Luciana Gonzaga v. Estate of Jose A. Barros

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 18, 2024
• Docket: A-2171-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2171-22

LUCIANA GONZAGA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ESTATE OF JOSE A. BARROS, deceased,

Defendant-Respondent. ____________________________

JOANA BARROS and NADIA BARROS,

Respondents. ____________________________

Submitted October 29, 2024 – Decided November 18, 2024

Before Judges Chase and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket No. FD-20-1054-22.

Lorraine M. Medeiros, attorney for appellant. Christopher A. Kozlowski, attorney for respondents Joana Barros and Nadia Barros.

PER CURIAM

In this Family Part matter, plaintiff Luciana Gonzaga appeals from the

November 4, 2022 order denying her motion for reconsideration of the trial

court's order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, finding a prenuptial

agreement (the agreement) between Luciana1 and her now-deceased husband,

Jose Barros, enforceable. Based on our de novo review of the record and

prevailing law, we affirm.

I.

We glean the following salient facts from the record. Luciana was born

in Brazil and her native language is Portuguese. Luciana and Jose entered into

a romantic relationship in 2007. Prior to the relationship, Luciana had one

child—Luan—and Jose had two—Joana and Nadia. On December 5, 2010,

Luciana and Jose had a child together, Sophia.

In contemplation of their marriage, Luciana and Jose executed an

agreement, which is dated February 24, 2015. Attorney Nelson C. Monteiro

1 Since several parties share the surname Barros, we refer to the parties by their first names for clarity and intend no disrespect by doing so. A-2171-22 2 notarized Jose's signature on January 9, and attorney Anabela DaCruz-Melo

notarized Luciana's signature on February 24.

Paragraph 7 of the agreement provides that Luciana and Jose would each

maintain certain assets and income as separate property, and Luciana "waive[d]

and release[d] all rights and interests," including "distribution in intestacy"

which she might otherwise have acquired as his widow or distributee.

Luciana and Jose married on March 18, 2015. Following the marriage,

Jose financially supported Luciana, Sophia, and Luan. The couple remained

married until Jose's death on November 23, 2021.

Jose died intestate on November 23, 2021. Luciana asserts that Jose spoke

often about his will and his intention to provide for her and Sophia after his

death. However, no will was found after Jose's death. Luciana asserts that Jose

made representations regarding his intentions to financially support her and

Luan to the federal government in connection with an immigration application

for her and Luan to become legal residents. There are no corroborating

documents in the record which support her assertion.

Luciana was appointed administrator of Jose's estate (the Estate). Joana

and Nadia opposed Luciana's claims for relief as interested parties and potential

heirs. After a hearing on March 10, 2022, the Probate Part appointed a third-

A-2171-22 3 party administrator for the Estate and a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent

Sophia's interests, and instructed Luciana to file a complaint in the Family Part

to determine the validity of the agreement.

Luciana filed a two-count verified complaint in the Family Part seeking

to (1) dissolve the agreement as unconscionable, thus allowing her to claim part

of the Estate, and (2) compel the Estate to provide interim financial support to

her and Sophia. Luciana also demanded punitive damages, court costs, and

attorney's fees. In her verified complaint, Luciana asserts she was unduly

pressured into signing the agreement, contending Jose told her if she did not

sign it, he would not marry her and she would be separated from Sophia when

she was deported back to Brazil.

Luciana was represented by a Portuguese-speaking attorney in connection

with the agreement, but contends she did not understand the agreement since it

was written in English, the provisions of the agreement were never explained to

her, and she did not have the opportunity to negotiate the terms. Luciana alleges

that she was not permitted to choose her own attorney to review the agreement,

but rather, Jose chose DaCruz-Melo to witness Luciana signing the document.

Luciana contends she was never given a copy of the executed agreement, and

the schedule of Jose's assets set forth in the agreement was incomplete.

A-2171-22 4 Although Luciana states she did not know what she was signing, she also

contends that Jose told her the provisions of the agreement were of "no

consequence" because he did not intend to enforce them. Luciana alleges this

stipulation, as well as Jose's promise to support her and Sophia after his death ,

was made in front of unidentified third-party witnesses.

On September 20, 2022, the Family Part held oral argument on a motion

and cross-motion as to the enforceability of the agreement, Luciana's request for

financial support for Sophia, and her request to use certain assets that Joana and

Nadia sought to liquidate. After the proceedings, the trial court entered an order

which: (1) deemed the agreement enforceable, (2) denied Luciana's motion to

set aside the agreement, (3) transferred all remaining issues surrounding the

Estate, including distribution of support for Sophia, to the Probate Part for

further consideration, and (4) dismissed Luciana's verified complaint with

prejudice.

Luciana filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the Family Part (1)

made an inappropriate credibility judgment in reaching its decision, (2) failed to

give the parties adequate notice it would resolve the ultimate issue in the case

in connection with the motion, and (3) failed to afford her a sufficient

opportunity to present relevant evidence.

A-2171-22 5 The Family Part issued an order and written opinion denying

reconsideration on November 4, 2022. The trial court rejected Luciana's

argument that she did not have sufficient notice that the ultimate issue of the

enforceability of the agreement would be decided at oral argument on September

20, since Luciana requested in the verified complaint that the court both

determine the validity of the agreement and compel interim relief. The trial

court explained "there could be no discussion of interim spousal su pport paid

via the [E]state if the [agreement] was deemed enforceable." Accordingly, the

trial court determined "the validity of the [agreement] has to be adjudicated first

before even entertaining the issue of interim support."

The trial court also rejected Luciana's argument that she was not

represented by counsel at the signing of the agreement. The trial court stated it

was unpersuaded by Luciana's argument that Moses Aspan, Luciana’s long-time

immigration attorney, was unaware of the agreement. The court further noted

Aspan’s representation in immigration matters was insufficient to prove

DaCruz-Melo was not representing Luciana’s interests at the time she signed the

agreement.

The trial court was unpersuaded by Luciana's argument that Jose disclosed

assets in the agreement that differed from the documentation he filed with the

A-2171-22 6 federal government. In the agreement, Jose listed the value of his plumbing

business as plus or minus $250,000. However, in support of Luciana's

immigration application, Jose stated he made "around $200,000" annually from

his plumbing business. The trial court "d[id] not find that there is a material

difference" between the two amounts sufficient enough to invalidate the

agreement. Rather, the court noted "[i]t seems highly likely . . . that a small

business owner such as [Jose] would have significant income fluctuations year

over year, and perhaps even month over month," and there was no suggestion

the discrepancy was a result of Jose's attempt to hide assets from Luciana.

Accordingly, the trial court found "[p]laintiff never established a prima

facie case for challenging the enforceability of the [agreement]," and denied

Luciana's motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed. 2

II.

Our standard of review of legal conclusions of Family Part judges is the

same de novo standard applicable to legal decisions in other cases. Amzler v.

Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020). Interpretation of the

2 The administrator of the Estate and the GAL filed letters of non-participation on appeal.

A-2171-22 7 language of a contract is reviewed de novo. Est. of Pickett v. Moore's Lounge,

464 N.J. Super. 549, 554-55 (App. Div. 2020).

We review a trial judge's decision on whether to grant or deny a motion

for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Branch v.

Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). We find "abuse of discretion

when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed

from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" U.S. Bank Nat'l

Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).

A motion for reconsideration is "an opportunity to seek to convince the

court that either 1) it has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect

or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or

failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence."

Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (quoting Guido v. Duane

Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The

moving party must "state with specificity the basis on which [the motion] is

made" and supply "a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that

counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred." R. 4:49-2.

A-2171-22 8 The trial court's decision to hold a plenary hearing is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. See Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015). "[N]ot

every factual dispute that arises in the context of matrimonial proceedings

triggers the need for a plenary hearing." Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J.

Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 1995).

III.

Our de novo review of the record and prevailing law leads us to conclude

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of the order

dismissing the complaint and denying interim support predicated on Luciana's

failure to establish a prima facie showing that the agreement was unenforceable

by clear and convincing evidence.

A.

Prenuptial agreements are enforceable assuming full disclosure and

comprehension by each party, and absent unconscionability. Rogers v. Gordon,

404 N.J. Super. 213, 219 (App. Div. 2008). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 37:2-38, the

party seeking to invalidate a prenuptial agreement must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that "[t]he party executed the agreement involuntarily[,]"

or the agreement is unconscionable. N.J.S.A. 37:2-38(c) also provides that an

agreement is unconscionable if, before the execution, the party:

A-2171-22 9 (1) Was not provided full and fair disclosure of the earnings, property and financial obligations of the other party;

(2) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided;

(3) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party; or

(4) Did not consult with independent legal counsel and did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, the opportunity to consult with independent legal counsel.

We are unpersuaded by Luciana's argument that the trial court was

palpably incorrect in finding she did not meet her prima facie burden of

establishing the unenforceability of the agreement by clear and convincing

proof. Luciana's contentions that she was not apprised of Jose's financial assets

prior to execution of the agreement, she was not represented by counsel, and

that a copy of the agreement was never given to her or explained to her, do not

equate to the clear and convincing prima facie evidence required to meet her

substantial burden.

Luciana's claim that her legal representation was deficient as to the

agreement is not grounded in the record. First, there is no evidence her

immigration attorney had any involvement with the agreement, rather the only

A-2171-22 10 evidence is that attorney DaCruz-Melo was retained. Paragraph fifteen of the

agreement sets forth "[e]ach of the parties hereto acknowledge that they have

been represented by independent counsel of his or her own choice, and has

carefully reviewed [the agreement] with said counsel." As stated by the trial

court, simply being "represented by a different attorney . . . with respect to the

[agreement]" does not mean that DaCruz-Melo's representation of Luciana was

necessarily insufficient. Luciana had years to raise any issues with counsel's

representation, if any, and address any deficiencies in the signing of the

agreement, obtain a copy and have it translated to her into Portuguese. There is

no competent evidence in the record that Luciana was not properly represented

in connection with the agreement or given a copy of the document sufficient to

meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.

Luciana also fails to support her allegations that Jose's assets, at the time

of his death, were not recorded on the financial disclosure section in the

agreement. There is no evidence in the record to support counsel's argument

that "there is a life insurance policy, bank accounts in Portugal, real property in

Portugal, a safety deposit box . . . with several thousands of dollars in cash, and

essentially an estate worth multi-millions of dollars" which were not disclosed

to Luciana until after the marriage.

A-2171-22 11 There was no evidence proffered to the trial court establishing that its

denial of Luciana's motion for interim support predicated on the

unenforceability of the agreement, dismissal of the complaint was palpably

incorrect, or that it failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent

evidence. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Luciana's reconsideration motion.

B.

We are unpersuaded that the trial court's order dismissing Luciana's

complaint without further discovery was clearly capable of producing an unjust

result.

Our review is under the plain error standard, since the issue was not raised

to the trial court. R. 2:10-2. "Relief under the plain error rule, R[ule] 2:10-2, at

least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'" Baker

v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J.

429, 435 (1957)). Further, the rule sets "a 'high bar,' requiring reversal only

where the possibility of an injustice is 'real' and 'sufficient . . . .'" State v. Alessi,

240 N.J. 501, 527 (2020) (quoting State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019);

and quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). We also "generally defer

to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its

A-2171-22 12 discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the

applicable law." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019) (quoting Pomerantz

Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)).

Luciana does not point to specific discovery which would have impacted

the trial court's decision to deny her motion to set aside the agreement and

dismiss the complaint. "[A] plaintiff 'has an obligation to demonstrate with

some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the

missing elements of the cause of action.'" Wellington v. Est. of Wellington, 359

N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Auster v. Kinoian, 153 N.J.

Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 1977)).

Rather, Luciana broadly argues the trial court "erred in not setting a

discovery schedule." Luciana further proffers the trial court should have found

additional discovery was needed as to the unconscionability of the agreement,

without the issue having been raised to the trial court, simply because there was

an assertion that Jose "pledge[d] financial support for [Luciana] as well as

[Luan]," without mention of an agreement. Luciana has not substantiated this

sweeping allegation with any proofs in the record nor any jurisprudence

requiring a trial court to raise a discovery issue sua sponte.

A-2171-22 13 Setting aside her failure to raise the issue to the trial court, Luciana has

not set forth with specificity what additional discovery would have uncovered

and how it would have impacted the court's determination that the agreement

was valid and enforceable. Without setting forth "with some degree of

particularity" what further discovery would cure the deficiencies in her

complaint, we conclude Luciana has not met her burden of establishing the trial

court erred in not ordering additional time for discovery before dismissing

Luciana's complaint. Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting

Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015)).

C.

We are unconvinced that Luciana's due process rights were violated based

on dismissal of the complaint after the trial court found Luciana did not establish

a prima facie showing the agreement was unenforceable. Luciana had sufficient

notice that the court was considering the validity of the agreement because she

was the party who requested the ruling through her verified complaint.

Luciana's motion sought interim support which necessarily required the trial

court to determine whether the agreement was an enforceable bar to certain

monetary relief.

A-2171-22 14 The trial court held oral argument and permitted counsel for both parties

to present arguments as to the enforceability of the agreement, which was a

finding necessary to decide Luciana's interim support application. Luciana was

provided with an interpreter as to those proceedings. Therefore, pursuant to the

standard set forth by Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76,

84 (App. Div. 2001), we conclude Luciana had notice and an opportunity to be

heard.

Finally, Luciana asserts she was deprived of due process because the trial

court based its decision on "the relationship of the [c]ourt with the two attorneys

involved and nothing more." This contention is belied by the record. We discern

no error with the trial court's acknowledgement that both attorneys who

represented Jose and Luciana as to the agreement were "well[-]known to th[e]

[c]ourt as they are experienced and competent matrimonial practitioners and

both of them speak fluent Portuguese." The trial court then proceeded with a

thorough analysis as to the language of the agreement, the facts established in

the record, and the standard to invalidate the agreement, finding that Luciana

had not met her prima facie burden by clear and convincing evidence.

A-2171-22 15 To the extent we have not addressed any of Luciana's remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-2171-22 16