Lovelady v. State

2 Tex. L. R. 370
Texas Supreme Court·Decided October 15, 1883·Published

Opinion

Opinion by

Willson, J.

1. It was not error to permit the State’s witness, Dr. Skeen to answer the hypothetical question propounded to him by the district attorney. That question was as follows : “Suppose that a person should strike another on the back of the head, at the place described by you, when the skin was off the size of a dollar, with the large end of an iron wedge sufficently hard to tear off the skin, and open the wound to the skull and produce a wound down the back of the neck several inches long, so that the blood would settle there, would such a blow produce death ?” The witness answered as follows : “Of course such a blow would produce death instantle. As this particular portion of the cranium is the seat of life, a concussion here will injure the spinal column and produce paralysis and death.” It was objected to the question that it was hypothetical, and not based upon a state of facts already in evidence;and that it did not involve a question of science or skill such as would warrant the admission in evidence of the opinion of the witness. In putting'hypothetical questions to an expert witness counsel may assume the facts in accordance with his theory of them; it is not essen[371] tial that he state the facts to the witness as they have been proved. Guiterman et. al., vs Liverpool etc., St. Ship Co., 83 N. Y., 358. Conley vs. The People, Id., 464; 1 Greenl. Ev., 440.

Of course, as stated by Mr. Wharton, if the', facts on which the hypothesis is based fall, the answer falls also. Whar. Cr. Ev. 418. Nor would it be a proper practice to allow hypothetical questions having no foundation whatever, in the evidence in the case. In the case at bar, the witness was shown to be a medical expert, and it was further shown that there was a severe wound upon the back of the deceased’s head, which could have been inflicted with an iron wedge, and that an iron wedge was found near the body of the deceased shortly after her death. We cannot say that the hypothetical question objected to, had no foundation in the evidence in the case. It was the theory of the prosecution that deceased was killed by a blow inflicted upon the back of her head with an iron wedge in the hands of the defendant, and it was proper to permit, this theory to be supported by the hypothetical question objected to. As to the other objection to the question, it is also untenabl e This precise question is discussed and settled in Waite vs. State, 13 Tex., Ct., App., 168, in which case the authorities in support of the admissibility of such evidence is cited.

11. We now approach the principal and most difficult question in the case. It is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Is it of that cogent, satisfactory and convincing character which the law demands to sustain a conviction of crime ? It is unnecessary for us to recapitulate the rules of law in regard to the nature, strength,sufficiency &c.,of circumstantial evidence. They have been so ofceu and so fully stated and explained in previous decisions, that we need only refer to the case of Pogne vs. State 12 Tex., Ct., App., 283, where the authorities upon the subject will be found cited. In prosecutions for murder the State must establish clearly and satisfactorily the corpus delicti. This corpus delicti consists of two things; first, a criminal act; and second, the defendant’s agency in the commission of such act. Thus is the case at bar the burden of proof was upon the prosecution to establish first, that Anna Lovelady was dead; that her death was not the result of accident or natural causes; and second, that defendant committed the act which produced her death. Whar. Cr. Ev., Sec. 325; 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. Sec. 1056.

Mr. Wharton says ; “It has been already stated that the corpus [372] delicti includes two things; first the objective, and then the subjective elements of criminality; in other words; first, that the overt act took place; secondly, that it took place through criminal agency. Of homicide therefore it must be held essential to a conviction, first, that the deceased should be shown to have been killed; and secondly, that this killing should have been proved to have been criminally caused. And on the well known principle that in capital cases this criminal agency, of the defendant cannot be proved on his confession alone, without proof of the corpus delicti, it must not only be shown, to justify a conviction in such case, that the deceased was dead, but that her death was criminally produced. Unless the corpus delicti in both of these respects is proved, a confession is not by itself enough to sustain a conviction.” Whar., on Horn., Sec , G41. It is perfectly competent to establish tha corpus delicti by circumstantial evidence, (1 Bish., Crim. Pro., 1057;) but as is well said by Mr. Bishop; “Special care should be exercised as to the corpus delicti, and there should be no conviction where this part of the case is not proved with particular clearness and certainty.”. 1 Bish. Cr. Pro. Section 1059.

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Related

Guiterman v. Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia Steamship Co.
83 N.Y. 358 (New York Court of Appeals, 1881)