L.R. v. Division of Disability Services

84 A.3d 1011, 434 N.J. Super. 430, 2014 WL 463012, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 21
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division·Decided February 6, 2014·No. A-5701-11·Published

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5701-11T2

L.R., APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

Petitioner-Appellant, February 6, 2014

v.

APPELLATE DIVISION

DIVISION OF DISABILITY SERVICES,

Respondent-Respondent.

Argued September 11, 2013 – Decided February 6, 2014

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Fasciale.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Disability Services.

Susan W. Saidel argued the cause for appellant (Disability Rights New Jersey, attorneys;

Ms. Saidel, of counsel and on the brief).

Jennifer Simons, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J.

Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney;

Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Simons, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by FUENTES, P.J.A.D.

L.R. participates in the Personal Assistance Service Program (PASP) established by the Legislature under the Personal Assistance Services Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4G-13 to -22, (the Act).

The PASP is administered by the Division of Disability Services (DDS or Division), in the New Jersey Department of Human Services.1 As a resident of Hunterdon County, L.R. was able to receive PASP assistance benefits under the "cash management plan" earlier than other similarly situated eligible consumers residing in other counties in the State.2 In December 2009, L.R. requested to use the unspent part of her monthly budgeted cash allowance to pay for the landline connection to her residence phone, cell phone service, and internet access.

The Division denied her request on January 6, 2010.

Relying on N.J.A.C. 10:140-2.2(e), the Division determined it was not obligated to pay for services that are not related to

1 DDS defines its core mission as "serving people who have become disabled as adults, whether through illness or injury. Such conditions are also called late-onset disabilities. It is estimated that one in five people - about 1.75 million New Jerseyans - has a disability that may limit their physical or cognitive function." Division of Disability Services, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES (January 21, 2014), http://nj.gov/humanservices/dds/home/. 2 In March 2000, Hunterdon County became the first county in the State to use the cash management plan as a pilot program. The cash management model was adopted by Essex County in July 2001. The Division convened a "PASP Cash Model Legislative Panel" in 2005 to develop a legislative proposal to implement the cash model approach as a formal amendment to the Act. The Legislature formally amended the Act to incorporate the cash management model approach. The legislation was signed into law by Governor Corzine effective November 20, 2009. 43 N.J.R. 2551(a)(Oct. 3, 2011).

the consumer's personal care or performed by a personal assistant. According to the Division, L.R. was only entitled to receive financial assistance to pay the cost of a personal assistant.

Although L.R. had the right to appeal an adverse agency action under N.J.A.C. 10:140-3.10, and to further file an administrative appeal of an adverse decision with the PASP State Program Administrator, N.J.A.C. 10:140-3.11(d), she claims that her initial efforts to challenge the denial of her request were met with great resistance, misinformation, and obfuscation.3 L.R. eventually filed an administrative appeal which was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for adjudication.

3 In a certification included in her appellate appendix, L.R. averred that the fiscal intermediary for the Hunterdon County PASP told her there was no way for her to challenge this determination by way of an appeal, grievance procedure, or other form of reconsideration. Although these allegations have not been confirmed, we expect the Division to investigate this matter as a possible violation of L.R.'s Personal Assistance Consumer's Bill of Rights under N.J.S.A. 30-4G-16.1(h), (i) and (j).

The fiscal intermediary is the agency that disburses "the cash benefit to consumers under the Personal Assistance Services Program." N.J.A.C. 10:140-1.4. The fiscal intermediary also serves as the business agent for the consumer and prepares "the payroll checks and other disbursements at the direction of the consumer, as well as keep records of all transactions." Ibid. (Emphasis added).

Because the salient facts were not disputed, both sides moved for summary decision before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case. After considering the arguments presented, the ALJ issued an initial decision holding that under N.J.S.A. 30:4G-14, PASP funding can only be used to cover the cost of employing "personal care assistants" to perform "personal assistance services," as defined in N.J.A.C. 10:140- 1.4. The ALJ thus accepted the Division's position to limit PASP benefits to providing "personal care services through personal care assistants."

As a corollary to this principal ruling, the ALJ rejected L.R.'s argument that the programmatic funding restrictions endorsed by the Division here were not applicable to individuals receiving PASP funding through the "cash management model." As authorized by N.J.A.C. 10:140-3.11(e), the Commissioner's final decision adopted without modification the ALJ's findings and conclusions of law. Although the Commissioner concluded that as a matter of law, the Legislature intended the Act "to provide individual recipients with choice and control over their chosen services," he nevertheless concluded L.R. was not entitled to use unspent budgeted funds under the cash management plan to offset the cost of internet access and/or to pay for the use of a cellular phone or landline telephone service in her residence.

L.R. now appeals to this court pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:140-

3.11(f), arguing that the Commissioner's decision to deny her request is arbitrary and capricious because it undermines the expressed purpose of the Act, "to promote the greatest possible degree of self-control and self-direction on the part of each recipient of services." N.J.S.A. 30:4G-15. According to L.R., the Legislature created the PASP "cash management model" to give eligible participants the flexibility to utilize unspent monthly budgeted funds in a manner that achieves a greater level of independence and autonomy over their personal activities.

We agree with L.R.'s arguments and reverse. Our legal analysis will be informed by the following uncontested facts.

I

L.R. is a fifty-four-year-old woman who suffers from multiple disabilities4 that severely limit her everyday

4 L.R. has osteoarthritis and bone spurs in her neck which causes pain and weakness throughout her arms and inhibits her ability to perform tasks requiring repetitive motions; she has difficulty reaching and retrieving items and is unable to lift or move anything that weighs more than ten pounds; she suffers from post-concussion syndrome with visual tracking difficulties, migraine headaches, vertigo, light sensitivity, memory problems, dry eye, and cataracts in both eyes; she has respiratory problems including pneumonia, asthma, respiratory allergies, and vocal cord dysfunction. She uses an inhaler and nebulizer to treat these respiratory problems and, as a consequence, is highly susceptible to respiratory infections. As a prophylactic measure, she uses a surgical mask when she leaves her residence (continued)

activities. She uses a "variety of assistive devices" to get around her home and travel outside her immediate environment. These include "a power wheelchair, a rolling walker, a quad cane, a reacher,5 and a stair lift." She spends nearly all of her time at home. It is thus undisputed that L.R. is eligible to receive PASP for a "permanent physical disability" as that term is defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4G-14.6

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L.R. v. Division of Disability Services, 84 A.3d 1011, 434 N.J. Super. 430, 2014 WL 463012, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 21 (N.J. Ct. App. 2014).

84 A.3d 1011 (L.R. v. Division of Disability Services) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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