1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Jun 26, 2026 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 LUCAS McCOMAS, CHRIS EAKLE, No. 2:26-cv-00105-MKD AUSTIN KEY, and IAN SUTTON, 8 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiffs, DENYING IN PART 9 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO v. DISMISS AND GRANTING 10 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CHELAN COUNTY, CHELAN STRIKE 11 COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and Sheriff MIKE MORRISON, with the ECF Nos. 9, 16 12 latter both individually and in his official capacity, 13 Defendants. 14 Before the Court is Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 15 Complaint, ECF No. 9, and Defendants’ Joint Motion to Strike Declarations of 16 Lucas McComas, Chris Eakle, Austin Key, Ian Sutton, and Mary Schulz, ECF No. 17 16. The Court has reviewed the motions and record and is fully informed. For the 18 reasons explained below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ 19 Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, and grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike, ECF No. 20 16. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs Lucas McComas, Chris Eakle, Austin Key, and Ian Sutton are all
3 employees of the Chelan County Sheriff’s Office. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiffs 4 allege that in summer 2022, they had each “completed [a] merit-based Civil 5 Service test, and each was ranked in the top four position for promotion to the rank
6 of sergeant.” Id. 5. In September 2022, Plaintiffs McComas, Key, and Eakle were 7 promoted to the rank of sergeant. Id. at 8. 8 In Fall 2022, Sheriff Brian Burnett ran for re-election against Defendant 9 Mike Morrison. Id. Plaintiffs allege that “[b]oth candidates implicitly, if not
10 directly, compelled law enforcement personnel to declare their allegiance and then 11 support them respectively.” Id. at 9. Sheriff Burnett “published his employee 12 supporters in photos . . . the list included . . . Plaintiffs McComas, Eakle, Key, and
13 Sutton.” Id. In November 2022, Defendant Morrison was elected as Sheriff of 14 Chelan County. Id. at 10. That same month, Sheriff Burnett promoted Plaintiff 15 Sutton to sergeant “to ensure Plaintiff Sutton’s merit right to that rank when the 16 position was slated to be funded in July 2023.” Id. at 11.
17 In December 2022, fearing retaliation from Defendant Morrison against 18 Plaintiffs, “Sheriff Burnett notified Plaintiffs that he would ask the Commission to 19 reclassify Plaintiffs to their former position as deputies, and thereby return
20 Plaintiffs to the Sergeant’s reinstatement list, to protect their merit entitlements to 1 their sergeant’s rankings.” Id. Sheriff Burnett also “advised Plaintiffs to make the 2 same request to the Commissioners to voluntarily ‘step down’ to return to the
3 protected deputy status and reinstatement list, so that when sergeants’ positions 4 became vacant, they would be entitled to return to their sergeant’s positions.” Id. 5 at 12. In December 2022, Plaintiffs made the request. Id.
6 Defendant Morrison notified Plaintiffs in December 2022 that he would be 7 reducing all four Plaintiffs from their positions as sergeants. Id. at 14. Defendant 8 Morrison also “stated that the Plaintiffs ‘will have the right to be placed on a 9 Sergeant reinstatement list until it expires.’” Id. at 15. Plaintiffs allege that
10 Defendant Chelan County Commissioners knew Plaintiffs “voluntary reduction 11 was being forced upon them for their speech and [was] intended as protection 12 against retaliation” but “the Civil Service Board approved Plaintiffs’ requests to be
13 reduced to deputy roles, and returned to the reinstatement list.” Id. at 16. 14 However, in late December, Defendant Morrison issued an email stating that 15 “Plaintiffs would not be allowed to step down voluntarily, or voluntarily reduced in 16 rank . . . but would now remain in their roles as sergeants . . .” Id. at 17.
17 On January 1, 2023, after taking office, Defendant Morrison “demoted each 18 Plaintiff sergeant as probationary employees from their earned rank as sergeants to 19 the rank of deputy, thereby denying them the right to reinstatement as well.” Id. at
20 18. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Morrison made multiple statements tying their 1 demotion to their support of Sheriff Burnett. Id. at 20. Plaintiffs also allege that, 2 on January 4, 2023, the Chelan County Civil Service Commission certified a
3 “Sergeant Reinstatement List - 01/01/2023 - Indefinite” for each Plaintiff, but 4 Defendant Morrison declared the reinstatement list invalid. Id. at 20-21. Plaintiffs 5 further allege that “[s]ergeants’ positions have been available and funded at the
6 Chelan County Sheriff’s Office, and Defendants have refused to place Plaintiffs 7 into those positions.” Id. at 22. Plaintiffs characterize Defendants’ alleged 8 retaliation as a “continuing constitutional offense” and allege continuing economic 9 and noneconomic damages. Id.
10 In Summer 2024, Plaintiffs McComas and Eakle filed complaints with 11 Chelan County’s Human Resources alleging retaliation. Id at 20. Defendant 12 Chelan County “declined to properly investigate Plaintiffs’ retaliation complaints
13 [and] forwarded Plaintiffs’ complaints to Defendants’ prosecuting attorney, who 14 summarily told Plaintiffs that their retaliation complaints had no merit.” Id. 15 Plaintiffs bring claims against Defendants Chelan County, Chelan County 16 Sheriff’s Office, and Morrison under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding First
17 Amendment speech and retaliation; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional 18 distress. ECF No. 1 at 22-38. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a 19 claim. ECF No. 9. Defendants subsequently moved to strike declarations of Lucas
20 1 McComas, Chris Eakle, Austin Key, Ian Sutton, and Mary Schultz, which were 2 submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ response to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 16.
3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 “To survive a [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must 5 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
6 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 7 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the 8 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 9 suffice.” Id. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
10 Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable 11 inference to be drawn from them, but legal conclusions are not entitled to the same 12 assumption of truth. Id. A complaint must contain either direct or inferential
13 allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under 14 some viable legal theory. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. “Factual allegations must be 15 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. 16 DISCUSSION
17 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, contending 18 that Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are time barred and that Plaintiffs 19 have failed to plausibly allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
20 distress. ECF No. 9 at 5. 1 1. Motion to Strike 2 Defendants move to strike the declarations Plaintiffs filed in support of their
3 response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No. 16.
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1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Jun 26, 2026 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 LUCAS McCOMAS, CHRIS EAKLE, No. 2:26-cv-00105-MKD AUSTIN KEY, and IAN SUTTON, 8 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiffs, DENYING IN PART 9 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO v. DISMISS AND GRANTING 10 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CHELAN COUNTY, CHELAN STRIKE 11 COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and Sheriff MIKE MORRISON, with the ECF Nos. 9, 16 12 latter both individually and in his official capacity, 13 Defendants. 14 Before the Court is Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 15 Complaint, ECF No. 9, and Defendants’ Joint Motion to Strike Declarations of 16 Lucas McComas, Chris Eakle, Austin Key, Ian Sutton, and Mary Schulz, ECF No. 17 16. The Court has reviewed the motions and record and is fully informed. For the 18 reasons explained below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ 19 Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, and grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike, ECF No. 20 16. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs Lucas McComas, Chris Eakle, Austin Key, and Ian Sutton are all
3 employees of the Chelan County Sheriff’s Office. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiffs 4 allege that in summer 2022, they had each “completed [a] merit-based Civil 5 Service test, and each was ranked in the top four position for promotion to the rank
6 of sergeant.” Id. 5. In September 2022, Plaintiffs McComas, Key, and Eakle were 7 promoted to the rank of sergeant. Id. at 8. 8 In Fall 2022, Sheriff Brian Burnett ran for re-election against Defendant 9 Mike Morrison. Id. Plaintiffs allege that “[b]oth candidates implicitly, if not
10 directly, compelled law enforcement personnel to declare their allegiance and then 11 support them respectively.” Id. at 9. Sheriff Burnett “published his employee 12 supporters in photos . . . the list included . . . Plaintiffs McComas, Eakle, Key, and
13 Sutton.” Id. In November 2022, Defendant Morrison was elected as Sheriff of 14 Chelan County. Id. at 10. That same month, Sheriff Burnett promoted Plaintiff 15 Sutton to sergeant “to ensure Plaintiff Sutton’s merit right to that rank when the 16 position was slated to be funded in July 2023.” Id. at 11.
17 In December 2022, fearing retaliation from Defendant Morrison against 18 Plaintiffs, “Sheriff Burnett notified Plaintiffs that he would ask the Commission to 19 reclassify Plaintiffs to their former position as deputies, and thereby return
20 Plaintiffs to the Sergeant’s reinstatement list, to protect their merit entitlements to 1 their sergeant’s rankings.” Id. Sheriff Burnett also “advised Plaintiffs to make the 2 same request to the Commissioners to voluntarily ‘step down’ to return to the
3 protected deputy status and reinstatement list, so that when sergeants’ positions 4 became vacant, they would be entitled to return to their sergeant’s positions.” Id. 5 at 12. In December 2022, Plaintiffs made the request. Id.
6 Defendant Morrison notified Plaintiffs in December 2022 that he would be 7 reducing all four Plaintiffs from their positions as sergeants. Id. at 14. Defendant 8 Morrison also “stated that the Plaintiffs ‘will have the right to be placed on a 9 Sergeant reinstatement list until it expires.’” Id. at 15. Plaintiffs allege that
10 Defendant Chelan County Commissioners knew Plaintiffs “voluntary reduction 11 was being forced upon them for their speech and [was] intended as protection 12 against retaliation” but “the Civil Service Board approved Plaintiffs’ requests to be
13 reduced to deputy roles, and returned to the reinstatement list.” Id. at 16. 14 However, in late December, Defendant Morrison issued an email stating that 15 “Plaintiffs would not be allowed to step down voluntarily, or voluntarily reduced in 16 rank . . . but would now remain in their roles as sergeants . . .” Id. at 17.
17 On January 1, 2023, after taking office, Defendant Morrison “demoted each 18 Plaintiff sergeant as probationary employees from their earned rank as sergeants to 19 the rank of deputy, thereby denying them the right to reinstatement as well.” Id. at
20 18. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Morrison made multiple statements tying their 1 demotion to their support of Sheriff Burnett. Id. at 20. Plaintiffs also allege that, 2 on January 4, 2023, the Chelan County Civil Service Commission certified a
3 “Sergeant Reinstatement List - 01/01/2023 - Indefinite” for each Plaintiff, but 4 Defendant Morrison declared the reinstatement list invalid. Id. at 20-21. Plaintiffs 5 further allege that “[s]ergeants’ positions have been available and funded at the
6 Chelan County Sheriff’s Office, and Defendants have refused to place Plaintiffs 7 into those positions.” Id. at 22. Plaintiffs characterize Defendants’ alleged 8 retaliation as a “continuing constitutional offense” and allege continuing economic 9 and noneconomic damages. Id.
10 In Summer 2024, Plaintiffs McComas and Eakle filed complaints with 11 Chelan County’s Human Resources alleging retaliation. Id at 20. Defendant 12 Chelan County “declined to properly investigate Plaintiffs’ retaliation complaints
13 [and] forwarded Plaintiffs’ complaints to Defendants’ prosecuting attorney, who 14 summarily told Plaintiffs that their retaliation complaints had no merit.” Id. 15 Plaintiffs bring claims against Defendants Chelan County, Chelan County 16 Sheriff’s Office, and Morrison under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding First
17 Amendment speech and retaliation; and (2) intentional infliction of emotional 18 distress. ECF No. 1 at 22-38. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a 19 claim. ECF No. 9. Defendants subsequently moved to strike declarations of Lucas
20 1 McComas, Chris Eakle, Austin Key, Ian Sutton, and Mary Schultz, which were 2 submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ response to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 16.
3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 “To survive a [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must 5 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
6 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 7 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the 8 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 9 suffice.” Id. In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
10 Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable 11 inference to be drawn from them, but legal conclusions are not entitled to the same 12 assumption of truth. Id. A complaint must contain either direct or inferential
13 allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under 14 some viable legal theory. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. “Factual allegations must be 15 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. 16 DISCUSSION
17 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, contending 18 that Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are time barred and that Plaintiffs 19 have failed to plausibly allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
20 distress. ECF No. 9 at 5. 1 1. Motion to Strike 2 Defendants move to strike the declarations Plaintiffs filed in support of their
3 response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No. 16. Plaintiffs argue that 4 “[t]he Court should deny Defendants’ motion to strike, convert the motion [to 5 dismiss] to a Rule 56 motion under Rule 12(d), continue hearing and allow for
6 proper discovery into Defendants’ claimed facts under Rule 56(f) . . .” ECF No. 18 7 at 19. The Court declines to do so. 8 When considering a motion to dismiss, “[r]eview is limited to the complaint; 9 evidence outside the pleadings cannot normally be considered in deciding a
10 12(b)(6) motion.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 11 1993). “A court may, however, consider certain materials – documents attached to 12 the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of
13 judicial notice – without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 14 summary judgment.” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Rule 15 12(d) provides that, “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside 16 the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
17 treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” However, “[w]hether to 18 convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 19 12(d) is at the discretion of the district court.” Barnes v. Sea Hawai’i Rafting,
20 LLC, 493 F.Supp.3d 972, 976 (D. Haw. 2020) (quoting Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Blue 1 Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2015)), aff’d sub nom. 2 Barnes v. Kris Henry, Inc., 2022 WL 501582 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022).
3 “The central question in determining whether to convert a Rule 12 motion 4 into one for summary judgment is whether the proffered materials and additional 5 procedures required by Rule 56 will facilitate disposition of the action or whether
6 the court can base its decision upon the face of the pleadings.” United States v. 7 Walker River Irrigation District, 473 F.Supp.3d 1150, 1154 (D. Nev. 2020) 8 (simplified). Further, “courts regularly decline to convert a motion to dismiss into 9 one for summary judgment when the litigation is in its early stages.” Benton v.
10 Executive Hotel Seattle, LLC, 2021 WL 764135, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2021) 11 (citing Williams v. Cty. of Alameda, 26 F.Supp.3d 925, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2014)); 12 Barnes, 493 F.Supp.3d at 976.
13 The Court exercises its discretion and declines to convert the motion to a 14 Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. This case was filed less than four months 15 ago and deadlines for discovery and trial have not yet been set. Further, the motion 16 can be decided considering only the complaint under the proper Rule 12(b)(6)
17 standard. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike. 18 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim 19 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ federal claims are time barred pursuant to
20 RCW 4.16.080(2) and that RCW 4.96.020, Washington’s presentment statute, does 1 not toll the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. ECF No. 9 at 8. Plaintiffs 2 contend that the continuing violations doctrine applies and that the plain meaning
3 of RCW 4.96.020 tolls the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. ECF No. 10 at 4 6. 5 A § 1983 action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when
6 plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of their 7 action. Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). “[C]ontinuing impact 8 from past violations is not actionable.” Id (simplified). Under Washington state 9 law, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2);
10 see RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 11 Washington’s claims presentment statute provides: 12 No action subject to the claim filing requirements of this section shall be commenced against any local governmental entity, or against any 13 local governmental entity's officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct until 14 sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof. The applicable 15 period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period. For the purposes of the 16 applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to 17 have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed. 18 RCW 4.96.020. “RCW 4.96.020 contains a special statute of limitations 19 [and] does not operate to toll the state’s general residual limitations period 20 1 applicable to § 1983 actions.” Boston v. Kitsap County, 852 F.3d 1182, 2 1189 (9th Cir. 2017).
3 The continuing violations doctrine may be invoked by showing a “series of 4 related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or the 5 maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during that period.”
6 Gutowsky v. County of Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Green v. 7 Los Angeles Cnty. Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1989)). 8 The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the doctrine in holding that it does not 9 apply to “discrete acts” merely because they are plausibly or sufficiently related to
10 each other. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). 11 Plaintiffs allege a constitutional injury occurred on January 1, 2023, when 12 Plaintiffs were demoted. ECF No. 1 at 18. Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on March
13 4, 2026, over three years after the alleged injury. Id. at 40. This is outside of 14 Washington’s three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims and 15 RCW 4.96.020 does not toll the statute of limitations. See Boston, 852 F.3d at 16 1189.
17 Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a continuing violation. Plaintiffs 18 characterize Defendants’ conduct as ongoing because Defendant Morrison 19 allegedly continues to treat the January 2023 reinstatement list as invalid, sergeant
20 positions allegedly have been available and funded, Defendants allegedly have 1 refused to place Plaintiffs into those positions, and Plaintiffs continue to suffer 2 harm. ECF No. 1 at 20-22. But the pleaded constitutional injury occurred when
3 Defendant Morrison allegedly demoted Plaintiffs from sergeant to deputy and 4 denied them reinstatement rights because of their protected speech. Id. at 18-19. 5 Plaintiffs knew of that injury on January 1, 2023. Id. at 18. Even treating
6 Defendant Morrison’s alleged rejection of the reinstatement list as a separate 7 adverse act, that act occurred in January 2023 and is also untimely. 8 Plaintiffs’ general allegation that Defendants have refused to place them into 9 later available sergeant positions also does not constitute a continuing violation.
10 The Complaint does not identify any specific vacancy, request for reinstatement, 11 denial, decisionmaker, or date within the limitations period, nor does it allege facts 12 supporting a reasonable inference that any timely non-selection was an
13 independent retaliatory act. As pleaded, Plaintiffs allege continuing effects of the 14 January 2023 demotions and denial of reinstatement rights, not a continuing 15 violation. 16 Likewise, the 2024 HR complaints do not make the § 1983 claim timely.
17 Although Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Chelan County failed to properly 18 investigate those complaints and that the prosecuting attorney concluded they 19 lacked merit, they do not plausibly allege that the handling of those complaints
20 1 caused a new constitutional injury or constituted an independently actionable 2 adverse employment action.
3 Because the Complaint establishes on its face that the § 1983 claim accrued 4 in January 2023, and because amendment would not cure that limitations defect, 5 Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice.
6 3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim 7 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a claim for 8 intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF No. 9 at 14-18. 9 “‘Outrage’ and ‘intentional infliction of emotional distress’ are synonyms
10 for the same tort.” Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 631 n.1 (Wash. 2003) (citation 11 omitted). The elements of this claim are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) 12 intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; and (3) actual result to the
13 plaintiff of severe emotional distress.” Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1012 14 (Wash. 1989) (citation omitted). 15 Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants’ use of law enforcement officers for 16 personal gain . . . is extreme and outrageous conduct.” ECF No. 1 at 38. Plaintiffs
17 further allege that Defendants conduct continues to inflict emotional distress on 18 Plaintiffs. Id. “[T]he Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual 19 allegations and any reasonable inference to be drawn from them.” Ashcroft, 556
20 1 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded an intentional infliction of 2 emotional distress claim.
3 However, the Court’s jurisdiction over state law claims that form “part of the 4 same case or controversy” arises out of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “Ordinarily, if 5 federal claims are dismissed before trial[,] the state claims should be dismissed as
6 well.” S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Orange Cnty. Transp. Auth., 96 F.4th 1099, 1109 (9th 7 Cir. 2024) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 8 (1966)). “When a district court ‘has dismissed all claims over which it has original 9 jurisdiction,’ it ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ over remaining
10 state law claims.” Pell v. Nuñez, 99 F.4th 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 28 11 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The Ninth Circuit requires that a district court provide notice 12 and opportunity to be heard before it sua sponte declines to exercise supplemental
13 jurisdiction. Ho v. Russi, 45 F.4th 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2022). 14 Because Plaintiffs’ remaining intentional infliction of emotional distress 15 claim raises a question of state law, the Court gives notice that it intends to decline 16 supplemental jurisdiction over it. Consistent with the below schedule, the parties
17 shall file a brief setting forth their positions as to whether the Court should exercise 18 supplemental jurisdiction. 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
20 1 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED in part as 2 to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and
3 DENIED in part as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 4 2. By no later than July 3, 2026, the parties shall file a brief setting 5 forth their position as to whether the Court should exercise supplemental
6 jurisdiction. 7 3. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Strike Declarations of Lucas McComas, 8 Chris Eakle, Austin Key, Ian Sutton, and Mary Schulz, ECF No. 16, is 9 GRANTED.
10 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to enter 11 this Order and provide copies to counsel. 12 DATED June 26, 2026.
13 s/Mary K. Dimke MARY K. DIMKE 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15 16 17 18 19 20