24CA1674 LS v Prospect Recreation 07-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0803 Jefferson County District Court No. 22CV30158 Honorable Diego G. Hunt, Judge
L.S., a Minor, by and through his parents and next friends, Tammy and Frank Straton, Tammy Stratton, and Frank Stratton,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Prospect Recreation and Park District,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Welling and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025
Parker Lipman, LLC, Christopher P. Koupal, Karen H. Blau, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees
The Lane Law Firm, P.C., Sean J. Lane, Brittney M. Townsley, Aurora, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant Prospect Recreation and Park District (Prospect)
appeals the district court’s order denying its motion to dismiss the
claims asserted against it by plaintiff, L.S. (the child), whose
parents and next friends, Tammy and Frank Stratton, brought the
action on the child’s behalf, alleging that the child was injured in an
area maintained by Prospect.1
¶2 Prospect contends that the district court erred by finding that
it waived immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act
(CGIA) because (1) the horse pathway where the incident occurred
(also referred to as the horse alley) was not a public facility; (2) the
empty fencepost hole that allegedly caused the child to trip was not
a public facility located in any park or recreation area; and (3)
Prospect did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous condition. As a result, Prospect asserts that the district
court erred by failing to dismiss the child’s claims against Prospect
pursuant to the CGIA. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the order.
1 Richard Sherrill is also a named defendant in the case but he is
not a party to this appeal.
1 I. Background
¶3 Prospect is a governmental entity. On behalf of Jefferson
County, Prospect owns and maintains Prospect Arena, a public
park located in Arvada. Prospect Arena is a rectangular parcel of
land that runs north to south. It contains a horse arena on the
south end and a playground and covered pavilion on the north end.
The park also has a horse pathway that is approximately ten feet
wide and runs in an upside-down “L” shape along the northern and
eastern edges of the park. The horse pathway allows riders to
access the horse arena from the northern end of the park.
2 Figure 1: Map of Prospect Arena
The rectangular image depicts Prospect Arena. The playground and pavilion are located toward the top of the image. The playground is a square parcel with an additional square jutting out on the upper lefthand corner. The pavilion can be identified by the blue square roof directly to the right and in line with the southern edge of the playground. The horse arena is located two-thirds down from the top and is a large dirt tract. The northern edge of the horse arena forms a roughly semicircular shape before it runs in straight lines north and south. The horse pathway runs along the top and down the right edge of the diagram. The fence line runs between the horse pathway and playground and pavilion. The image depicts the fence line before sections of the fence were removed.
3 ¶4 Historically, a fence running along the inner edge of the horse
pathway separated riders from the playground and pavilion. But in
September or October 2020, Prospect’s employees removed a large
section of the fence running from west to east and north to south
on the northeastern edge of the park near the pavilion. The fence
was deteriorating, causing a safety hazard. To remove the fence,
Prospect employees wrapped a chain around the fenceposts and
pulled them straight out of the ground with a small front end
loader. Prospect employees testified they filled in the fencepost
holes with dirt after removing them.
¶5 In November 2020, the child was playing at the playground in
Prospect Arena. The child noticed two horse riders, Richard Sherrill
(Sherrill) and another person, heading north on the horse pathway
away from the horse arena. As the child got closer, he tripped in
what the district court determined was a half-empty fencepost hole,
which had been created by Prospect’s employees when they
removed the fence in 2020. As the child fell, he flailed his arms,
scaring one of the horses. The startled horse kicked sideways and
struck the child in the head, causing the child to suffer a traumatic
brain injury.
4 ¶6 The child’s parents filed this lawsuit against Prospect and
Sherrill asserting claims for negligence and premises liability.
Prospect filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the CGIA. The
district court held a hearing in accordance with Trinity Broadcasting
of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993).
Following the hearing, the district denied the motion to dismiss,
determining that Prospect had waived immunity under the CGIA.
Prospect now appeals. See § 24-10-108, C.R.S. 2024 (a court’s
decision on a motion raising sovereign immunity is a final order
subject to an interlocutory appeal).
II. CGIA
¶7 We first conclude that the district court correctly ruled that
the horse pathway is a public facility. We then determine that the
district court was correct by finding that the pathway and fencepost
hole are located in a recreation area. Finally, we agree with the
district court that the fencepost hole was a dangerous condition.
As a result, we conclude the district court’s order finding that
Prospect waived sovereign immunity under the CGIA was proper.
5 A. Standard of Review
¶8 “Governmental immunity implicates issues of subject matter
jurisdiction that are determined in accordance with C.R.C.P.
12(b)(1).” St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L., 2014 CO 33,
¶ 9 (St. Vrain I). “When the jurisdictional issue involves a factual
dispute, a reviewing court employs the clearly erroneous standard
of review . . . .” Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798
(Colo. 2000). A district court’s conclusions are clearly erroneous if
there is no support in the record. Parocha v. Parocha, 2018 CO 41,
¶ 11.
¶9 If disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined
with the merits, the plaintiff must prove a likelihood of success on
the merits. Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, ¶¶ 21, 24.
This standard requires the district court to engage in “factfinding
rather than merely making a ruling of law regarding sufficiency of
the evidence to present a fact question.” Id. at ¶ 21 (quoting Foster-
Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcock Can., 46 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir.
1995)).
¶ 10 If, however, “the facts are undisputed and the only issue is one
of statutory interpretation, we review the district court’s ruling de
6 novo.” Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colorado Springs, 2018 CO 10,
¶ 17. “[O]ur primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent . . . .” St. Vrain I, ¶ 10. “To determine legislative
intent, we construe the statute as a whole, giving consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.” Smokebrush,
¶ 18.
¶ 11 When “a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the statute’s
plain and ordinary meaning and look no further.” Daniel v. City of
Colorado Springs, 2014 CO 34, ¶ 12. On the other hand, if the
statute is ambiguous, we may employ other tools of statutory
interpretation to determine legislative intent. St. Vrain I, ¶ 11.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 12 “[S]overeign immunity generally bars any action against a
public entity for injuries that lie in tort or could lie in tort.”
Smokebrush, ¶ 20. The CGIA waives governmental immunity in “an
action for injuries resulting from certain tortious governmental
conduct, including certain kinds of negligent acts or omissions by
public entities or their employees.” Id. Because the CGIA derogates
Colorado’s common law, we strictly construe the CGIA’s immunity
provisions and broadly construe its waiver provisions. Id. at ¶ 22.
7 ¶ 13 The CGIA provides that sovereign immunity “is waived by a
public entity in an action for injuries resulting from . . . [a]
dangerous condition of any . . . public facility located in any park or
recreation area maintained by a public entity. § 24-10-106(1)(e),
C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis added). Thus, under the CGIA, a plaintiff
must prove that (1) “his . . . injury occurred in or on a ‘public
facility’”; (2) the public facility was “‘located in’ a ‘recreation area’”;
(3) the public facility was “maintained by” a public entity; and (4) a
“‘dangerous condition’ existed and caused an injury in or on the
public facility.” Daniel, ¶ 14.
C. The Horse Pathway is a Public Facility
¶ 14 It is undisputed that Prospect is a public entity and is
responsible for maintaining Prospect Arena, including the horse
pathway. At issue, then, is whether the horse pathway is a “public
facility” within a “recreation area” where a “dangerous condition”
existed.
¶ 15 The district court concluded that while the fencepost hole,
which was left when portions of the fence were removed, was not
alone a “facility,” “in conjunction with the other features of the
park, [it] furthered the [facility’s] purpose.” But Prospect argues
8 that the horse pathway is not part of a public facility of the
playground, but is instead a separate facility that abuts the
playground, as one does not ride horses on the playground or play
on the horse pathway and arena. We reject this narrow view of
“facility” because we — as the district court properly did — must
look at the overall purpose of Prospect Arena, not just pieces of it in
isolation.
¶ 16 Under the CGIA, a court conducts a two-step analysis to
determine what constitutes a public facility. First, we examine
whether the horse pathway is “public.” Id. at ¶ 15. Second, we ask
whether it is a “facility” for purposes of the CGIA. Id.
¶ 17 Turning to the first step, we conclude, like the district court,
that the horse pathway is “public” because it is “accessible to and
beneficial to the general public.” Id. During the Trinity hearing,
testimony of a Prospect employee, Sherrill, and the child’s father
established that Prospect Arena is open to the general public
without the need for a permit. As a part of Prospect Arena, the
horse pathway serves the public by providing users access to the
horse arena from the north end of the park for recreational
purposes. And Prospect Arena is maintained by Prospect for the
9 benefit of the public. See St. Vrain I, ¶ 28 (“We hold that for a
facility to be ‘public’ under section 24–10–106(1)(e), it must be
accessible to the public and maintained by a public entity to serve a
beneficial public purpose.”) (footnote omitted).
¶ 18 Second, although the court did not explicitly find the horse
pathway was a facility, it found that the fencepost hole where the
fence used to be, along with the playground, was part of the public
facility comprised of the park as a whole. This is consistent with
the supreme court’s interpretation of the CGIA in St. Vrain I. In
that case, the supreme court found the CGIA’s use of the word
“facility” to be ambiguous. See id. at ¶¶ 15, 23. But by employing
the canons of statutory construction, the court concluded that the
word does not encompass individual items, nor is it limited to
buildings. Instead, it includes a “collection of items that serve a
greater purpose.” Id. at ¶ 24. The court in St. Vrain I ultimately
concluded that an injury incurred by a child on a zip line on a
public school playground occurred on a “facility” because the zip
line was a component of a larger playground. Id. at ¶ 26.
¶ 19 Additionally, in Daniel, the supreme court concluded that a
parking lot adjacent to a golf course was part of the recreation area
10 because it “promote[d] recreation by allowing golfers a convenient
place to park after transporting themselves and their golf clubs to
the golf course. While a vehicle is not absolutely necessary to play
golf, a parking lot next to a golf course clearly promotes golfing.”
Daniel, ¶ 25.
¶ 20 Like the zip line and parking lot, the horse pathway next to the
horse arena promotes recreation by allowing horse riders a pathway
to and from the horse arena. It also promotes the safety of the
recreation area by keeping horses in a designated lane and away
from the children in the playground. Thus, the horse pathway
serves as a fundamental component to the overall purpose of
Prospect Arena. Prospect Arena’s park design allows children and
horses to recreate in proximity to one another.
¶ 21 But Prospect argues that the horse pathway is more akin to
the walkway in Young v. Brighton School District 27J, 2014 CO 32.
In Young, the supreme court was tasked with determining whether
a concrete walkway that ran between a school playground and
school building was a public facility under the CGIA. The supreme
court determined that the walkway was not a public facility. Id. at
11 ¶ 35. While the walkway and horse pathway may appear similar at
first blush, there are vital differences between the two.
¶ 22 The court in Young noted that the walkway “was not designed
to promote a specific play activity” but “was designed for multiple
purposes” other than recreation. Id. at ¶ 27. While children
utilized the walkway to access the playground, “the walkway also
served as a way to access the school and a way to traverse the
school grounds more generally.” Id. And the Young court
distinguished the walkway from the parking lot in Daniel, which it
said “was specifically designed for the purpose of providing visitors
with a convenient place to park their vehicles while using the golf
course’s amenities.” Id. at ¶ 26. In Young, the court clarified that
its holding should not be read to “imply that a walkway could never
qualify as a component of a larger ‘public facility.’” Id. at ¶ 30 n.11.
Rather, it held that, “[i]f a strong relationship exists between the
walkway and other recreational equipment such that together the
walkway and equipment promote a broader, common purpose of
recreation, such a walkway could so qualify.” Id.
¶ 23 Contrary to the walkway in Young, the horse pathway serves
the singular purpose of allowing horse riders to access from the
12 north side of the park the horse arena located in the south end of
the park. See id. at ¶¶ 26-27 (contrasting the multiple uses of the
walkway with the “singular purpose of the parking lot in Daniel”).
The horse pathway is more analogous to the parking lot in Daniel
because it was designed so that riders could conveniently access
the horse arena from the northern end of the park.
¶ 24 And Prospect acknowledges that the horse pathway is “an
accessway to recreation” for horse riders to get to and from the
horse arena. (Emphasis added.) Prospect also concedes that the
“[h]orse alley exists for the very purpose of separating horses and
pedestrians, so horses and pedestrians do not share common
spaces” and that the horse pathway is “meant only for travel by
horse.” But the horse pathway does not have different hours of
operation from the playground, nor does it require an entrance fee
or permit. In other words, while the playground and horse pathway
serve different functions, their overall purpose is to promote
recreation activities and safety for all users of the entire park.
Thus, the horse pathway, along with the other components of
Prospect Arena, promotes recreational opportunities for the public.
13 D. The Horse Pathway is Located in a Recreation Area
¶ 25 The closer question is whether the horse pathway and the
fencepost hole are “recreation areas.” To determine this, we
conduct a three-step analysis. First, we determine what property
constitutes the relevant recreation area. Daniel, ¶ 24. “To do this,
we include any contiguous areas of public property that plausibly
promote recreation and exclude any areas that clearly do not
promote recreation.” Id. at ¶ 23. Second, if the recreation area was
designed for both recreational and non-recreational purposes, we
determine if the “‘primary purpose’ in constructing or maintaining
the area was the promotion of recreation.” Id. Third, if “the
primary purpose was the promotion of recreation, we then
determine whether the public facility at issue is ‘located in’ the
boundaries of the recreation area.” Id.
¶ 26 The court did not conduct a separate analysis to determine
whether the fencepost hole was a “recreation area” once it
determined Prospect Arena was a “public facility.” Instead, because
it impliedly considered the analyses to be similar, it used much of
the same reasoning for both.
14 ¶ 27 Prospect attempts to argue that the fencepost hole “was
allegedly located at the nexus of two adjoining properties: Prospect
Arena and the Van Bibber Trail [a residential path].” It further
argued that “the hole along the fence line that separated the two
facilities could not plausibly be considered to promote recreation.”
¶ 28 We can certainly contemplate instances where specific areas of
a public facility would likely not be considered located within a
“recreation area” because they encompass spaces within the public
facility that does not primarily promote recreation. But there was
no signage noting that the fence or horse alley were off limits to
certain users of the park. Nor was the horse alley off limits to the
playground users.
¶ 29 But because the fence had been removed before the child fell,
identified in Figure 2 below, Prospect cannot rely on what the
fence’s intended purpose had been. Rather, by the time the child
ran toward the horses, there was no fence present at all. Therefore,
pedestrians could access the horse alley — and ostensibly horses
could easily enter into the playground and pavilion area — without
anyone knowing or even perceiving that Prospect Arena had
intended for those two areas to be delineated with a fence. Because
15 the area where the child fell and was injured had no barrier
between the horse alley and playground, on this record, we cannot
say that the horse path and playground, along with the land
between those two areas, did not together primarily promote
recreation.
Figure 2: Map of Prospect Arena After Fence Removal
16 The rectangular image depicts Prospect Arena after Prospect removed the fence. Portions of the fence along the top right corner of the image were removed and never replaced.
¶ 30 Finally, as to the third step, there is no dispute that the
fencepost hole was “located in” the boundaries of the recreation
area. See Daniel, ¶ 30 (concluding the parking lot was “located in”
the recreation area because it was located on the public entity’s
property and adjacent to the public recreation area).2
¶ 31 Therefore, we affirm the district court’s finding that the area
where the child fell was located within a recreation area, albeit on
slightly different grounds than relied on by the court. Stickle v.
County of Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, ¶ 41, aff’d, 2024 CO 7.
E. The Fencepost Hole was a Dangerous Condition
¶ 32 Prospect contends that the fencepost hole was not a
dangerous condition. We disagree and conclude that there was
record support for the district court’s finding that the fencepost hole
was a dangerous condition that existed for such time that, had
Prospect exercised reasonable care, it would have been discovered.
2 Prospect’s reference to the Van Bibber Trail to argue that the
horse path and fencepost were within that area appears irrelevant, as the record contains no precise location of the trail.
17 ¶ 33 The CGIA defines a “dangerous condition” as
either a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity or public employee in constructing or maintaining such facility. For the purposes of this subsection (1.3), a dangerous condition should have been known to exist if it is established that the condition had existed for such a period and was of such a nature that, in the exercise of reasonable care, such condition and its dangerous character should have been discovered.
§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis added).
¶ 34 “Colorado courts have consistently held that the phrase ‘knew
or should have known’ is satisfied by actual or constructive
knowledge, also referred to as the knowledge that one exercising
reasonable diligence should have.” Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ.
Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008). And “the plaintiff must
prove that the [hole] created a chance of injury . . . which exceeded
the bounds of reason.” City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO
37, ¶ 23. “Assessing whether the plaintiff has met this burden
requires examining the totality of the circumstances presented by
18 the undisputed evidence as to whether that particular condition
presented an unreasonable risk.” Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022
CO 10, ¶ 22. The existence of a dangerous condition is a question
of fact, and we defer to the district court’s factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs,
2015 COA 126, ¶ 12.3
¶ 35 To determine whether a dangerous condition exists for
purposes of the CGIA, we employ a four-part test. A public entity
waives immunity if the injuries occurred as a result of
1. the physical condition of the public facility or the use
thereof;
2. which constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or
safety of the public;
3. which is known to exist or should have been known to
exist in the exercise of reasonable care; and
3 We disagree with Prospect that whether a defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge of a “dangerous condition” is reviewed de novo. See Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, ¶ 36 (determining that a district court’s finding of when a public entity learns of the dangerous condition is reviewed under the clear error standard).
19 4. which condition is “proximately caused by the negligent
act or omission of the public entity in constructing or
maintaining the facility.”
St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, ¶ 16 (St.
Vrain II).
¶ 36 First, we have already determined that the horse pathway is a
“public facility” and neither party disputes that the hole was a
physical condition. But Prospect appears to dispute whether the
hole was actually a fencepost hole from the fence Prospect
employees removed in September or October 2020. There was
ample evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that it
was, including photographs and testimony from a park visitor who
said it was “obvious[ly]” a posthole located “sort of right along where
that fence line would have been.” The district court compared
Sherrill’s testimony with Exhibit 4, a photograph taken of the
location of the injury by Sherrill, and found it was consistent with
the picture.
¶ 37 Second, we conclude that there was evidence to support the
district court’s finding that the fencepost hole posed a risk to the
health and safety of the public that a reasonable person could
20 conclude exceeded the bounds of reason. Sherrill described the
hole as five to six inches in diameter, and said that it appeared to
be made by an auger and perfectly round; that it appeared to be
manmade. Sherrill also testified that he estimated the hole to be
approximately four inches deep, although there was additional
testimony that it may have been as much as ten inches. Brad
Sassolino, a Prospect maintenance technician and the supervisor of
the Prospect Arena’s fence removal, testified that the fencepost
holes were “a safety hazard” that could result in injury because the
holes were “a trip hazard.” See McKinley, ¶ 13 (depression in
parking lot that was approximately four inches deep was a
dangerous condition). The district court found that Prospect’s
“employees allegedly failed to fully fill, or improperly filled, at least
one fencepost hole. Its employees created a dangerous condition.”
Whether a condition on a public facility “presents an unreasonable
risk will necessarily be a fact-specific inquiry,” and we will defer to
the district court’s factual findings if they are supported by the
record. Dennis, ¶ 23. Given this evidence, we agree with the
district court that the hole presented an unreasonable risk to the
public.
21 ¶ 38 Prospect further contends that the fencepost hole, by itself, did
not create an unreasonable risk, as it was the child’s actions that
contributed to the injury. Specifically, Prospect argues that the
child “was injured because he ran at [an] unknown animal, [and]
ignored warnings from its owner,” and the “way in which [the child]
approached the horses” was unreasonable. In essence, Prospect
states that the child’s injuries did not result from the fencepost
hole. We disagree.
¶ 39 But the proper analysis is whether a dangerous condition is
proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public
entity in constructing or maintaining the facility. Dozier, ¶ 32; see
also St. Vrain II, ¶ 16. Thus, whether the child’s injuries were
proximately caused by his own negligence is irrelevant to determine
whether Prospect waived immunity. Daniel, ¶ 27 (“[A]n injured
individual’s purpose in visiting the recreation area where he or she
was injured is irrelevant. . . . [A] public entity owes the same duty
to an individual injured by a dangerous condition ‘located in’ a
‘recreation area’ regardless of the idiosyncratic reasons why that
individual might have visited the recreation area.”).
22 ¶ 40 Third, the fencepost hole existed for such a time that the
exercise of reasonable care should have led to its discovery. The
fence was removed in September or October of 2020. The child was
injured on November 21, 2020. Between when the fenceposts were
removed and the date of the injury, Prospect employees visited
Prospect Arena multiple times for routine inspections and trash
cleanup. And based off these routine inspections, Prospect argues
that its employees did inspect its work. But Prospect’s employees
did not visit the park to specifically inspect for fencepost holes until
after the child was injured. And photographs of the hole taken after
the child’s injury reveal that the hole would have been reasonably
visible if Prospect employees inspected that area.
¶ 41 Thus, had Prospect exercised reasonable care and inspected
its work removing the fence, it should have discovered the fencepost
hole.
¶ 42 Prospect further argues that there was no evidence that the
fencepost hole existed before the date of the child’s injury and that
there was testimony offered by a park visitor that she did not notice
any holes in September and October of 2020. Additionally,
Prospect alleges testimony during the Trinity hearing indicated that
23 the fencepost hole “rapidly deteriorated or settled, creating a
condition [that Prospect] lacked any opportunity to discover.” As we
have already stated above, however, the existence of a dangerous
condition is a factual question, and we defer to the district court’s
factual findings. McKinley, ¶ 12. And the district court found,
“Ultimately, there was a fencepost hole that [the child] tripped on
from fencing [Prospect] recently removed. And [Prospect] should
have known of the dangerous condition it created had it inspected
its work.” While the record may not contain an exact date of when
the hole was created, we are not in a position to second-guess the
district court’s findings that it existed for such a time that it should
have been discovered upon reasonable inspection.
¶ 43 Finally, because we determine that Prospect created the hole
by removing the fence in 2020, Prospect’s negligence by not
24 ensuring all the fencepost holes were properly filled proximately
caused the hole.4
III. Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 44 Prospect requests its attorney fees and costs pursuant to
C.A.R. 28(a)(9), C.R.C.P. 12(b), and sections 13-16-113 and 13-17-
201, C.R.S. 2024. Because we affirm the district court’s order, we
decline to award Prospect its attorney fees.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 45 We affirm the district court’s order.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GROVE concur.
4 This case is not like the timing at issue in Dozier, ¶¶ 3, 27.There, the supreme court determined that immunity had not been waived because “the County wasn’t afforded ‘a reasonable time under the circumstances to discover and correct the condition’” because it was just minutes between when water spilled on the courthouse floor and the plaintiff slipping on the puddle. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 27 (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983)). In this case, the district court determined, with record support, that the fencepost hole existed for two to three months before the child’s fall, so the dangerous condition existed for a sufficient amount of time that Prospect should have known about the condition and fixed it.