L.P. v. C.R.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: December 4, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1235
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1235

L.P.

vs.

C.R.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant appeals from the extension of an abuse

prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, on the ground

that the statute infringes his right to "protect[] property"

under art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as

amended by art. 106 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts

Constitution (art. 106).1 We affirm.

Background. The plaintiff resided in one building of a

multibuilding property with several other residents, including

her landlord, the defendant. On May 24, 2024, the plaintiff

obtained an ex parte abuse prevention order (order). The

1The notice of appeal also includes the denial of the defendant's motion to vacate the order. However, his brief devotes no specific argument to this motion. affidavit that she submitted in support of her complaint alleged

that, among other things, the defendant entered her room,

screamed at her, and grabbed her roughly by the arms to remove

her, leaving red marks. The order prohibited the defendant from

abusing the plaintiff and required him to stay away from her

residence.

At the hearing after notice, the defendant acknowledged

that he "put [his] hands on" the plaintiff. He explained that

the plaintiff was in another tenant's room and that he had "both

the right and responsibility, as the landlord, to remove [the

plaintiff] from other people's private spaces in the house that

we share." The judge found that the uncontested fact that the

defendant "place[d] [his] hands on" the plaintiff and physically

removed her was a basis to enter the order. The judge extended

the order for one year and modified it to limit the "stay away"

provision, so the defendant could access the other buildings on

the property, and to allow written communication regarding the

plaintiff's tenancy. The judge also suggested to the defendant

that he had appropriate remedies available to deal with the

plaintiff's tenancy, such as "housing court or an eviction

process."

2 Discussion. The defendant contends that the entry2 and

extension of the order violated what he characterizes as his

right to "physically defend [his] real property" under art. 106

and argues that G. L. c. 209A is unconstitutional as applied to

him.3 We disagree.

As an initial matter, the defendant argued below only that

as the landlord he had a right to physically remove the

plaintiff. On the record before us, the defendant did not cite

the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or raise any other

constitutional argument, either at the hearing or through a

motion for reconsideration. Where the argument was not

adequately raised below, it is waived. See Sugarman v. Board of

Registration in Med., 422 Mass. 338, 347 (1996). We briefly

address it regardless.

"We review a challenge to the constitutionality of a

statute de novo" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Dufresne,

489 Mass. 195, 200 (2022). "We begin with a presumption of

The initial ex parte abuse prevention order is moot and 2

not subject to appellate review because it was extended at the hearing after notice. See Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 661 (2020).

In his reply brief, the defendant waived the argument, 3

raised in his initial brief, that the judge's findings were insufficient to issue an abuse prevention order under G. L. c. 209A.

3 statutory validity" (citation and quotation omitted). Id.

Assuming without deciding that strict scrutiny applies, a

c. 209A order "must be narrowly tailored to a compelling

government interest, and be the least restrictive means

available to vindicate that interest" (quotations and citations

omitted). Commonwealth v. A.Z., 493 Mass. 427, 432 (2024). The

Commonwealth has a compelling interest in curtailing household

violence, and c. 209A, which "create[s] a safe haven . . . ,

leaving fewer opportunities for abusive contact" (citation

omitted), Commonwealth v. Carino, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 578, 582

(2024),4 is narrowly tailored to that "protective purpose," id.

See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 347 (1990) (stay away

and no abuse provisions were "eminently reasonable, in that they

both serve directly to support the statute's primary goal of

abuse prevention"). Here, where the defendant entered the room

without permission and used physical force to try to remove the

plaintiff, and where the abuse prevention order did not deprive

the defendant of available legal mechanisms to possess and

protect his property, we conclude that the order was a narrowly

4 The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review on a different issue. See 495 Mass. 1106 (2025).

4 tailored mechanism to serve the compelling government interest

of protecting the plaintiff from abuse.

Order extending and modifying abuse prevention order affirmed.

Order denying motion to vacate order affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Sacks & Allen, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: December 4, 2025.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.