Lowry v. Cobb

9 La. Ann. 592
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedDecember 15, 1854
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 9 La. Ann. 592 (Lowry v. Cobb) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lowry v. Cobb, 9 La. Ann. 592 (La. 1854).

Opinion

Slidell, C. J.

We refer to the cases of Cobb v. Parham, 4 An. 148, and Parham & Lowry v. Cobb, 7 An., for a more minute detail of the origin of a litigation of which the present suit is a sequel. By a reference to those cases, it will be found that Lowry and Mrs. Cobb were joint proprietors of a large estate called the Buckhorn plantation; that they quarrelled, and after an acrimonious litigation, submitted their differences to arbitrators, clothed with the authority of amicable compounders; that those arbitrators made a very discreet and equitable award, by which both proprietors were divested, for a stated time, of the control of the estate, a receiver was appointed, and a judicious system of administration prescribed, which, if undisturbed, would have probably resulted to the great advantage of both parties; that Mrs. Cobb and husband, flagrantly violated the award, usurped the administration of the common estate, and appropriated its revenues to their own use.

Soon after this unjustifiable breach of the award, we find Mrs. Cobb and her husband, confessing a judgment in favor of a mortgage creditor, who, until then, it would seem, was satisfied with the receivorship, and willing to look to the application of the revenues of the estate in the manner prescribed by the award. The result of this confession was a sale, in 1849, of a large portion of the estate by the Sheriff. It was adjudicated to Moraney, on twelve months’ eredit, at $41,775.

It appears that Moraney was a friend and connection of Lowry, and that he and two other persons interested in this purchase, have an understanding with Lowry, to convey the interest thus acquired to him, upon reimbursement of [593]*593the amount paid, and it may be inferred from the evidence, that this understanding existed at the time of the Sheriff’s sale; and one of the questions most urgently presented in argument for the defendants is, whether they have a right to treat this purchase as one made by Lowry and inuring to the benefit of the partnership.

It is true, as asserted by the defendants, that a partner has not a right to prefer his own interest to that of the firm, nor deprive the partnership of a profitable bargain, by taking it to his own account. The doctrine is obviously deducible from the nature of the contract of partnership, on entering into which, the partner promises to his associates his efforts for the common benefit. This promise he would violate, by seeking his individual advantage to that of the partnership. Hence, the books abound in cases where a partner who, ■while his relations as such existed, has stipulated clandestinely for any private benefit to himself, has been compelled to divide such gains with his associates. But we conceive that the circumstances of the present case do not fall within the rule, and that by her own inequitable conduct the defendant excluded herself from its application. Lowry had faithfully submitted to the award, by which the partnership property was placed under the administration of Par-ham, the receiver, and which award Mrs. Gobb was bound, by every consideration of partnership and moral duty, to respect. Without any just cause, she and her husband wrested the possession from Parham, diverted to their own use the crops which had been sacredly appropriated to purposes vitally necessary to the protection of the partnership interests, awakened the distrust of an important creditor ; and occasioned, if not invited, a forced sale by this creditor of the partnership estate under his mortgage. When Loiory thus saw his own ruin impending by the bad faith of his co-proprietor, who had thus flagrantly violated the compact for their common preservation, the instinct of self-defence necessarily compelled him to seek the assistance of his friends; and having sheltered himself in some degree, through their interposition, from the calamity which would otherwise have crushed him, the promoter of the mischief has no equity to share that shelter with him. A contrary doctrine would hold out to bad faith the chance of a successful wrong, with a certainty of impunity in case of failure.

It is said that on the day of sale, Gobb offered arrangements to which, if Lowry, had acceded, a sale in block could have been avoided, a better price realized, and further indulgence from the creditors gained. But the .evidence satisfies us, that Gobi was not prepared to carry out these arrangements, if Lowry had acceded ; and certainly Lowry’s experience was not such as to authorize him to entertain the propositions with any confidence that they would be fulfilled by his adversaries.

We conclude, therefore, that the defendant -was not entitled to share in the benefit of the stipulation made by Morancy and his associates in favor of Lowry.

With regard to the damages claimed by Lowry for the divestiture of his title, by the judicial sale, to pay Mrs. Gobbs' debt, we think his estimate of them exaggerated. The property was not bought by a stranger, but by his own friends, acting through Morancy, who stand ready to reinvest him with the legal title, whenever he shall repay their advances for his benefit. This is conclusively shown by their intervention in this cause, and by the testimony of Morancy and others. At the samo time, his position as owner of the mere [594]*594equitable title, instead of the title in his own name which he previously held, involves some disadvantages which we think it our duty to take into account.

We have also to allow in the balance we are to ascertain, the sum of $2,101 97, being amount of balance ascertained by the award of the arbitrators, which should bear interest at six per cent, from 11th of March, 1847.

Also, one half of proceeds of the crop of 1847, appropriated by Pa/rham to the payment of Mrs. Gobb’s debt, to Burlce, Watt & Go., and Hynes, to wit, $8,289 74, to the former, and $400 to the latter, the one-half is $4,344 67, which should bear interest at six per cent, from the 1st of Pebruar}!-, 1848.

We have also in the estimate of Lowry's damages, taken into consideration the expensive, and vexatious litigation in which he was involved by the wrongful injunction suit. It will be observed, that with regard to the suits on the the appeal bond and the injunction bond, we have treated the damages there allowed, as compensating for the share of Lowry in the crop of 1848, appropriated by Mrs. Gobb to her own use.

There is some obscurity perhaps in the award with regard to an item of $14,000, appropriated to the payment of the debt to Burk, Watt & Go., for one-half of which credit is claimed by Lowry. Our conclusion is, that this was taken into consideration by the arbitrators, and allowed before striking the balance of $2,101 in favor of Lowry. If otherwise, we are at a loss to understand why the arbitrators should have made no provision for securing it by mortgage, nor for the rate of interest upon it.

The claim of Lowry for the one-half of the crop of 1848, is disposed of in another suit, No. 3007, of the docket of this court; but provision for its payment in the partition will be made in this decree.

As to the credits to which Mrs. Oobb's

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Bluebook (online)
9 La. Ann. 592, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lowry-v-cobb-la-1854.