Loverkamp v. Loverkamp

45 N.E.2d 871, 381 Ill. 467
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 17, 1942
DocketNo. 26916. Reversed and remanded.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 45 N.E.2d 871 (Loverkamp v. Loverkamp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loverkamp v. Loverkamp, 45 N.E.2d 871, 381 Ill. 467 (Ill. 1942).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in an ejectment suit in the circuit court of Massac county. The chain of title, under which the respective parties claim, runs to a common source in Charles Redmeier, Jr. On and prior to December 5, 1916, Redmeier owned other lands and the north half of the northeast quarter of section twenty-four, township fifteen in said county. On that date, he and his wife conveyed by warranty deed the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of said section twenty-four to his son Henry. Plaintiff’s chain of title is as follows: Charles Redmeier, Jr., to Henry Redmeier, he to Charles Loverkamp, and Charles Loverkamp to plaintiff. Defendant’s chain of title is Charles Redmeier, Jr., by descent to Emma Redmeier, his widow, Henry Redmeier, a son, and Lena Dummeier, a daughter, and they to defendant, Lester Loverlcamp. All of the conveyances in plaintiff’s chain of title described the tract conveyed as the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter and all the deeds in defendant’s chain of title described the land conveyed as the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter.

A public highway enters the northeast quarter. on the north line at or near the dividing line between the northwest quarter and the northeast quarter of said quarter section and extends due south six chains and then in a southwesterly direction intersecting the south line of the north half of the northeast quarter and then on south. The divergence of the road from a north and south line creates a triangular-shaped tract containing three and one-half acres, which is the tract involved in this litigation. The cause was tried before the court without a jury and resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of defendant.

The complaint contained two counts, the first of which alleged defendant unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff possession of the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter, etc. Count 2 alleged defendant unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff a certain parcel of land described, to-wit:

“All that portion of the Northwest one-fourth (J4) of the Northeast Quarter (J4) of Section No. Twenty-four (24) Township Fifteen (15) South, Range Five (5) East of the Third Principal Meridian, in Massac County, Illinois, which lies East, Southeasterly and South of the public road that runs through said forty acre tract, as the same now exists, containing Three and One Half (3.5) acres, more or less; said parcel of ground being more particularly described; A parcel of ground described as follows:
Beginning Six (6) chains South of the Northeast corner of the Northwest one-fourth (J4) of the Northeast Quarter (%) of Section Twenty-four (24), in Township Fifteen (15) South, Range Five (5) East of the Third Principal Meridian, on the East side of the public highway; thence South 86° 30' East to the southeast corner of the Northwest one-fourth (J4) of the Northeast one-fourth (¿4) of the aforesaid section, Township and Range; thence West 87° East to the public road; thence in a Northeasterly direction, along the public road to the place of beginning, being 3.5 acres, more or less.”

Defendant’s answer traversed the allegations of unlawful withholding in both counts. Defendant’s special defense number one alleged he was possessed of and claimed to be the owner of all of the north one-half of the northeast quarter lying east of the public road, and pleaded adverse possession under the twenty-year Statute of Limitations. Defendant’s special defense number two, filed after the evidence was heard and the cause argued orally, alleged the defendant claimed to own all of the north one-half of the northeast quarter lying east of the public road and alleged that the dividing line between the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter was fixed by agreement of Charles Redmeier and Henry Redmeier, which agreement was made when Charles Redmeier sold the land to Henry in 1916, and that by said agreement the public road marked the dividing line between the two tracts. Defendant claimed he was the owner of all of the north one-half located east of the roadway by virtue of said agreement and twenty years’ adverse possession by him and his predecessors in title. Plaintiff traversed the material facts in both of defendant’s special defenses.

Defendant introduced the evidence .of Emma Redmeier, the widow of Charles Redmeier, Jr., deceased, Henry Redmeier, a son, and Nora Redmeier, Henry’s wife. The evidence of these witnesses tended to prove that a few days prior to the execution of the deed from Charles Redmeier and wife to Henry Redmeier, December 5, 1916, Henry Redmeier and Charles Redmeier, Jr., agreed that the road right-of-way should be the dividing line between the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter. Plaintiff objected to the introduction of such evidence and now urges its admission and consideration as grounds for reversal. Defendant offered the evidence on the theory that whenever a boundary line between adjoining owners of land is unascertained or in dispute, the parties may establish it by parol agreement and possession in pursuance of that agreement, and contends that when a line is so established it will be binding on the parties and their privies.

It is well established that the rule sought to be invoked by defendant cannot be applied unless at least one of two conditions exists, namely: there must be a dispute between the adjoining owners as to the location of the line, or that the line has not been ascertained. (Jones v. Scott, 314 Ill. 118; Marks v. Madsen, 261 id. 51; Purtie v. Bell, 225 id. 523.) The application of the rule is limited to the establishment of a disputed line or the locating of an unascertained line. Jones v. Scott, supra.

The line between the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter was not marked by government survey but that survey showed witness marks and monuments by which the location of boundary lines of the whole northeast quarter could be readily located. The boundary line of the northeast quarter being thus determined, it was a simple matter to determine the location of the lines between the quarters of the northeast quarter. For many years prior to December 5, 1916, Charles Redmeier, Jr., owned the whole of the north half of the quarter and he did not establish the line between the two forties. He constructed fences on either side of the road disregarding the location of any of the quarter-quarter lines. Consequently, when he and Henry had their conversation a few days prior to the execution of the deed relative to the location of the line, no dispute had then arisen as to its location.

The elements of the second condition under which the rule can be applied were not present. Appellee contends the evidence of the surveyor and others leaves a doubt as to whether the road right-of-way was on the quarter-quarter line for the first six chains south from the north line of the quarter. The evidence as to the location of the public road on the quarter section to the north and the evidence of the surveyor is convincing that the roadway is on the quarter-quarter line for that distance.

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Bluebook (online)
45 N.E.2d 871, 381 Ill. 467, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/loverkamp-v-loverkamp-ill-1942.