LUANITA LANE v. BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (And Two Companion Cases).

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 20, 2023
• Docket: 22-P-0730
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-730 22-P-731 22-P-732

LUANITA LANE

vs.

BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (and two companion cases1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff appeals from the denial of her motion to

reopen her case as well as the allowance of motions to dismiss

two complaints that she filed in the Superior Court.2 We affirm.

Background. The plaintiff is the mother of a student in

the Boston public schools (BPS). On December 12, 2019, she

filed a complaint against BPS that was dismissed on January 24,

2020. Over two years later, on April 11, 2022, she filed a

motion to reopen the case, which was denied on April 26, 2022.

Thereafter, also on April 26, 2022, the plaintiff filed a second

1 Luanita Lane vs. Boston Public Schools; Luanita Lane vs. Emma Simmons, in her capacity as the principal of the Roxbury Prep Lucy Stone Charter School. 2 This case was paired with the companion cases for decision in

this court. complaint against BPS and a third complaint, against Emma

Simmons in her capacity as principal of the Roxbury Prep Lucy

Stone Charter School (Roxbury Prep). The defendants filed

motions to dismiss the second and third complaints pursuant to

Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The same judge

who denied the plaintiff's motion to reopen the case allowed the

motion to dismiss the second complaint, while a different judge

allowed the motion to dismiss the third complaint. The

plaintiff timely appealed the order and the judgments.

To the extent that we are able to parse her allegations,

the plaintiff claims that her son was bullied and harassed by a

teacher and a dean at Roxbury Prep; teachers withheld education

from her son; and teachers failed to document her son's

homework.3

Discussion. "We review the allowance of a motion to

dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts

alleged in the complaint." Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare

Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 614 (2019), citing Calixto v. Coughlin,

3 We need not address claims, raised for the first time on appeal, wherein the plaintiff purported to name four other schools as defendants, alleged additional bullying and harassment by teachers and other students, and alleged that she "was told" of other harm to her son, although her son "said nothing happened." See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553, 562-563 (2020) ("issues not raised below cannot be argued for the first time on appeal").

2 481 Mass. 157, 158 (2018). To survive a motion to dismiss, the

plaintiff must present factual allegations that rise above the

level of speculation and plausibly suggest an entitlement to

relief. See Murrow v. Esh Circus Arts, LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

233, 234 (2018), citing Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass.

623, 636 (2008).

The plaintiff does not argue that the judges erred in

dismissing her complaints or denying her motion to reopen the

first case, nor does she provide a factual record or legal

authority that would allow us to conclude that these decisions

were wrong. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in

481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (appellant's brief must contain "citations

to the authorities and parts of the record on which the

appellant relies" and "[t]he appellate court need not pass upon

questions or issues not argued in the brief"). See also Cabot

v. Cabot, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 768 (2002) ("Because he offers

no citation to authority to support his argument, we do not

address it"). "The fact that the plaintiff represents [her]self

does not excuse [her] noncompliance with procedural rules."

Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417

Mass. 183, 184 (1994).

3 Passing over the inadequacy of her brief, we conclude that

the plaintiff's complaint against Roxbury Prep4 failed to allege

facts rising above the speculative level that would allow relief

to be granted in her favor. See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.

The complaint is devoid of specific factual allegations that

would entitle her to relief. The allegations are in vague

terms, such as "the teachers [were] withhold[ing] education

curriculum" from her child and "trying to make him get into

trouble." Additionally, the plaintiff's requested relief was

that the unnamed teachers and deans be fired and criminally

charged for the alleged crimes perpetrated on her son. These

claims and requests for relief do not "allege facts that

demonstrate [s]he has a cause of action." Flagg v. AliMed,

Inc., 466 Mass. 23, 38 (2013).

To the extent that the plaintiff's complaint can be

construed as a complaint seeking a civil harassment order under

G. L. c. 258E, she fares no better. The complaint does not

identify three distinct acts, allegedly committed by a

4 The plaintiff did not include in the appendix the two complaints that she filed against BPS, as required by Mass. R. A. P. 16 (e), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), and Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019). As a result, claims stemming from these complaints are waived. See Chokel v. Genzyme Corp., 449 Mass. 272, 279 (2007). And although the plaintiff was granted leave to file a nonconforming brief, this does not excuse her failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

4 defendant, of "willful and malicious conduct . . . with the

intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to

property." See G. L. c. 258E, § 1. Bare assertions that merely

recite an element of a tort, such as harassment, do not suffice

as allegations of fact. See Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass. 379,

388 (2014). Dismissal of the plaintiff's complaints was proper.

In case No. 22-P-730, the order denying the motion to

reopen the case is affirmed. In case No. 22-P-731, the judgment

is affirmed. In case No. 22-P-732, the judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Blake, Grant & Smyth, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: April 20, 2023.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.