Lucas v. Florent, Inc.

19 Misc. 3d 760
CourtCivil Court of the City of New York
DecidedMarch 5, 2008
StatusPublished

This text of 19 Misc. 3d 760 (Lucas v. Florent, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Civil Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lucas v. Florent, Inc., 19 Misc. 3d 760 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2008).

Opinion

[761]*761OPINION OF THE COURT

Matthew F. Cooper, J.

Petitioner, the owner of a building in Manhattan’s Meatpacking District, commenced this commercial landlord-tenant nonpayment proceeding seeking rent for September and October 2007. The monthly rent is $6,018.12. The parties have a 10-year lease that commenced April 1, 1995 and which was extended an additional three years in 2005. It appears that the extended term of the lease expires on March 31, 2008.

Respondent operates Café Florent, a well-known restaurant much beloved for its idiosyncratic take on classic bistro cuisine, its late hours and its colorful ambience. When Café Florent first opened more than 20 years ago, nightlife in the Meatpacking District consisted of some rough and tumble bars, the occasional basement rock n’ roll venue and rampant street prostitution. In the intervening years, the meat wholesalers gave way to chic boutiques and designer hotels, and the prostitutes and their drive-through patrons were replaced by celebrities and scenesters lining up to get into the hottest clubs and trendiest restaurants. As is often the case when an area like the Meatpacking District undergoes a radical transformation, a pioneering establishment like Café Florent, which played a key role in that transformation, ends up as a vestige from an earlier time. The sad result is that the perfect neighborhood bistro can no longer afford to be in the neighborhood it helped create.

Both sides seem to recognize that this nonpayment proceeding is merely a skirmish before the final showdown. By all indications, the real battle will be the holdover proceeding that will presumably come after the lease expires a few weeks from now. In her reply affirmation, petitioner’s attorney quotes respondent’s principal, Florent Morellet, as having told a local paper, “I can’t tell you [when we’ll close]. Nobody will know until the fat lady sings. I’ll fight with the last bone in my body.” Café Florent’s patrons can only hope that before “the fat lady sings” an accommodation can be reached that results in a new lease that is fair to both parties.

In the meantime, this nonpayment case continues. Now before me are pretrial motions that deal with an issue that often arises in commercial summary proceedings: the tenant’s right to assert monetary counterclaims. Petitioner has moved to strike the sole counterclaim contained in respondent’s answer and respondent has cross-moved to amend its answer to include two ad[762]*762ditional counterclaims. Both the existing and proposed counterclaims are also styled as affirmative defenses in that they seek to offset petitioner’s claim for rent as well as to collect damages. Although each is labeled “Affirmative Defense/Counterclaim, ’ ’ they are all fundamentally counterclaims. For matters of simplicity, respondent’s affirmative defenses/counterclaims will be referred to as counterclaims throughout this decision, but the court’s decision on each counterclaim will also be applicable to the correlating affirmative defense.

The original counterclaim alleges that petitioner breached the lease by failing to file tax certiorari proceedings and that as a result respondent overpaid its share of the annual tax increases for the last six years by at least $150,000. The first proposed counterclaim alleges that respondent overpaid $27,167.18 in additional rent because petitioner billed respondent for 100% of the annual tax increases when the lease requires respondent to pay only 662/s%. The second proposed counterclaim alleges that respondent lost an estimated $30,000 in revenue because petitioner failed to sign off on an affidavit to allow sidewalk seating. Both sides also assert that each is entitled to summary judgment.

Petitioner contends that the lease bars respondent from raising any of the counterclaims in this summary proceeding. She points to the provisions in the lease wherein the tenant waives its right to assert a counterclaim and agrees to pay rent as it becomes due each month “without any setoff or deduction whatsoever.” Respondent submits that, notwithstanding the provisions in the lease barring counterclaims, its counterclaims are permissible because they are “inextricably intertwined” with the landlord’s claim for rent.

As both sides acknowledge, lease terms precluding tenants from pursuing counterclaims in commercial landlord-tenant summary proceedings are generally enforceable. (See Amdar Co. v Hahalis, 145 Misc 2d 987, 988 [App Term, 1st Dept 1990].) The exception is where a counterclaim is “so ‘inextricably intertwined’ with petitioner’s claim that joint resolution of the claims will ‘expedite disposition of the entire controversy, avoid multiplicity of other lawsuits between the parties to accomplish the same result, do speedy justice for all and eliminate greater delay and expense.’ ” (Ring v Arts Inti., Inc., 7 Misc 3d 869, 880 [Civ Ct, NY County 2004], quoting Haskell v Surita, 109 Misc 2d 409, 414 [Civ Ct, NY County 1981].) “Where the issues raised in the counterclaim bear directly upon the landlord’s right to [763]*763possession, they are said to be intertwined in the summary proceeding issues and should be disposed of in one proceeding.” (Sutton Fifty-Six Co. v Garrison, 93 AD2d 720, 722 [1st Dept 1983], citing Great Park Corp. v Goldberger, 41 Misc 2d 988 [Civ Ct, NY County 1964].)

Both respondent’s original counterclaim and the first proposed counterclaim in its amended answer concern alleged overcharges of taxes paid as additional rent. Overcharge claims have been found to be inextricably intertwined with claims for possession and rent, and thus permitted to be interposed as counterclaims despite contrary lease provisions. (See e.g. Yanni v Brandwen Prods., 160 Misc 2d 109, 112 [Civ Ct, NY County 1994] [court stated that “relegat(ing) tenant to a plenary action on the overcharge, as petitioner urges, would be contrary to law and manifestly unjust”].) Similarly, claims relating to the method in which certain charges are calculated have been held to be permissible counterclaims, despite lease provisions barring the interposition of counterclaims in a summary proceeding. (See e.g. All 4 Sports & Fitness, Inc. v Hamilton, Kane, Martin Enters., Inc., 22 AD3d 512, 513 [2d Dept 2005] [Court held that counterclaims were permissible where “(t)he plaintiffs contentions and those of the defendant relating to the method of calculating ‘CAM (common area maintenance) charges’ are inextricably intertwined”].)

Here, respondent’s counterclaim for an alleged overpayment arising from the landlord’s failure to initiate tax certiorari proceedings is intertwined with petitioner’s claim for rent to the extent that the overpayment may offset the claim. Nevertheless, to allow respondent to pursue such a large counterclaim, which respondent estimates to be in excess of $150,000 and goes back at least six years — where petitioner’s claim is for a relatively small amount of rent going back no further than September 2007 — would only serve to turn this proceeding from summary to protracted and “bog down its disposition.” (Ring v Arts Intl., Inc., 7 Misc 3d 869, 881 [2004].) Moreover, the counterclaim is speculative at best. The lease provision that respondent contends obligates the landlord to institute tax reduction proceedings is clearly missing a clause or perhaps even a whole sentence.

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Related

All 4 Sports & Fitness, Inc. v. Hamilton, Kane, Martin Enterprises, Inc.
22 A.D.3d 512 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2005)
Ring v. Arts International, Inc.
7 Misc. 3d 869 (Civil Court of the City of New York, 2004)
V & J Inc. v. 2320 Route 112, LLC
13 Misc. 3d 30 (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York, 2006)
Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger
41 Misc. 2d 988 (Civil Court of the City of New York, 1964)
Haskell v. Surita
109 Misc. 2d 409 (Civil Court of the City of New York, 1981)
Amdar Co. v. Hahalis
145 Misc. 2d 987 (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York, 1990)
Yanni v. Bruce Brandwen Productions, Inc.
160 Misc. 2d 109 (Civil Court of the City of New York, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
19 Misc. 3d 760, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lucas-v-florent-inc-nycivct-2008.