Lucien v. Gonzalez-Gamez

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 7, 2024
Docket5:23-cv-03670
StatusUnknown

This text of Lucien v. Gonzalez-Gamez (Lucien v. Gonzalez-Gamez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lucien v. Gonzalez-Gamez, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JARON LUCIEN, Case No. 23-cv-03670-PCP

8 Plaintiff, ORDER SERVING COMPLAINT AND 9 v. GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 10 E. GONZALEZ-GAMEZ, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 2 Defendants. 11

12 13 Jaron Lucien, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison, filed this pro se civil rights action 14 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The lawsuit is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 15 For the reasons stated below, the Court orders Defendants to respond to the Complaint. 16 However, for Mr. Lucien’s benefit, the Court notes an ambiguity which Mr. Lucien may wish to 17 clarify. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 At all relevant times, Mr. Lucien was incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison 20 (“SVSP”). Compl. at 1, 4.1 On March 12, 2023, Mr. Lucien spoke to multiple inmates in his duty 21 as an inmate representative. See id. at 6. While fulfilling that duty, “an argument transpired 22 between [Mr. Lucien] and another inmate,” “which resulted in a mutual combat.” Id. Both Mr. 23 Lucien and his opponent were ordered to get down, and both inmates “followed orders and got 24 down in a prone position.” Id. 25 While Mr. Lucien was still in a prone position, he observed his opponent speaking to 26 Defendants Gonzalez-Gamez and Raymundo. See id. “The next thing [Mr. Lucien] kn[e]w . . . the 27 1 other inmate stood up and attacked” Mr. Lucien. Id. Mr. Lucien contends that Defendants 2 Gonzalez-Gamez and Raymundo did not act to stop this attack, but instead “stood and watched 3 with deliberate indifference.” Id. Mr. Lucien was injured during the attack. See id. He claims that 4 Defendants Gonzalez-Gamez and Raymundo violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to 5 protect him from the other inmate’s attack. See id. 6 Mr. Lucien represents that he filed two grievances regarding this incident. See id. at 6. He 7 contends that “the director[’]s office” granted both grievances, and that his administrative 8 remedies are exhausted. See id. at 1, 6. However, the exhibits attached to the Complaint undercut 9 this representation.2 Mr. Lucien’s exhibits show that he filed Grievance 379857; that this 10 grievance was rejected on procedural grounds by SVSP’s Office of Grievances; that this rejection 11 was appealed to the Office of Appeals in Sacramento; and that the Office of Appeals overturned 12 the procedural rejection and ordered SVSP to open a “open a new grievance log number . . . and 13 answer [Mr. Lucien’s] claim on the merits.” Id. at 13–21. 14 On June 7, 2023, in response to the Office of Appeals’s order, SVSP’s Office of 15 Grievances opened Grievance 410928 for Mr. Lucien. See id. at 12. SVSP’s Office of Grievances 16 subsequently notified Mr. Lucien that it had until August 7, 2023, to respond to Grievance 17 410928. See id. at 11. Mr. Lucien filed the instant action on July 25, 2023, see id. at 10, 18 approximately two weeks before the due date for a response from SVSP’s Office of Grievances. 19 The record does not contain the decision of SVSP’s Office of Grievances as to Grievance 20 410928, nor does it contain any appeal of Grievance 410928 to the Office of Appeals in 21 Sacramento. See generally, id. 22 II. Legal Standard 23 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 24 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must 25 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 26

27 2 In reviewing the adequacy of a complaint, a court may consider documents physically attached to 1 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 2 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 3 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 4 III. Analysis 5 A. Failure-to-protect claim 6 The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 7 inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment 8 requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. Id. In 9 particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other 10 prisoners. Id. at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015). The failure of prison 11 officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the 12 prison violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged 13 is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately 14 indifferent to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately 15 indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to 16 take reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837. 17 Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference. See id. at 18 835–36 & n.4. A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an 19 inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., 20 the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take 21 reasonable steps to abate it. See id. at 837. This is a question of fact. Id. at 842. 22 Here, Mr. Lucien alleges that Defendants observed another inmate attack Mr. Lucien, but 23 did not act to stop the attack. Compl. at 6. Instead, Defendants “stood and watched” the attack, and 24 Mr. Lucien suffered injuries. See id. This is sufficient to plead a failure-to-protect claim. 25 B. Exhaustion 26 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) 27 (“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect 1 any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 2 exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Even when the relief sought cannot be granted by the 3 administrative process, i.e., monetary damages, a prisoner must still exhaust administrative 4 remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85–86 (2006). An action must be dismissed unless the 5 prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before he filed suit. See McKinney v. Carey, 6 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 7 2006) (where administrative remedies not exhausted before prisoner sends complaint to court, 8 action will be dismissed). Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of the district 9 court. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84. 10 In California, there are two levels of review for non-healthcare appeals by inmates, 11 referred to as a grievance and an appeal.

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Related

Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Jackson v. District of Columbia
254 F.3d 262 (D.C. Circuit, 2001)
Earnest Woods, II v. Tom Carey
684 F.3d 934 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Marty Cortez v. Bill Skol
776 F.3d 1046 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
McKinney v. Carey
311 F.3d 1198 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

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Lucien v. Gonzalez-Gamez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lucien-v-gonzalez-gamez-cand-2024.