Luciano Meza-Atienzo v. Pamela Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJuly 10, 2025
Docket20-71643
StatusUnpublished

This text of Luciano Meza-Atienzo v. Pamela Bondi (Luciano Meza-Atienzo v. Pamela Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luciano Meza-Atienzo v. Pamela Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUCIANO MEZA-ATIENZO, No. 20-71643 Agency No. Petitioner, A 074-414-655 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 8, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***

Petitioner Luciano Meza-Atienzo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision upholding an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning and supplements that

reasoning with its own analysis, we review both decisions. See Bhattarai v. Lynch,

835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We review the BIA’s factual findings under

the highly deferential substantial evidence standard, and review both purely legal

questions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo. See Cordoba v. Barr, 962

F.3d 479, 481–82 (9th Cir. 2020). “For both asylum and withholding claims, a

petitioner must prove a causal nexus between one of [his] statutorily protected

characteristics and either [his] past harm or [his] objectively tenable fear of future

harm.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing

Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021) (asylum) and Flores-

Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 886–87 (9th Cir. 2019) (withholding)). An asylum

applicant must demonstrate that a protected ground was “at least one central

reason” for his persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). A withholding of

removal applicant, on the other hand, must prove only that a cognizable protected

ground is “a reason” for future persecution. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d

351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017).

2 20-71643 1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that

Meza-Atienzo is not eligible for asylum and withholding of removal. Meza-

Atienzo failed to identify a nexus between any alleged past persecution or fear of

future persecution and a protected ground. See Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d

1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that a “lack of a nexus to a protected

ground is dispositive of [a petitioner’s] asylum and withholding of removal claims”

(citation omitted)). The record shows that the Knights Templar gang members

targeted Meza-Atienzo’s uncle for financial reasons and targeted Meza-Atienzo

because he intervened in a violent confrontation when he tried to extricate his

uncle from the attackers. Further, Meza-Atienzo testified that he believed his

uncle was targeted by the gang members because he had money in his possession.

Thus, the BIA did not err in finding that Meza-Atienzo was the victim of a private

act of violence and that the attack was not motivated by a protected ground. See

Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that purely

personal retribution is not persecution on account of a protected ground).

As to Meza-Atienzo’s claimed fear of future harm, the record supports the

BIA’s findings that he is not likely to face future harm if he returns to Mexico.

Meza-Atienzo conceded that he has not “received any threats from Mexico” since

coming to the United States. He also testified that he did not know whether the

Knights Templar gang is currently looking for him. Meza-Atienzo currently has

3 20-71643 family living in Mexico and testified that he did not know whether his family has

had any problems. Although he testified that his sister was the victim of a robbery

by two hooded men and that his dad was afraid of selling his house in Michoacan

because he fears being robbed, these events do not rise to the level of future

persecution. Cf. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding

that a noncitizen’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by

theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”).

Given Meza-Atienzo’s testimony and the passage of time since the violent incident

occurred, the BIA did not err in finding a lack of nexus between the feared future

harm and a protected ground. Because the record supports the BIA’s nexus

determination, Meza-Atienzo’s asylum and withholding of removal claims

necessarily fail.1 See Riera-Riera, 841 F.3d at 1081.

2. To qualify for CAT relief, Meza-Atienzo must show it is “more likely

than not” that he will be tortured upon removal. 8 C.F.R § 1208.16(c)(2).

“Torture is ‘more severe than persecution.’” Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1144

(9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018)).

Because Meza-Atienzo’s claimed past harm and feared future harm do not rise to

1 Since the nexus requirement is dispositive of both asylum and withholding of removal claims, we need not review Meza-Atienzo’s additional claims. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).

4 20-71643 the level of persecution, they “necessarily fall[] short of the definition of torture.”

Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2021).

PETITION DENIED.

5 20-71643

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Related

Zetino v. Holder
622 F.3d 1007 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Nishchal Bhattarai v. Loretta E. Lynch
835 F.3d 1037 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Harold Riera-Riera v. Loretta E. Lynch
841 F.3d 1077 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Raul Barajas-Romero v. Loretta E. Lynch
846 F.3d 351 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Amartsengel Sanjaa v. Jefferson Sessions
863 F.3d 1161 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Zhihui Guo v. Jefferson Sessions
897 F.3d 1208 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Edgar Cordoba v. William Barr
962 F.3d 479 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Carla Davila v. William Barr
968 F.3d 1136 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
Alicia Naranjo Garcia v. Robert Wilkinson
988 F.3d 1136 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Doris Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Merrick Garland
69 F.4th 1012 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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