L.R., Jr. v. J.R.B.

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1374-24

L.R., JR.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.R.B.,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted June 30, 2026 – Decided July 21, 2026

Before Judges Chase and Torregrossa-O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, Docket No. FV-08-0868-25.

Hark & Hark, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Collis, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1 We use initials to protect the identities of the parties. In this one-sided appeal, defendant J.R.B. appeals from the trial court's

January 2, 2025 final protective order ("FPO") entered against him and in favor

of plaintiff L.R., Jr. under the Victim's Assistance and Survivor Protection Act

("VASPA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21. We vacate the FPO, reinstate the

temporary protection order ("TPO"), and remand for a new trial because

defendant was not informed of his right to an attorney or advised of the

consequences of an FPO.

I.

We derive the following facts from the parties' testimony. Plaintiff pled

guilty to endangering the welfare of a child in 2001 and was subject to Megan 's

Law and parole supervision for life ("PSL"). In 2011, plaintiff and defendant

worked together as volunteer emergency medical technicians ("EMTs").

Plaintiff served as defendant's supervisor. After plaintiff filed a complaint,

defendant received a thirty-day suspension. Defendant then voluntarily left his

position.

Plaintiff claimed that his record was expunged in April 2016. Plaintiff

moved to Florida in 2018. In 2019, defendant discovered plaintiff's LinkedIn

account and saw that plaintiff worked as an EMT in Florida. Defendant then

submitted an Open Public Records Act ("OPRA") request to the State Parole

A-1374-24 2 Board and obtained plaintiff's judgment of conviction, which included Megan's

Law and PSL requirements. After receiving these documents, defendant notified

Florida authorities that plaintiff resided in Florida and was required to register

under Megan's Law. In November 2019, Florida law enforcement officers

visited plaintiff's residence and informed him that he must register as a sex

offender because of his New Jersey conviction. Plaintiff subsequently returned

to New Jersey and started to work here again as an EMT.

In February 2020, defendant posted the documents obtained through the

OPRA request on Facebook. Plaintiff testified that defendant then made

additional posts about his past but plaintiff "let it go, cause I was hoping if I let

it go it would just stop."

In November 2024, defendant emailed the New Jersey State Emergency

Medical Services Task Force ("EMSTF"), stating that he knew of an employee

with a child endangerment conviction. That same month, defendant posted on

the New Jersey Forest Fire Department's webpage, "[w]hy does the Department

allow sex offenders on the crew?" He also linked plaintiff's payroll information

from the State Department of Treasury. In December 2024, defendant posted

on the EMSTF webpage, "[w]hy does the [EMSTF] have people who pled to

endangering the welfare of a child?"

A-1374-24 3 Plaintiff filed a VASPA complaint and obtained a TPO against defendant

on December 26, 2024. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant

committed stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, and cyber harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-

4.1.

The court held a FPO hearing on January 2, 2025. Both parties appeared

self-represented. Before the hearing began, the court informed the parties that

they would have the opportunity to testify and cross-examine each other. The

record does not reflect that the court advised them of their right to retain counsel

or the collateral consequences of an FPO. 2 Both parties then testified.

Plaintiff claimed that defendant's posts endangered his life due to the

nature of his offense. He stated that the information remains online and only

defendant can remove it.

Defendant explained that he was concerned about plaintiff's background

and did not believe plaintiff should serve as an EMT. Defendant further testified

2 Many trial courts will give an opening statement to all participants detailing their right to hire an attorney and the collateral consequences of an FPO. If so, when the parties' individual case is called, the trial court should make sure the parties heard the opening statement and have no questions regarding it. Here, the record does not reflect whether the opening statement was given. A-1374-24 4 that he has not attempted to contact plaintiff or have others contact him and has

not seen plaintiff in person for over ten years.

After hearing the testimony, the trial court issued an oral decision. The

court found plaintiff credible. The court found defendant credible in part but

disbelieved some aspects of his testimony. The court did not find a predicate

act of cyber harassment. However, the court found that defendant monitored

plaintiff online, specifically on LinkedIn, and posted in February 2020 that

plaintiff was a sex offender. The court determined that in November 2024,

defendant knew plaintiff was associated with the Forest Fire Department and

posted plaintiff's payroll and criminal history information on their webpage.

The court also found that defendant posted on the EMSTF webpage. The court

concluded that defendant's conduct constituted maintaining a close proximity to

plaintiff on three occasions with the sole purpose of annoying him and this

amounted to stalking. After finding that plaintiff feared for his safety, the court

entered an FPO.

This appeal follows.

A-1374-24 5 II.

In VASPA cases, "[w]e defer to a trial court's factual findings 'when

supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" C.R. v. M.T. (C.R. II),

257 N.J. 126, 139 (2024) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12

(1998)). Our "deference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely

testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Ibid. (quoting MacKinnon

v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007)). Thus, we shall not disturb a trial

court's factual findings "unless they 'went so wide of the mark that a mistake

must have been made.'" Ibid. (quoting MacKinnon, 191 N.J. at 254). However,

we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Ibid. (citing State v.

Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018)).

VASPA, in pertinent part, provides:

Any person alleging to be a victim of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, or stalking or cyber harassment, and who is not eligible for a restraining order as a "victim of domestic violence" as defined by . . . [the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35], may, except as provided in subsection b. of this section, 3 file an application with

3 Subsection b. addresses "nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at such conduct, or stalking or cyber-harassment has been committed by an unemancipated minor" or "committed against an unemancipated minor by a parent, guardian, or other person having care,

A-1374-24 6 the Superior Court pursuant to the Rules of Court alleging the commission of such conduct or attempted conduct and seeking a [TPO].

[N.J.S.A. 2C:14-14(a)(1).]

The statute was adopted to authorize courts "to issue protective orders for

persons victimized by acts of stalking . . . in situations for which the domestic

violence statutes are inapplicable because the victim lacks a prior or existing

spousal, household, or dating relationship, or . . . [a] child in common[] with the

offender."4 Assemb. Health Comm. Statement to S. 1517, at 1 (Mar. 20, 2023)

(L. 2023, c. 127).

At an FPO hearing:

[T]he standard for proving the allegations made in the application for a protective order shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors:

(1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or any attempt at

custody[,] and control of that child" and provides alternative avenues to seek redress. 4 VASPA replaced and expanded the scope of protections afforded under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act, which provided protection for persons not eligible under the PDVA but was limited to "acts of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or attempts thereof, committed against" a victim. Assemb. Health Comm. Statement to S. 1517, at 1 (Mar. 20, 2023) (L. 2023, c. 127). A-1374-24 7 such conduct, or acts of stalking or cyber- harassment against the alleged victim; and

(2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a).]

If an FPO is issued, it shall: (1) prohibit the respondent from having

contact with the victim; and (2) prohibit the respondent from committing any

future act of nonconsensual sexual contact, sexual penetration, or lewdness, or

any attempt at such conduct, against the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(e). Further,

an FPO may include additional relief, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(f)(1)-(5), and

requires placement on a registry, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-20.

III.

We begin with defendant's assertion that the trial court erred because it

failed to advise him that he could have an attorney represent him. He also argues

that he should have been warned of the collateral consequences of an FPO. We

agree.

"At the outset, we reiterate the Legislature clearly intended VASPA to

include individuals who are victims of the offenses enumerated in the statute but

could not be protected by the PDVA." A.C. v. R.S., 483 N.J. Super 47, 55 (App.

Div. 2025); see also R.L.U. v. J.P., 457 N.J. Super. 129, 135 (App. Div. 2018)

A-1374-24 8 (discussing how "[V]ASPA was intended to fill th[e] void" left by the PDVA).

Moreover, our Supreme Court has expressed that VASPA is "a compliment to

the PDVA[,]" which "mirrors the PDVA in certain respects and diverges from it

in others." C.R. II, 257 N.J. at 143. The Court then detailed the many

similarities and some differences between the statutes, which we need not repeat

here. Id. at 143-47.

Where the ramifications of a final restraining order ("FRO") and FPO are,

at minimum, similar, it stands to reason that the due process rights afforded

during an FRO hearing should also be similar. In A.C. v. R.S., we reasoned that

the similarities between VASPA and the PDVA implies that VASPA, like the

PDVA, is meant to "provide maximum protection for victims." 483 N.J. Super.

at 56. That said, there appears to be no indication that the inverse would not

also be true—VASPA, like the PDVA, requires the accused be appraised of

certain due process rights.

"[O]rdinary due process protections apply in the domestic violence

context, notwithstanding the shortened time frames for conducting a final

hearing that are imposed by the statute." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 478

(2011) (internal citation omitted). "[E]nsuring that defendants are not deprived

of their due process rights requires our trial courts to recognize both what those

A-1374-24 9 rights are and how they can be protected consistent with the protective goals of

the [PDVA]." Id. at 479.

Due process requires defendants be given "a meaningful opportunity to

defend against a complaint." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 606 (App. Div.

2013). The right to counsel is an important due process right of a defendant in

an action under the PDVA. A.A.R. v. J.R.C., 471 N.J. Super. 584, 588 (App.

Div. 2022). While this right does not guarantee the appointment of counsel, it

does require "a defendant understand[] that [they have] a right to retain legal

counsel and receive a reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney." Ibid. Due

process allows litigants a meaningful opportunity to defend against a complaint

in domestic violence matters, which would include the opportunity to seek legal

representation, if requested. Franklin v. Sloskey, 385 N.J. Super. 534, 540-41

(App. Div. 2006).

As noted above, the record neither demonstrates that the judge informed

defendant of his right to be represented by legal counsel in advance of trial , nor

that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel. Guided

by the noted principles, we conclude the court mistakenly applied its discretion

by its failure to instruct defendant of his right to be represented by legal counsel

in advance of trial and by not taking testimony concerning whether defendant

A-1374-24 10 knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Although we can

appreciate the need for the court to have control over management of its trial

list, we discern there would have been no undue prejudice to plaintiff if

defendant sought an adjournment to obtain counsel as the TPO protections

would have remained in effect. Therefore, we are constrained to vacate the FPO,

reinstate the TPO, and remand for a new trial.

Because we are vacating the FPO and remanding for a new trial, we need

not reach defendant's arguments that the predicate act of stalking was not met

and that the FPO was not necessary for plaintiff's protection. We also do not

reach defendant's argument concerning a lack of clarity in the VASPA penalties.

On remand, this matter must be assigned to a different judge because

credibility findings were made. R. 1:12-1(d); See Pressler & Verniero, Current

N.J. Ct. Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 1:12-1(2025) ("a matter remanded after appeal for

a new trial should be assigned to a different judge if the first judge has, during

the original trial, expressed conclusions regarding witness credibility " (citing,

among others, R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 306 (2009))). Lastly, our opinion

should in no way be construed as an expression of whether plaintiff should

receive an FPO when the matter is re-tried.

Vacated and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1374-24 11