LSF9 Master Part. v. Ehrensberger, T.
This text of LSF9 Master Part. v. Ehrensberger, T. (LSF9 Master Part. v. Ehrensberger, T.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-A18010-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
THOMAS H. EHRENSBERGER
Appellant No. 1239 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order July 20, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at No(s): GD-10-012424
BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS, AND OTT, JJ.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 27, 2017
Thomas H. Ehrensberger appeals pro se from the July 20, 2016 order
denying his petition to open a default judgment. We dismiss this appeal.
On June 30, 2010, Appellee’s predecessor-in-interest instituted this
mortgage foreclosure action against Appellant, when he failed, starting on
May 1, 2008, to make payments on a mortgage secured by property located
at 123 Wedgewood Drive, Gibsonia. After proper notice, default judgment in
the amount of $520,956.34 was entered on February 1, 2012, due to
Appellant’s failure to file an answer. The sheriff’s sale was stayed while
Appellant participated in an Allegheny County program designed to save
homes from foreclosure. On December 15, 2014, the stay on the case was
lifted as the program proved ineffectual. Seventeen months later, on May J-A18010-17
27, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to open the default judgment, which the
trial court denied as untimely filed. See Dumoff v. Spencer, 754 A.2d
1280 (Pa.Super. 2000) (petition to open default judgment may be granted
only when it is promptly filed; trial court properly denied petition to open
when party waited eleven months to file petition to open default).
This appeal followed. Appellant’s brief fails to comply with any
applicable rule of appellate procedure, he refers to no legal authority, and
his argument is indecipherable. Specifically, the brief does not contain a
statement of jurisdiction, the text of the order on appeal, a statement of
questions involved, a statement of the factual and procedural background of
the case, a summary of the argument, a statement of our standard and
scope of review, or a table of citations. Pa.R.A.P. 2111, 2114-2118. It is
replete with factual assertions that are unsupported by reference to
documents of record and contained in a reproduced record, which violates
Pa.R.A.P. 2132. There is no legal authority cited. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (brief’s
argument portion must include “discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent”).
Since Appellant’s brief is so defective under the Rules of Appellate
Procedure as to preclude effective appellate review, we will not consider the
merits of his arguments. Karn v. Quick & Reilly Inc., 912 A.2d 329, 335
(Pa.Super. 2006) (“this Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the
appellant fails to conform substantially to the briefing requirements set forth
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in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure”). Appellant’s failure to
provide legal authority also results in waiver. Korn v. Epstein, 1727 A.2d
1130, 1135 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citation omitted) (“Where the appellant has
failed to cite any authority in support of a contention, the claim is waived.”)
Finally, we find waiver due to a lack of a discernable challenge to the ruling
on appeal. Ibn-Sadiika v. Riester, 551 A.2d 1112, 1114 (Pa.Super. 1988)
(“When an appellant fails to carry forward, or is indecipherably vague in,
argumentation upon a certain point in his appellate brief, that point is
waived.”). Appellant’s pro se status does not absolve him of the
responsibility to comply with the rules of appellate procedure, cite legal
authorities, and develop cogent argument on the pertinent issue. First
Union Mortg. Corp. v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 327, 337 (Pa.Super. 1999)
(“pro se representation does not relieve appellant of his duty to properly
raise and develop his appealable claims”)
The April 27, 2017 Application for Voluntary Substitution of Appellee
and Entry of Appearance is granted. LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST
is substituted as the Appellee in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
-3- J-A18010-17
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/27/2017
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