RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3026-23
L.P.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.R.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted December 11, 2025 – Decided December 24, 2025
Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FD-04-2413-19.
Patricia A. Darden, attorney for appellant.
Cynthia D. Sora, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(13). Defendant A.R. appeals from non-dissolution orders dated January 29,
February 21, and April 19, 2024, arising from a parenting time dispute with
plaintiff L.P. We affirm.
The parties have a lengthy litigation history, which began when plaintiff
filed a non-dissolution complaint in 2019 for joint legal custody and parenting
time with the parties' then three-year-old daughter. Defendant responded with
a counterclaim describing the parties' relationship as difficult and claiming
plaintiff had not seen their daughter on a regular basis. She also requested,
among other things, the court conduct an in-camera review of Pennsylvania
Department of Human Services (DHS) files and criminal records regarding child
endangerment and physical abuse of plaintiff's son from another relationship,
who was born in 2001. Further, defendant requested the court order a drug test.
Her allegations of abuse would color much of the court proceedings.
A judge conducted a five-day plenary hearing and rendered a decision on
August 25, 2020. This order would be the first of many orders entered by the
six judges to hear this matter. The judge granted defendant sole legal and
physical custody and ordered plaintiff would not exercise parenting time until
he completed twelve in-person co-parenting classes with defendant. Plaintiff
received telephonic parenting time with the parties' child.
A-3026-23 2 Plaintiff filed a motion for custody and to remove the child to
Pennsylvania. On December 2, 2020, a second judge, who we will refer to as
the trial judge because it is his orders defendant now appeals from, denied the
motion noting there was no change in circumstances and plaintiff was not
entitled to parenting time until he completed the co-parenting counseling
sessions.
On April 26, 2021, a third judge issued an order denying competing
motions filed by the parties for various relief. Notably, the order modified the
required co-parenting sessions to individual sessions for plaintiff. On July 6,
2021, the matter returned before the trial judge who "vacated" defendant's
request to suspend plaintiff's parenting time and reinstated visitation. Defendant
was ordered to participate and cooperate in co-parenting classes again.
On October 25, 2021, a fourth judge denied plaintiff's order to show cause
for custody and visitation, and ruled plaintiff must submit proof he completed
the court-ordered parenting classes. Plaintiff was having visitation by video and
this order continued it. The judge appointed a custody evaluator to conduct a
best interests evaluation. On February 8, 2022, the judge increased plaintiff's
visitation to six supervised visits until she received the evaluation and ordered
a custody trial. On April 13, 2022, the judge ordered unsupervised parenting
A-3026-23 3 time, curbside pick-up, and no contact between the parties during the parenting
time exchange.
Following the custody trial, the judge found no change in circumstances
to modify custody. On August 16, 2022, she entered an order maintaining
plaintiff's parenting time under the April 2022 order and ordered him to have
intensive therapy to better co-parent with defendant.
Defendant filed an order to show cause to suspend parenting time on
August 29, 2022. She claimed plaintiff was not complying with the pick-up and
drop-off procedures. Plaintiff cross-moved to change the parenting time
exchange location. He pointed out he had completed the court-ordered therapy
and asked the court for overnight parenting time. Defendant's reply disputed
these assertions.
On December 5, 2022, a fifth judge entered an order requiring both parties
to appear in court and modified the parenting-time exchange location to a police
station on an interim basis. On December 23, 2022, the judge denied defendant's
request to suspend parenting time, returned the parenting-time exchange to its
original location, and ordered plaintiff not to exit his vehicle during exchanges.
On March 1, 2023, a therapist wrote to the court explaining plaintiff was
attending his court-ordered sessions. The matter returned to court on July 14,
A-3026-23 4 2023. A sixth judge heard the case on this date and entered an order directing
the parties to download an application to communicate regarding their daughter.
Plaintiff received increased parenting time. However, the judge ordered there
would be no parenting time in Pennsylvania. The judge ordered continued
therapy and denied defendant's request for the DHS records.
Defendant moved for reconsideration and sought further relief. On
September 22, 2023, the judge modified the July order to state plaintiff could
not take the child outside of New Jersey. On October 16, 2023, defendant's
attorney wrote to the court, claiming plaintiff violated its order and took the
child to Philadelphia. As proof, counsel provided a recording of a telephone call
placed by the child to defendant and the geolocation of an AirTag defendant had
affixed to the child's shoe, allegedly showing she was in Philadelphia. Plaintiff
disputed this claim and argued the child's sneakers were left in his car and he
did not take the child outside of New Jersey. This alleged violation of the
prohibition on parenting time outside of New Jersey—and proving the
violation—would become the major issue for defendant at trial.
Defendant later formally moved for relief related to the alleged violation
and sought sanctions against plaintiff. The motion was returnable before the
A-3026-23 5 trial judge on October 23, 2023. After a lengthy argument, which we address
more fully below, the judge rescheduled the matter for December 1, 2023.
The parties returned to court for trial on December 1, 2023. However,
before the trial began, plaintiff's counsel noted her client had not seen the child
since October because defendant was wrongfully withholding her. The parties
also addressed defendant's assertion plaintiff violated the court's order by taking
the child out of state. Defendant's counsel reiterated her claim the proof of the
violation was in the child's phone records, argued she could prove the violation
using her client's phone records, and requested the court interview the child.
The judge reiterated he wanted to start the trial to resolve these issues and urged
defendant to call her first witness. Defense counsel continued to argue for the
judge to interview the child, noting the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Division) had interviewed her as part of a referral and
investigation. The judge denied the request without prejudice pending his
review of the Division's file.
Plaintiff's counsel also wished to address a motion for sanctions filed
against her by defendant. However, the judge emphasized time was running out
to begin the trial. Defendant then called her goddaughter who testified she
A-3026-23 6 tracked the child's phone to Philadelphia using her phone on a separate occasion
than the sneaker tracking incident.
After the goddaughter's testimony, the judge addressed when the matter
would return because it was the end of the court day. Plaintiff's counsel asked
the judge to address parenting time. Defendant's counsel resisted the request,
noting the Division had interviewed the child who stated plaintiff had taken her
to Philadelphia and left her alone, and she became afraid, so she called
defendant. Because plaintiff maintained the child's cellphone on his mobile
account, defendant's counsel requested the court order the cellphone carrier to
produce its records to show the child called defendant the day she was in
Philadelphia.
The trial judge declined, noting if plaintiff was untruthful about taking the
child to Philadelphia, it should not result in punishing the child by limiting
plaintiff's time with her. Defendant's counsel disputed the judge's comment and
continued to argue this was an important issue. The judge denied the request
for an order directing the carrier to produce its records. Defense counsel
continued to argue about plaintiff's violation and the judge responded that if
defendant proved the violation, he would monetarily sanction plaintiff.
However, he would not sanction plaintiff by depriving him of parenting time.
A-3026-23 7 Defense counsel asked the judge to place his ruling on the record that he
would not interview the child, despite his "obligation to protect . . . her best
interests." The judge explained he would not be interviewing the child because
"it's evident . . . the parties are working hard to influence the child." At seven
years of age, she lacked the capacity to withstand an interview.
Both attorneys continued to argue the merits of various issues with the
judge. The judge ruled the hearing was over and the parties would be left to
their proofs at trial. However, he reiterated his concern defendant was trying to
prevent plaintiff from having parenting time and it was not in the child's best
interests to punish plaintiff for violating the court's order by limiting parenting
time.
On December 19, 2023, the trial judge entered an order memorializing his
rulings about the child's cellphone records and the interview. The judge ruled
the child could not travel to Philadelphia, but granted plaintiff parenting time,
and rescheduled the trial.
The parties filed dueling motions. Plaintiff claimed defendant was
denying him parenting time, and defendant sought a modification of his
parenting time. The trial judge would hear these motions. Beforehand, plaintiff
A-3026-23 8 filed an order to show cause to enforce parenting time, which the trial judge also
granted on January 29, 2024.
On February 21, 2024, the trial judge entered an order denying defendant's
request to suspend parenting time and her request to subpoena the daughter's
phone records. The judge continued plaintiff's parenting time and ordered
additional parenting time by way of video. Defendant moved for a stay pending
appeal, which was denied.
The parties appeared for trial on April 10, 2024. The trial judge noted that
the day before, defendant filed a motion to recuse him. He declined to adjudicate
the motion because neither he nor plaintiff's attorney had the opportunity to
prepare for the motion. Therefore, the motion would be rescheduled. Even
though the judge reminded counsel the day was reserved for the trial, defendant's
counsel insisted on proceeding with the recusal motion and argued with him
about his ruling, talked over him, and ignored his entreaties to stop. Ultimately,
the judge made clear he would not hear the recusal motion at that instant and
would not adjourn trial on account of the motion. Both parties testified at trial
and plaintiff adduced ten exhibits into evidence.
On April 11, 2024, the trial judge ordered the matter to return
approximately a week later to decide the recusal motion and the issues presented
A-3026-23 9 during the trial. Pending the return, the judge enforced plaintiff's parenting time
under the July 14, 2023 order. The order also stated plaintiff could seek help
from police if defendant did not comply with parenting time.
The trial judge made oral findings on the recusal motion and issues raised
during the trial on April 17, 2024. Regarding the recusal, the judge noted he
received the motion the morning of the plenary hearing and declined to
adjudicate it then because the parties had at least two months' notice of the
hearing, and the motion could have been filed during that time. He was also
uncertain if plaintiff's counsel received the motion.
The judge observed the parties' case was difficult and marked by two prior
plenary hearings and numerous orders, which he had reviewed. He found the
defense made efforts to stop the plenary hearing by seeking his recusal and filing
an emergent appeal over the issue, which was denied. The judge concluded
there was no basis to grant the recusal under Rule 1:12-1 or the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
As for the best interests aspect of the trial, the judge found the issue was
not as defendant presented it; namely, "[w]hether . . . the child was taken to
Philadelphia against [c]ourt [o]rders, . . . [and] if that's established definitively[,]
that there is . . . some . . . fatal consequence as to [plaintiff]'s rights as a
A-3026-23 10 biological parent of the child." The judge noted defendant's allegations against
plaintiff that he had a criminal history, had abused his other child, and used
drugs were nothing new because she made these allegations throughout the five
years of litigation and during both prior plenary hearings.
According to the trial judge, the central issue was defendant's violation of
court-ordered parenting time. It was "clear in her testimony . . . she does not
want [plaintiff] to have any contact with the child and . . . is unilaterally
terminating the parental rights of" plaintiff. The judge found defendant had not
proven plaintiff violated the prohibition on taking the child out of state based on
the evidence she presented concerning the AirTag she planted. Plaintiff testified
"what actually happened was the child's sneakers were in the car[,] and his son
took the car and went to [plaintiff's home in] Philadelphia." The judge
concluded defendant's aim was to "get a [gotcha] moment in something that she
could bring back to court and argue that this would be a reason that the father
should not be permitted to see the child." This was defendant's "single . . .
mantra" during her testimony.
Along these lines, the trial judge accepted defendant's testimony the child
called from plaintiff's home in Philadelphia. However, the testimony showed
defendant's interest was less about the child's safety and more about "getting
A-3026-23 11 proof that [plaintiff] had taken the child to Philadelphia [because n]o law
enforcement was called, no effort was undertaken by [defendant] in this rather
. . . scary situation [where] the child called . . . and claimed that she was alone."
The judge reviewed the history of the litigation and listened to the audio
recordings of prior court proceedings. He found the prior court orders intended
plaintiff to have contact with the child and "both parents have quality time with
the child." Instead, the judge discerned a clear pattern, which was less about
plaintiff's ability to parent and more about defendant's intent to prevent him from
parenting.
The trial judge declined to modify custody but concluded there was a
change in circumstances warranting a modification and expansion of plaintiff's
parenting time because defendant "weaponized" the means the court previously
implemented to afford plaintiff parenting time. In addition to plaintiff's
weeknight of parenting time, the judge also ordered he would have one overnight
every other weekend at his home. The judge vacated the limitation on taking
the child to Philadelphia. He concluded this was the "only way . . . [plaintiff]
A-3026-23 12 would get quality time" with the child. The judge also noted the Division had
no safety concerns. 2
Given the pattern of defendant's conduct of ignoring court orders, the
judge expressly directed her to permit parenting time and ordered law
enforcement to assist in enforcement if she failed to comply. The judge ordered
parenting time would be expanded if defendant failed to comply with his order.
He also directed his order be given to the Camden County Prosecutor, which
was investigating defendant's interference with plaintiff's parenting time. The
judge entered an order memorializing his rulings on April 19, 2024.
I.
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because
of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433
N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
412 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of
the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by
or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice."'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
2 On January 4, 2024, the Division closed its investigation for neglect against both parties after concluding the allegations referred to it were unfounded . A-3026-23 13 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)).
A judge "shall be disqualified on the court's own motion and shall not sit
in any matter" when, among other things, "there is any other reason which might
preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably
lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). "It is unnecessary to
prove actual prejudice on the part of the court, but rather 'the mere appearance
of bias may require disqualification'" if the belief of unfairness is "objectively
reasonable." Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 67 (App. Div. 2001)
(quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997)).
However, a judge is not required to "withdraw from a case upon a mere
suggestion that [they are] disqualified 'unless the alleged cause of recusal is
known by [them] to exist or is shown to be true in fact.'" Id. at 66-67 (quoting
Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App.
Div. 1986)). The decision to recuse is "entrusted to the 'sound discretion' of the
trial judge whose recusal is sought." Id. at 66 (quoting Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J.
Super. 57, 63 (App. Div. 1990)).
II.
Defendant raises the following point on appeal:
A-3026-23 14 THE JUDGE'S COMMENTARY, TEMPERAMENT, AND DEMEANOR, AS WELL AS HIS APPLICATION OF INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD[]S DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF AN IMPARTIAL AND FAIR ADJUDICATION OF HER CLAIMS.
In support of her argument, defendant points us to the October 23, 2023
appearance before the trial judge, in which she claims, "[t]he [c]ourt was hasty,
critical and aggressive with [defendant,] which contrasted with the [c]ourt's
sympathetic and empathetic demeanor towards plaintiff's counsel." She asserts
the judge demonstrated bias by not adjudicating a dispute in fact; namely,
"whether or not the child was left alone and frightened in Pennsylvania."
At the outset, we note the October 2023 hearing did not result in the entry
of an order. Even if it did, defendant's notice of appeal does not designate the
October hearing as an event she is contesting on appeal. It is "only the
judgments, orders[,] or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal [which]
are subject to the appeal process and review." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.
Court Rules, cmt. 5.1 on R. 2:5-1(f)(1) (2025).
Notwithstanding the fact the October 2023 proceeding is not before us on
appeal, our review of the transcript of that proceeding does not support
defendant's assertions the trial judge favored plaintiff over defendant and was
hasty. The transcript shows the judge permitted defendant's counsel the lion's
A-3026-23 15 share of the argument. She recounted the entire history of the case at length and
articulated her client's claims against plaintiff with little or no interruption.
Indeed, measured by the number of transcript pages alone, defendant argued her
cause for approximately twenty-seven pages whereas plaintiff's argument
spanned approximately sixteen pages.
The trial judge concluded the hearing without making a decision because
he ran out of time and ordered the matter to be relisted—not out of haste or
favoritism. Moreover, as a matter of law, a plenary hearing was necessary to
adjudicate the issues presented in defendant's motion. See Hand v. Hand, 391
N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) ("A plenary hearing is required when the
submissions show there is a genuine and substantial factual dispute regarding
the welfare of the children, and the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing
is necessary to resolve the factual dispute.").
Defendant next points us to the December 1, 2023 appearance as evidence
of reversible error. She regurgitates portions of the transcript from that hearing,
during which her attorney argued plaintiff should face consequences for
allegedly taking the child out of state in violation of court orders , and recounts
the judge's response that he did not view the alleged violation in a similar light.
A-3026-23 16 Defendant claims the judge acted inappropriately when he refused to grant a stay
pending appeal.
We are unconvinced the judge committed reversible error. As we
recounted, the issue of defendant's alleged violation was a trial issue. Arguably,
the judge would be pre-judging the issue if he granted defendant enforcement
where there was a material dispute of fact.
Moreover, defendant was not prevented from seeking emergent appellate
review. The record shows she filed separate motions for leave to appeal from
the February 21, 2024 and April 11, 2024 orders. She also filed an emergent
appellate application for a stay in April 2024. We denied the emergent
application on the merits, in part, because defendant did not demonstrate
irreparable harm. Thereafter, defendant withdrew the motions for leave to
appeal.
Defendant argues we should stay or reverse all orders entered since
December 1, 2023. Again, we are limited to addressing the orders set forth in
her notice of appeal. Therefore, we do not address the December 19, 2023 order.
In regard to the three orders on appeal, we discern no misapplication of
the facts or law warranting our intervention. Aside from a dissatisfaction with
A-3026-23 17 the trial judges' rulings, defendant has not convinced us the denial of the recusal
motion was an abuse of discretion.
Defendant's certification in support of her recusal motion purportedly set
forth the reasons why the judge should recuse. Her certification pointed to the
October 2023 hearing, which we have already stated was a fair proceeding. She
also certified the December 1, 2023 hearing was another example of bias, but
our review of the record of that proceeding simply does not support this
conclusion.
Defendant also certified the court did not permit her attorney to speak ,
belittled her, and did not adjudicate her order to show cause when the parties
appeared to argue it on January 29, 2024. Our review of the transcript from that
appearance shows the opposite. Not only was defendant's attorney able to
present her arguments, but she often talked over the judge in a confrontational
manner. The judge repeatedly reminded defendant's counsel the issues raised in
defendant's order to show cause, specifically regarding plaintiff's alleged
violation, would be addressed at the plenary hearing; nevertheless, counsel
continued to argue the court should decide the issue. Defendant's certification
and her claims on appeal conflate the judge's exasperation over her attorney's
behavior with bias.
A-3026-23 18 Finally, as the judge explained, it was implicit in his granting plaintiff's
order to show cause to enforce parenting time that defendant's order to show
cause to find plaintiff in violation of a parenting time order was denied. He did
not need to make separate, formal findings as to why defendant's application
was denied; it was evident.
In sum, the record bears no evidence of impartiality or bias. On the
contrary, it shows the judge did his best to control rancorous hearings, lengthy
and repetitive arguments by counsel, and disputation of his rulings by counsel.
To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on appeal, it is because
it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3026-23 19