Lower Sioux Indian Community v. United States

163 Ct. Cl. 329, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 148, 1963 WL 8496
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 13, 1963
DocketAppeal No. 6-62
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 163 Ct. Cl. 329 (Lower Sioux Indian Community v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lower Sioux Indian Community v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 329, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 148, 1963 WL 8496 (cc 1963).

Opinions

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court;

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Indian Claims Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commis[331]*331sion), entered January 12,1962, wherein the Commission determined the boundaries of the area of land in which the Medawakanton Band of Sioux Indians (hereinafter referred to as the Sioux), had a compensable interest as of September 29,1837. The appeal is directed to the exclusion by the Commission of approximately 800,000 acres from the area ceded by the Sioux to the United States by the Treaty of September 29,1837 (7 Stat. 538).

The Commission held that the Sioux had recognized title to the area ceded but ruled that the aforementioned 800,000 acres were not a part of the cession.1 Finding 35, 10 Ind. Cls. Comm. 159, 186-7.

The Commission’s exclusion of the 800,000 acres turned on its concept of the location of the eastern boundary of the 1837 cession. The appellants relied on the delimitation of the 1837 cession as shown by Royce in Indian Land Cessions in the United States, H. R. Doc. No. 736, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1899), Bureau of American Ethnology, 18th Annual Report. The Commission found that Royce had “not accurately depicted” the line and substituted a straight line, thus cutting off approximately the eastern one-fifth of the cession as shown by Royce. The area excluded by the Commission is hereinafter referred to as the “Black River Area.” The basis for the Commission’s finding was that the language of Article 5 of the Treaty of Prairie du Chien of 1825 (7 Stat. 272), delineating the eastern boundary of the Sioux, was clear and unambiguous. Finding 35,10 Ind. Cls. Comm. 137, 159. The Commission then determined that on the evidence presented the Sioux did not have aboriginal title to said area by reason of exclusive use and occupancy from time immemorial until the date of the cession in 1837. Finding 38,10 Ind. Cls. Comm. 137, 160.

Two questions are presented by this appeal: First, whether the Commission was correct in its finding that the Black Biver Area was not included in the definition of Sioux coun[332]*332try under the Treaty of 1825, supra. Second, whether the judgment of the Commission that the Sioux did not own the Black River Area by Indian title was supported by the findings and by substantial evidence.

The appellants first contend that the Black River Area was a part of the Sioux country defined and recognized by the 1825 Treaty heretofore alluded to. Secondly, appellants claim aboriginal title to said area.

Appellee, on the other hand, contends that the Commission was correct in its interpretation of Article 5 of the Treaty of 1825, and that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the Sioux did not have Indian title to the Black River Area.

We need not decide the question whether the finding of the Commission that the Sioux did not have aboriginal title is supported by substantial evidence, since we hold that as a matter of law the Commission erred in interpreting Article 5 of the Treaty of 1825, and that the area in question is defined and recognized as part of the Sioux country by said treaty.

In making its determination that Article 5, delineating the eastern boundary of the Sioux, excluded the Black River Area in its definition of Sioux country, the Commission stated that “the language is clear and unambiguous in this regard.” We disagree.

Article 5 of the 1825 Treaty in pertinent part provides:

* * * The eastern boundary of the Sioux commences opposite the mouth of Ioway river, on the Mississippi, runs back two or three miles to the bluffs, follows the bluffs, crossing Bad axe river, to the mouth of Blade river, and from Blade river to half a day’s march below the Falls of the Chippewa River, [emphasis added] 7 Stat. 272, 273 (1825).

The Commission determined that the language of Article 5 clearly meant that the line commences at the mouth of Black River and follows a straight line from the mouth of Black River to the terminal point below Chippewa Falls. But it is noted that Article 5 does not read “and from the mouth of Black river to * * A careful reading of the article in question clearly indicates that there is an am[333]*333biguity regarding tbe point on the Black River from which the eastern boundary of the Sioux runs to the terminal point below Chippewa Falls. Thus, Article 5, contrary to the Commission’s finding, is not clear or unambiguous.

In this posture, we believe it necessary to first review the history and purpose of the 1825 Treaty in an effort to determine the intent thereof. We say this in the light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in the case of United States v. American Trucking Association, 310 U.S. 534 (1940), wherein the Court stated, at pages 543-544:

* * * When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one “plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole” this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no “rule of law” which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on “superficial examination.” [Footnotes omitted.]

A determination of the intent of the Treaty is in harmony with this court’s opinion in The Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 725, 740; 281 F. 2d 202, 210-211 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924, wherein the court stated:

We must seek to give this treaty provision a meaning which will give effect to all of its language. “It is a rule, in construing treaties as well as laws, to give a sensible meaning to all their provisions if that be practicable.” Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 270, 10 S. Ct. 295, 298, 33 L.Ed. 642. “Now, it is the duty of courts of justice so to construe all statutes as to give full effect to all the words in their ordinary sense, if this can properly be done; and thus to preserve the harmony of all the provisions.” Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Pet. 263, 272, 10 L.Ed. 154. All words of a statute are to be taken into account and given effect if that can be done consistently with the plainly disclosed legislative intent. McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 266, 59 S. Ct. 176, 83 L.Ed. 164.

The Treaty of August 19, 1825, commonly called the “Treaty of Prairie des Chiens” or “Prairie du Chien,” was [334]*334the result of continuous warfare among the tribes of the Upper Mississippi region. The warring tribes were assembled at Prairie des Chiens and a treaty was entered into establishing boundaries among them in an attempt to remove the cause of their hostilities. The preamble of the treaty clearly bears this out:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wolfchild v. Redwood County
112 F. Supp. 3d 866 (D. Minnesota, 2015)
United States v. Lower Sioux Indian Community
519 F.2d 1378 (Court of Claims, 1975)
Sioux Tribe v. United States
500 F.2d 458 (Court of Claims, 1974)
Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indians v. United States
391 F.2d 614 (Court of Claims, 1967)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
163 Ct. Cl. 329, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 148, 1963 WL 8496, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lower-sioux-indian-community-v-united-states-cc-1963.