Lucero v. Sti Trucking Incorporated

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 30, 2026
• Docket: 25-968
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH LUCERO, an individual, No. 25-688 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:22-cv-08035-SMB v. MEMORANDUM*

STI TRUCKING INCORPORATED, an Indiana corporation; ALEXANDER KIM,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

DMITRY KARP, UNKNOWN PARTIES, named as Jane Doe Kim, Wife; named as Jane Doe Karp, Wife,

Defendants.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. JOSEPH LUCERO, No. 25-968 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-08035-SMB v.

STI TRUCKING INCORPORATED; ALEXANDER KIM,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 14, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Defendants STI Trucking Incorporated (“STI”) and Alexander Kim, its

employee, appeal a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff Joseph Lucero based on

Kim’s negligence while driving an STI vehicle.1 Lucero cross-appeals a summary

judgment in favor of STI on his direct negligence claims against STI and in favor of

both defendants on his claim for punitive damages. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment on punitive

1 STI did not contest that it was liable under respondeat superior for the damages caused by Kim’s negligence.

2 25-968 damages. In Arizona, punitive damages can be awarded only if the “defendant’s evil

hand was guided by an evil mind,” Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz.

1986), which means that a negligent defendant’s conduct was “outrageous,

oppressive or intolerable,” Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz. LLC v. Carman, 515 P.3d 685,

692 (Ariz. 2022) (cleaned up). Kim did not have an evil mind simply because he

negligently attempted to pass Lucero’s truck, did not provide a recorded statement

to STI after the accident, and failed to complete mandated post-accident drug testing,

See id. at 688-89, 694-95. Kim’s conduct did not create “a risk substantially greater

than that necessary to make [it] negligent or even grossly negligent.” Id. at 693. Nor

was STI’s alleged negligence in hiring Kim or entrusting its vehicle to him the kind

of “outrageous conduct” that is “required to sustain a claim for punitive damages in

negligence cases.” Id.

2. Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on whether

the accident caused Lucero’s blurry vision. There was “medical evidence of the

possibility of the existence of the causal relationship” and “other evidence or

circumstances indicating such relationship.” Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Tucson v.

Fitzgerald, 413 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966). An ophthalmologist provided

a differential diagnosis that included “trauma given recent MVA [motor vehicle

accident]” as a possible cause of the blurry vision. Shortly before the accident,

Lucero had 20/30 vision in his left eye. Immediately after the accident, Lucero

3 25-968 experienced blurry vision in that eye, and, within a month, his vision in that eye was

20/300. See Montague v. Deagle, 462 P.2d 403, 406 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (affirming

judgment when there was medical evidence of possible causation and plaintiff

reported dizziness immediately after the accident).

For the same reasons, Defendants’ challenge to the jury’s award of damages

is unavailing.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the

jury on comparative fault. Defendants did not request such an instruction in time and

thus failed to comply with the district court’s local rules and the trial-setting order.

See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 191 (2010) (per curiam) (noting that local

rules have “the force of law” (cleaned up)). Moreover, Defendants approved

Lucero’s instructions, which expressly noted that no comparative fault instruction

would be given. See United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1217 (9th Cir. 2016)

(holding that a party waives objections to a jury instruction by affirmatively

approving that instruction).

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendants’

motion in limine. Defendants identified no specific evidence that it sought to exclude

and gave no reason to assume Lucero’s counsel would use “reptile tactics” in closing

4 25-968 argument.2

5. When reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial

premised on attorney conduct, we will not disturb the district court’s evaluation of

that conduct absent a “definite and firm conviction that the court committed a clear

error of judgment.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337,

346 (9th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up)). The district court did not clearly err by finding

that Plaintiff’s counsel’s statements regarding roadway safety rules were not

misconduct. See Montera v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 111 F.4th 1018, 1038 (9th Cir.

2024) (“[A]ppealing to the jury to act as a conscience of the community is not

misconduct when it is not specifically designed to inflame the jury.” (cleaned up)),

petition for cert. filed, No. 24-999 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2025). The district court also

reasonably concluded that the attorney’s reference to “who pays” during closing

arguments, taken in context, did not cause prejudice by implying that Defendants’

insurance would cover any judgment.3

2 So-called reptile tactics “appeal to jurors’ most primitive instincts of safety and self-preservation so that they override the portion of the brain that uses logic.” Kinsel v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, No. CV-20-08296, 2023 WL 11899597, at *9 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2023). 3 Having affirmed the compensatory damages judgment and the summary judgment on punitive damages, we need not consider the direct negligence claims against STI. Other than seeking punitive damages, Lucero articulated “no separate or additional damage from [STI]’s conduct,” so STI’s “separate liability adds nothing to the damages sought.” Roaf v. Stephen S. Rebuck Consulting, LLC, 550 P.3d 173, 178 (Ariz. 2024). Therefore, Lucero suffered no prejudice from being

5 25-968 AFFIRMED.

unable to pursue his direct negligence claims against STI.

6 25-968