for judicial review.

We have already stated that Kelley was required to seek judicial review of the Commission's decision in claim number 487871 by August 24, 2004--14 days after the Commission's decision became final. Kelley's petition for review was filed on August 4, 2006. As such, Kelley's petition for review appears to meet the 14-day requirement for filing a petition for judicial review.

However, Kelley's August 4, 2004 petition did not name the District as a party. As such, Kelley's August 4, 2004 petition does not meet the requirements of section 212.201(b), which requires that all parties to the proceedings before the Commission be named as defendants in the petition for judicial review.

Kelley, however, argues that her December 20, 2004 amended petition cures this pleading defect. We disagree. "[I]f an employer who was a party to the proceedings before the Commission was not made a defendant within the statutory time limit, the petition may not be amended thereafter to cure the jurisdictional defect." Wren v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 915 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).

In Heart Hospital, the plaintiff, like the plaintiff here, filed his petition for judicial review within 14 days. 116 S.W.3d at 835. However, also like the plaintiff here, he did not comply with other requirements of the Labor Code. Here, Kelley did not join all defendants as required by section 212.201(b). In Heart Hospital, the plaintiff timely filed his petition, albeit in the wrong county, a violation of Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.204 (Vernon 1996). Id. When the plaintiff in Heart Hospital finally filed his petition in the correct county, the 14-day deadline for filing had passed and the trial court then lacked jurisdiction. Id. Likewise, in this case, by the time Kelley amended her petition to name the District as a party, the 14-day deadline, which we have held to be jurisdictional, had long since passed.

Because Kelley did not amend her petition until December 20, 2004--almost four months after the statutory deadline for filing a petition for judicial review had passed--her attempted amendment comes too late. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction as it relates to claims 551552 and 551569.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the requirements section 212.201 of the Labor Code are jurisdictional prerequisites for seeking judicial review. Because Kelley failed to timely amend her petition for judicial review of claim within the 14-day time frame set forth in this section, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider her cause. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.