Lovett v. Camden County Safety Complex

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedDecember 9, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00059
StatusUnknown

This text of Lovett v. Camden County Safety Complex (Lovett v. Camden County Safety Complex) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lovett v. Camden County Safety Complex, (S.D. Ga. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION

LAZARUS LOVETT,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:20-cv-59

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY SAFETY COMPLEX, et al.,

Defendants.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. This matter is before the Court for a frivolity screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Defendant Camden Safety Complex. However, I FIND that some of Plaintiff’s claims may proceed. Specifically, the Court will direct service of the following claims by separate Order: Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to a hazardous condition against Defendants Proctor, Mastrolanni, Watson, Phillips, Malone, Cummings, Thomas, Christy, and Williams; and Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Tiffany for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS1 Plaintiff brings claims under § 1983 against various Defendants for injuries incurred when the bed he was assigned collapsed and the lack of medical attention he received following

1 All allegations set forth here are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Doc. 1. During frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[t]he complaint’s factual allegations must be accepted as true.” Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). the collapse. Doc. 1. Plaintiff claims Defendants Proctor, Mastrolanni, Watson, Phillips, Malone, Cummings, Thomas, Christly, and Williams knew the bed he was assigned at Defendant Camden County Safety Complex was dangerous and failed to warn him of that danger. Id. at 6. Plaintiff questioned Defendants Christy and Williams about the bed’s condition when it was

assigned to him, and Defendants Christy and Williams did not assign Plaintiff a different bed or otherwise correct the situation, despite Plaintiff’s question and their knowledge that the bed had previously collapsed. Id. When Plaintiff was lying on the top bunk reading, it collapsed, throwing him off the top bunk. Id. at 7. As a result, Plaintiff sustained injuries, including an injury to the back of his head. Id. Though Plaintiff was bleeding, he did not receive treatment from Defendant Tiffany for the head wound and had to stop the bleeding with his hand. Id. at 6, 7. Plaintiff is suing all Defendants in their individual capacities for monetary damages. Id. at 2– 3, 5. STANDARD OF REVIEW A federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of all complaints filed by

prisoners and plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(a). During the initial screening, the court must identify any cognizable claims in the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Additionally, the court must dismiss the complaint (or any portion of the complaint) that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). A claim is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)). In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a claim, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. DISCUSSION A plaintiff must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him “of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a

plaintiff must allege the act or omission was committed by “a person acting under color of state law.” Id. State agencies, penal institutions, and private corporations which contract with states to operate penal institutions are generally not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). The issue of whether a government entity is capable of being sued is “determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b); accord Lawal v. Fowler, 196 F. App’x 765, 768 (11th Cir. 2006). Under Georgia law, only three classes of legal entities are capable of being named in a lawsuit: “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue.” Id. (citing Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 368 S.E.2d 500 (Ga. 1988)). Camden County Safety Complex is a building and is, therefore, not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show he is entitled to relief against this Defendant. Accordingly, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS

Defendant Camden County Safety Complex. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Defendant Camden Safety Complex. However, I FIND some of Plaintiff’s claims may proceed. Specifically, the Court will direct service of the following claims by separate Order: Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to a hazardous condition against Defendants Proctor, Mastrolanni, Watson, Phillips, Malone, Cummings, Thomas, Christy, and Williams; and Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Tiffany for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

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Related

Abiola K. Lawal v. Raymond Fowler
196 F. App'x 765 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Bilal v. Driver
251 F.3d 1346 (Eleventh Circuit, 2001)
Louis Napier v. Karen J. Preslicka
314 F.3d 528 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Grech v. Clayton County, GA
335 F.3d 1326 (Eleventh Circuit, 2003)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
McNeil v. United States
508 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County
368 S.E.2d 500 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1988)
Adam Keith Waldman v. Alabama Prison Commissioner
871 F.3d 1283 (Eleventh Circuit, 2017)
Hale v. Tallapoosa County
50 F.3d 1579 (Eleventh Circuit, 1995)

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Lovett v. Camden County Safety Complex, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lovett-v-camden-county-safety-complex-gasd-2020.