Lucero v. United States

District Court, D. New Mexico·Decided October 27, 2020·No. 1:17-cv-01065·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

C.D. LUCERO and SUSAN VINCI-LUCERO,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Civ. No. 17-1065 JCH/JFR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In this case, the Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to a refund on their 2014 tax bill. As grounds for their claim, they contend that they overpaid federal income taxes because the stock that they received that year as part of a legal settlement was overvalued at $2.38 per share, and that $0.57 per share is the fair market value of the stock. On June 30, 2020, the case came before the Court for a non-jury trial. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic and by consent of the parties, the Court conducted the trial via videoconference. The parties provided the Court with paper copies of their exhibits in advance of trial and also displayed them onscreen during the trial. Having considered the testimony, the exhibits admitted at trial, and the arguments of counsel, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. APPLICABLE LAW I. Burden of Proof The parties agree that the burden of proof by a preponderance of credible evidence is on the plaintiff taxpayer in a tax refund case. See Doc. 58 at 6 (citing Blodgett v. Comm’r, 394 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005)) and Doc. 59 at 4 (citing In re Tax Refund Litigation, 989 F.2d 1290 (2nd Cir. 1993)). Credible evidence is that “which after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient up on which to base a decision on the issue if no contrary evidence were submitted (without regard to the judicial presumption of IRS correctness).” Blodgett v. Comm’r, 394 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Griffin v. Comm’r, 315 F.3d 1017, 1021 (8th Cir. 2003)). Once

the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden of proof shifts to the government. Id. II. The Value of Stock in a Closely Held Corporation It is undisputed that the company at issue, the Good Technology Corporation (“GTC”), was a closely held corporation and that its stock was not traded on an open public market. When a stock is unlisted or has no established market, a fact finder must determine the fair market value of such stock for purposes of taxation. Stock is valued on the date the shares are issued, or the date it is constructively received by the taxpayer. United States v. Roush, 466 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2006). The determination of fair market value is a question of fact. Eyler v. Comm’r, 88 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir 1996).

The parties agree that the value of stock in a closely held corporation where no public market exists is generally measured in terms of its fair market value, which is the price at which a willing buyer and willing seller with knowledge of all the relevant facts would agree to exchange the property or interest at issue. Rev. Rul. 59-60 at § 2.02, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (1959). See also Doc. 58 at 7; Doc. 59 at 5. “A sound valuation will be based upon all the relevant facts, but the elements of common sense, informed judgment and reasonableness must enter into the process of weighing those facts and determining their aggregate significance.” Rev. Rul. 59-60 at § 3.01. “While listed prices normally establish fair market value of publicly traded stock, the value of unlisted stock is best determined by considering actual sales at arm’s length in the normal course of business within 2

a reasonable time before or after the valuation date. Estate of Andrews v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 938, 940, 1982 WL 11197 (1982); Fitts’ Estate v. Comm’r, 237 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1956); Estate of Noble v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-2 at *5. When arm’s-length sales of unlisted stock are unavailable or inconclusive, the value of closely held stock shall be determined by considering all other available financial data and all relevant factors that would affect fair market value. Rev. Rul.

59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. These factors include the corporation’s net worth, prospective earning power, dividend-paying capacity, and other factors. Id. § 4.01; Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 940. These factors cannot be applied with mathematical precision, and the weight given to each factor must be considered in light of the particular facts of each case. Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 940-41. When considering expert testimony, a court is not required to follow the opinion of any expert if it is contrary to the court’s judgment. Estate of Deputy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-176 at *5 (citing Helvering v. Natl. Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295 (1938) and Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976), affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-285). A court may adopt

or reject expert testimony and will reject expert testimony where the witness’ opinion of value is so exaggerated that the testimony is incredible. Estate of Hall v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 312, 338, 1989 WL 10688 (1989); Chiu v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 722, 734-735, 1985 WL 15340 (1985).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Background 1. Plaintiffs C. D. Lucero and Susan Vinci-Lucero are residents of Santa Fe, New Mexico. [Bench Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at 8].

2. Prior to 2012, Ms. Vinci-Lucero worked for GTC as a senior Vice President of marketing. [Tr. at 11]. GTC offered a secure mobility platform for enterprises and governments that enables secure access to applications and data across devices and operating systems. [Ex. 7 (Information Statement and Solicitation of Written Consent Regarding Proposed Merger and Notice of Appraisal Rights) at 8].

3. As a marketing executive and Vice President, Ms. Vinci-Lucero was not privy to comprehensive information regarding the financial condition or day-to-day financial operations of GTC. [Tr. at 13]. 4. In February of 2012, Ms. Vinci-Lucero was diagnosed with breast cancer. She underwent surgery and chemotherapy. In May of 2012, her boss at GTC told her not to come back to work while she was going through treatment because it was “disruptive to business.” [Tr. at 13- 14]. Then in July of 2012, the CEO of GTC asked her to leave the company. [Tr. at 14]. 5. In October of 2012, Ms. Vinci-Lucero sued GTC for disability discrimination and wrongful termination. [Doc. 66 (Pretrial Order) at 5, ¶ 1; Tr. at 15].

6. In December of 2012, Ms. Vinci-Lucero decided to exercise stock options that had vested during her tenure with GTC. [Tr. at 49]. She retained a securities lawyer who found a buyer for her stock, Harvest Growth Capital (“Harvest Growth”), and negotiated the sale price. [Tr. at 49-50]. Ms. Vinci-Lucero exercised her option to buy 812,500 shares of GTC at $.66 per share, and on the same day she sold them to Harvest Growth at $3.80 per share. [Tr. at 50; Ex. 17 (Stock Purchase Agreement)]. Harvest Growth was already an investor in GTC, and it acknowledged in the purchase agreement that there was no market for the shares it was purchasing. [Tr. at 50-51; Ex. 17 at 5, ¶ 2.2(k)].

7. During the disability discrimination and wrongful termination lawsuit and subsequent settlement negotiations, Ms.

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